Peter Connelly

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a minor complainant, arguing the trial judge failed to properly assess the complainant's evidence and ignored contradictory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inconsistencies in the evidence were not so significant as to require specific mention by the trial judge, and that the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonable.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and other offences arising from the confinement and fatal beating of the deceased.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of a witness's prior statement to police under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule, the jury instructions on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, and several other aspects of the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the witness's statement was properly admitted under both the traditional past recollection recorded criteria and the principled approach to hearsay, and that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were adequate and correct in law.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed himself on the law and that his findings of fact were supported by the evidence, making the convictions reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial because it could not be certain from the trial judge's reasons that the defences of reflex response or self-defence were properly addressed.

The appellants appealed jury convictions and sought to adduce fresh evidence that a knife said at trial to belong to one appellant was actually the victim's knife dropped at the scene.

The Crown conceded the fresh evidence justified a new trial for one appellant, but argued it was not admissible or decisive for the other under the Palmer criteria.

The court held the Crown's joint venture theory and the way the knife evidence was used at trial bound the appellants together for purposes of the fresh evidence analysis.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered for both appellants.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder after the victim was brutally beaten and robbed in an underground parking garage.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred by excluding out-of-court statements from a deceased third party who had confessed to the murder, by misdirecting the jury on reasonable doubt, and by misdirecting the jury on the elements of first-degree murder based on unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the third party's hearsay statements lacked threshold reliability, the reasonable doubt instruction was adequate, and unlawful confinement in the course of a robbery can provide the basis for first-degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misused evidence of after-the-fact conduct, failed to find consciousness of innocence from his offer to take a polygraph test, misapplied the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and misapprehended material evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected all grounds, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The seven appellants were convicted of trafficking in heroin following an undercover police operation.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the 44.5-month delay between their charges and trial violated their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal agreed with respect to six of the appellants, finding the delay was largely systemic and caused prejudice, and ordered a stay of proceedings for those six.

The appeal of the seventh appellant, who was arrested much later, was dismissed on all grounds, including arguments regarding the destruction of police notes, jury instructions, and sentence fitness.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to apply to strike his guilty plea after learning of a second DNA test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that counsel had informed the appellant of the test and its significance.

The court held that counsel's decision not to seek to set aside the plea was within the bounds of competency, as the second DNA test would have had minimal impact given the strong independent evidence confirming the complainant's testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence of two years less one day.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider evidence supporting his claim that he was an innocent bystander and erred in relying on the identification evidence of a specific witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment of the evidence was reasonable and supported by the record.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the unprovoked, racially motivated, and gang-related machete attack warranted the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the credibility of a jailhouse informant and arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on intoxication, the common sense inference of intent, and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence would not have affected the verdict and that the jury instructions, read as a whole, did not contain reversible errors.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had stayed proceedings against several young offenders due to unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the time required for an application to transfer a young offender to adult court is part of the inherent time requirements of a case under the Young Offenders Act.

Applying the Morin framework, the Court found the delay was not unreasonable and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal to dispose of the remaining issues.

The respondents were convicted of attempted murder after an accomplice shot a convenience store clerk during an armed robbery.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the respondents could be convicted as parties under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code if they knew or ought to have known that the shooting was a probable consequence of the robbery.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the principles of fundamental justice require subjective foresight of death to convict a principal of attempted murder, the same minimum degree of mens rea is constitutionally required to convict a party.

The objective foreseeability component ('ought to have known') in s. 21(2) violates s. 7 of the Charter and cannot be justified under s. 1 in cases where subjective foresight is constitutionally required.

The appeal was dismissed.