Le Dain

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers applied to the Canada Labour Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for employees of Alberta Government Telephones (AGT).

The Board assumed jurisdiction, finding AGT to be a federal undertaking and not immune from the Canada Labour Code.

The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that while AGT is an interprovincial undertaking within federal jurisdiction under s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867, it is a provincial Crown agent and therefore immune from the Canada Labour Code.

The Court found no clear Parliamentary intention to bind the provincial Crown in the Code, and AGT did not waive its immunity by its conduct.

The appellant was charged with the murder of four infants and discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

She sued the Crown, the Attorney General, and police officers for malicious prosecution.

The respondents moved to strike the claim on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Crown itself enjoys absolute immunity under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, the Attorney General and Crown Attorneys do not enjoy absolute immunity at common law from suits for malicious prosecution.

The Court found that public policy does not justify absolute immunity where a prosecutor acts maliciously in fraud of their duties.

The appellant sought to appeal a decision dismissing his application to set aside wiretap authorizations (a Wilson application).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no right of appeal from a Wilson application and that the Charter does not guarantee such a right, for the reasons given concurrently in R. v. Meltzer.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to traffic in narcotics.

At trial, wiretap evidence was excluded under s. 178.16(2) of the Criminal Code, resulting in acquittals.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

Before the new trial, the appellants applied to set aside the wiretap authorizations (a Wilson application).

The application was dismissed, and the Court of Appeal held it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no right of appeal from a Wilson application, the Charter does not guarantee such an appeal, and the issue of post-arrest wiretaps must be dealt with at trial.

The appellant sought to set aside the renewal of an authorization to intercept private communications (a 'Wilson' application) to prevent the admission of wiretap evidence.

The petition was dismissed, and the Court of Appeal declined to hear an appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a review of an authorization is a criminal matter, that there is no need to reconsider Wilson v. The Queen, and that the Charter does not create a right to an interlocutory appeal where none exists in law.

The appellant sought a patent for a new soybean variety developed through artificial cross-breeding.

The Commissioner of Patents and the Federal Court of Appeal rejected the application.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the appellant failed to meet the disclosure requirements under s. 36(1) of the Patent Act.

The specification did not adequately describe the steps involved in the cross-breeding process to allow a person skilled in the art to reproduce the invention.

The Court further held that merely depositing a sample of the seeds did not satisfy the statutory disclosure requirement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were arrested without warrants and released the same day.

Eight months later, they were formally charged with theft and conspiracy.

At trial, the judge quashed the indictment due to unreasonable pre-charge delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal vacated the order, holding that pre-charge delay is not considered under s. 11(b).

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, ruling that a person is 'charged with an offence' within the meaning of s. 11(b) only when an information is sworn or an indictment is laid, meaning pre-charge delay is irrelevant to the s. 11(b) analysis.

The respondents, parents of a diabetic child, withheld his prescribed insulin due to their religious belief in faith healing, resulting in the child's death.

They were convicted of manslaughter by criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial due to errors in the jury charge regarding the burden of proof.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the order for a new trial.

The Court split on the appropriate test for criminal negligence under s. 202 of the Criminal Code, with half favouring an objective standard and half favouring a subjective standard requiring advertence to the risk.

The appellant, after consuming alcohol, drove his vehicle into a hayride, killing four people and injuring a fifth.

At trial, he was acquitted of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, but convicted of dangerous driving, after the trial judge instructed the jury that criminal negligence required a subjective 'deliberate and wilful assumption of the risk'.

The Crown successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, which ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the trial judge's instruction placed too high an onus on the Crown, though the Court split on whether the proper test for criminal negligence is purely objective or requires a minimal subjective intent.

The appellant and a co-accused were originally tried jointly and convicted of first degree murder.

A new trial was ordered, but prior to the second trial, the co-accused pleaded guilty to second degree murder and accepted a statement of facts indicating his footprints were at the scene.

At the appellant's second trial, the defence intended to call a footprint expert who had testified at the first trial that the footprints were not the co-accused's.

The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine the defence expert on whether the co-accused's guilty plea and admission would change his opinion.

The defence consequently did not call the expert, and the appellant was convicted.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that an expert cannot be cross-examined on facts that are not and will become part of the admissible evidence.

The appellant employer dismissed the respondent employee.

An adjudicator found the dismissal unjust and ordered the employer to provide a letter of recommendation with specified factual content and to answer any reference inquiries exclusively by sending that letter.

The employer appealed, arguing the orders infringed its freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter applies to administrative adjudicators.

The Court found that both the positive order to write the letter and the negative order restricting further comments infringed s. 2(b) but were saved under s. 1 as reasonable limits designed to counteract the consequences of the unjust dismissal.

The appellants, pregnant employees of the respondent, were denied weekly benefits under the respondent's group insurance plan during a seventeen-week disentitlement period surrounding their expected dates of confinement.

They filed complaints alleging sex discrimination under the Manitoba Human Rights Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the plan discriminated against pregnant employees by singling out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment compared to other health-related reasons for absence.

Overruling its previous decision in Bliss, the Court established that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex, as the capacity to become pregnant is unique to women.

The appellant airlines challenged the application of British Columbia's Social Service Tax Act to their aircraft and parts, as well as to in-flight sales of alcoholic beverages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act, properly construed, did not apply to aircraft and parts brought into the province temporarily for interprovincial flights.

The Court also held that in-flight liquor sales lacked sufficient presence in the province to attract the tax.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that Air Canada could recover the taxes unlawfully collected on its aircraft and parts, despite being paid under a mistake of law, but could not recover the taxes collected from passengers for liquor sales, as it acted merely as a tax collector.

The airlines sought to recover gasoline taxes paid to British Columbia between 1974 and 1976 under a statute that was ultra vires because it imposed an indirect tax.

The province amended the statute in 1976 to make it a valid direct tax, and in 1981 enacted retroactive legislation to impose the valid tax for the 1974-1976 period and confiscate the invalidly collected taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 1976 and 1981 amendments were constitutionally valid.

The Court also held that, as a general rule, taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute are not recoverable, rejecting the application of restitutionary principles in this context due to public policy concerns about fiscal chaos.

The appellant, a solicitor, was wrongfully dismissed by his employer without cause.

He claimed damages for lost pension rights, which had not vested at the time of dismissal, as well as aggravated damages for mental distress and punitive damages due to the harsh and humiliating treatment he received from his supervisor prior to dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the express terms of the pension plan precluded the implication of a term protecting unvested pension rights upon wrongful dismissal.

The Court further held that aggravated and punitive damages are generally not available in breach of contract actions unless the conduct complained of constitutes an independent actionable wrong.

The appellants, two waitresses, were subjected to severe sexual harassment by a cook at the restaurant where they worked.

The employer failed to take action when informed, leading to the termination of their employment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that sexual harassment in the workplace constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex under the Manitoba Human Rights Act.

The Court also held that the corporate employer was liable for the discriminatory acts of its employee committed in the course of employment, and restored the original damages awarded by the adjudicator.

The respondent sued the appellant for price discrimination under s. 31.1 of the Combines Investigation Act, which creates a civil cause of action for certain infractions of the Act.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 31.1, arguing it fell under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Combines Investigation Act is valid federal legislation under the general trade and commerce power (s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867).

The Court further held that s. 31.1 is intra vires Parliament because it is functionally related to the general objective of the legislation and is an integral part of the regulatory scheme.

The appellant purchased land to develop a residential subdivision and completed some infrastructure work before the Act to preserve agricultural land came into effect.

A portion of the land was subsequently zoned agricultural.

The appellant sought a declaration that he had acquired rights to proceed with the development on the agricultural portion, arguing that his subdivision plan approval constituted a permit authorizing use and that his development work constituted use for a purpose other than agriculture.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant did not have acquired rights under s. 101 of the Act.

The Court found that the land in the agricultural zone was not actually being used for non-agricultural purposes when the Act came into force, and that a subdivision plan approval does not constitute a permit authorizing use.

The respondent brought an action in the Federal Court alleging the appellants formed an agreement violating the Combines Investigation Act and claiming damages under both the Act and the Civil Code of Lower Canada.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the provisions creating a private cause of action and conferring jurisdiction on the Federal Court, as well as the court's competence to hear the provincial law claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the impugned provisions of the Combines Investigation Act are intra vires Parliament under the trade and commerce power.

The Court further held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear the claim under the federal Act, but lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim based on the Civil Code.

The respondent purchased two subdivided lots from a developer under a contract where the developer retained ownership until the purchase price was paid in full.

Before the price was fully paid and ownership transferred, the Act to preserve agricultural land came into effect, prohibiting the alienation of the lots without authorization.

The developer subsequently transferred ownership to the respondent without authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the contract created an obligation with a term, not a suspensive conditional obligation, and therefore the transfer of ownership was not retroactive to the date of the contract.

The Court also found that the respondent did not have an acquired right to the transfer under the Act.

The appeal was allowed and the deeds of sale were declared voidable.