Stevenson J.

The respondent, a permanent resident, was ordered deported after being convicted of an offence punishable by more than five years' imprisonment.

The Minister and Solicitor General filed a report indicating the respondent was likely to engage in organized crime, triggering an investigation by the Security Intelligence Review Committee.

The Committee held a partially in camera hearing and recommended a certificate be issued, which barred the respondent from appealing his deportation on compassionate grounds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory deportation provisions did not violate sections 7, 12, or 15 of the Charter.

The Court further held that the removal of the compassionate appeal and the procedures followed by the Review Committee did not violate the principles of fundamental justice under section 7.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that reversed in part a Superior Court judgment dismissing a claim for a compensatory allowance regarding a jointly purchased family residence paid for by the husband.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the Superior Court's judgment, finding no reason to vary the trial judge's finding and agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence of communications the appellant made to her church pastor and a lay counsellor, in which she admitted her involvement in the murder.

The appellant argued these communications were privileged under common law and s. 2(a) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that there is no prima facie common law privilege for religious communications.

Instead, claims of privilege for such communications must be determined on a case-by-case basis using the Wigmore criteria, informed by the Charter.

Applying the Wigmore criteria, the Court found the communications were not privileged because they did not originate in a confidence that they would not be disclosed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the trial judge instructed the jury that he could be found guilty as a party to murder under the combined operation of ss. 21(2) and 213(c) of the Criminal Code, even without subjective foresight of death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction using the curative proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 213(c) and s. 21(2) violate ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by permitting a murder conviction without subjective foresight of death, and ordered a new trial.

The respondent lost her job shortly after turning 65 and was denied regular unemployment insurance benefits due to the age restriction in s. 31 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

She appealed to a Board of Referees, arguing the provision violated s. 15 of the Charter, but the Board upheld the denial without deciding the constitutional issue.

The Federal Court of Appeal directly reviewed the decision and found the provision unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board of Referees lacked the statutory mandate to decide Charter questions, and thus the Federal Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to make a final determination on the issue.

However, addressing the substantive issue, the Court found that s. 31 violated s. 15(1) of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of age and could not be justified under s. 1, as it did not minimally impair the respondent's rights.

The Attorney General for Saskatchewan appealed a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal which found that proposed changes to provincial electoral boundaries infringed the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter.

The impugned legislation imposed a strict quota of urban and rural ridings and required urban ridings to coincide with municipal boundaries, resulting in variances in voter populations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the purpose of s. 3 is not absolute equality of voting power, but effective representation.

The Court found that the deviations from voter parity were justified by factors such as geography, community interests, and population growth patterns, and therefore did not violate s. 3.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately place the defence's theory before the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, with the majority agreeing with the Court of Appeal for Manitoba.

Chief Justice Lamer dissented, stating he would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging the constitutionality of the constructive murder provisions under section 213(a) of the Criminal Code.

By consent of the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.