Gaspard Côté

The respondent lost her job shortly after turning 65 and was denied regular unemployment insurance benefits due to the age restriction in s. 31 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

She appealed to a Board of Referees, arguing the provision violated s. 15 of the Charter, but the Board upheld the denial without deciding the constitutional issue.

The Federal Court of Appeal directly reviewed the decision and found the provision unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board of Referees lacked the statutory mandate to decide Charter questions, and thus the Federal Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to make a final determination on the issue.

However, addressing the substantive issue, the Court found that s. 31 violated s. 15(1) of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of age and could not be justified under s. 1, as it did not minimally impair the respondent's rights.

The respondent brought an action in the Federal Court alleging the appellants formed an agreement violating the Combines Investigation Act and claiming damages under both the Act and the Civil Code of Lower Canada.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the provisions creating a private cause of action and conferring jurisdiction on the Federal Court, as well as the court's competence to hear the provincial law claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the impugned provisions of the Combines Investigation Act are intra vires Parliament under the trade and commerce power.

The Court further held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear the claim under the federal Act, but lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim based on the Civil Code.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, which affirmed an Umpire's decision under the Labour Adjustment Benefits Act regarding the deductibility of pension benefits paid into an R.R.S.P. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that neither the Board of referees nor the Umpire had jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

The appellant, an agent of the Crown in right of Quebec, purchased over 10 per cent of the shares of a company governed by the Canada Business Corporations Act, becoming an insider.

It refused to submit an insider report, claiming Crown immunity under s. 16 of the federal Interpretation Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insider reporting provisions applied to the appellant.

By purchasing shares, the appellant implicitly accepted the benefits of the statutory regime and could not accept the benefit of the law without also incurring its burdens.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits until he was hospitalized for a work-related injury during his extended benefit period.

He received temporary total workmen's compensation payments, suspending his unemployment benefits.

After recovering, he applied for an extension of his benefit period under s. 20(7)(b) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

The application was dismissed on the basis that s. 36 disentitled him to extended benefits because he was not capable of and available for work.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 20(7) is intended to apply to an extension of a benefit period in respect of extended benefit, and the claimant is entitled to an extension despite being disentitled under s. 36 during his incapacity.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits until he obtained employment, shortly after which he sustained a serious injury and received temporary total disability benefits from the Workers' Compensation Board.

When he was fit to return to work, his previous job no longer existed, and he requested an extension of his initial benefit period under s. 20(7)(b) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

The request was denied pursuant to s. 36 of the Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was entitled to an extension of his benefit period, following its concurrent decision in Canada (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission) v. Gagnon.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal affirming a deportation order.

The notice of appeal was filed in October 1976 but the appeal was not brought for hearing within the one-year period required by Rule 59 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appeal was abandoned by virtue of Rule 59 and declined to order otherwise.