Cory J.

The appellant was arrested in connection with a cocaine transaction and placed in a cell with an undercover police officer.

The appellant initiated a conversation about the arrest, during which the undercover officer asked 'What happened?' and mentioned that his fingerprints were on the drugs, prompting the appellant to admit his fingerprints were also on the drugs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the undercover officer's conduct did not amount to active elicitation or the functional equivalent of an interrogation.

The statements were volunteered by the appellant, and his section 7 right to silence was not violated.

The Minister of Health and Community Services sought to extend an order granting him custody of the appellant's three children.

The appellant, an indigent parent, was denied legal aid for the custody hearing because the provincial guidelines did not cover custody applications.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the state's removal of a child from parental custody constitutes a serious interference with the psychological integrity of the parent, engaging the right to security of the person under section 7 of the Charter.

The Court concluded that in the circumstances of this case, the appellant's right to a fair hearing required that she be represented by counsel, and the government's failure to provide state-funded counsel violated section 7.

The infringement was not saved by section 1.

The appellant, who had a history of psychiatric illness, was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for breaking and entering.

The Review Board repeatedly granted him conditional discharges, denying an absolute discharge because it could not conclude he was not a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 672.54 of the Criminal Code under sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Winko, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions do not violate the Charter and dismissed the appeal.

The Alberta Provincial Judges' Association brought a motion for directions asking the Supreme Court of Canada to rule on whether its previous decision in Provincial Court Judges (No. 1) required the Province of Alberta to pay the reasonable expenses of the judiciary incurred in participating in the judicial compensation commission process.

The Court dismissed the motion, holding that the issue of representational costs did not arise from the implementation of its previous judgments.

The Court noted that while the participation of judges in the commission process is not constitutionally required, the approach to the payment of costs should be fair, equitable, and reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest, rape, and indecent assault to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal on the issues before them, except for the indivisibility of the Crown, which it found unnecessary to address.

The Court concluded there was no violation of the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to extend the period of suspension of the Court's previous judgment requiring an independent process for setting judicial remuneration.

The Court granted the motion, extending the suspension for two months or until Bill C-37 receives Royal Assent, whichever is sooner.

The appellants were charged with failing to comply with an administrative order issued under the Environmental Protection Act requiring them to clean up PCB contamination at an abandoned mine.

They did not appeal the order to the Environmental Appeal Board but attempted to collaterally attack its validity at their penal trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the order, as the legislature intended the specialized appeal board to be the exclusive forum for such challenges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing death.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that driving at night, more than 20 kilometers over the speed limit, on a curve, and totally on the wrong side of the road constituted a marked departure from the norm.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge for sentencing.

The respondent, a 17-year-old, was photographed without her consent while sitting on the steps of a building in a public place.

The photograph was subsequently published in an arts magazine.

She brought an action in civil liability against the photographer and the magazine publisher for invasion of privacy.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the unauthorized publication of the photograph infringed the respondent's right to her image, which is an element of the right to privacy under the Quebec Charter.

The Court balanced this right against the appellants' freedom of expression, concluding that the artistic nature of the photograph did not justify the infringement absent a predominant public interest.

The award of $2,000 in moral damages was upheld.

The appellants picketed a police station carrying placards alleging a police officer allowed or participated in the sexual abuse of children.

They were convicted of defamatory libel under s. 300 of the Criminal Code.

They appealed, arguing the defamatory libel provisions infringed their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provisions infringe s. 2(b), they are justified under s. 1, subject to the severance of a portion of s. 299(c).

The Court found the protection of reputation to be a pressing and substantial objective, and that the provisions were rationally connected and minimally impairing, given the requirement of subjective knowledge of falsity and intent to defame.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions upheld.

The appellant was arrested for possession of narcotics.

Hours later, an RCMP officer conducted a warrantless inventory search of the appellant's impounded car pursuant to police policy, discovering cash and cocaine.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search violated section 8 of the Charter because an inventory search is not a valid objective of the common law power of search incident to arrest, and thus the search was not authorized by law.

However, applying the Collins test under section 24(2) of the Charter, the Court concluded that the non-conscriptive evidence should not be excluded, as the breach was not serious and exclusion would have a more detrimental impact on the administration of justice.

The appellant, a black youth, was acquitted of assaulting a police officer after the Youth Court Judge accepted his testimony over the conflicting testimony of the white arresting officer.

In her oral reasons, the judge remarked that police officers have been known to overreact when dealing with non-white groups.

The Crown appealed, arguing these comments raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the judge's comments, viewed in context by a reasonable and informed person aware of the social reality of racism, did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias but rather reflected an appropriate recognition of the social context.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder after the trial judge allowed the Crown to reopen its case to call a new witness after the defence had closed its case.

The trial judge also allowed the Crown to cross-examine the accused on her bad character, including her sexual relationship with one of the co-accused and the presence of stolen property in her house.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and directed a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to reopen its case at the third stage of the trial, as it prejudiced the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The Court found that the character evidence was properly admitted as it was relevant to significant issues in the case.

The appellants, the owner and manager of a tavern, were charged with allowing indecent performances under s. 167(1) of the Criminal Code after undercover police observed lap dancing involving sexual contact between nude dancers and patrons.

The trial judge acquitted both, finding the performances were not indecent and the owner lacked mens rea.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the performances were indecent as they exceeded the community standard of tolerance due to the degrading nature of the sexual contact in a public tavern.

The manager's conviction was upheld.

However, the Court restored the owner's acquittal, finding the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the trial judge's factual finding that the owner lacked the requisite mens rea because he had reasonably delegated entertainment responsibilities to the manager.

The respondent, a government employee, was terminated while receiving short-term disability benefits.

He sued for wrongful dismissal and was awarded damages representing his salary for a 20-month notice period, with the Court of Appeal holding that disability benefits received during that period should not be deducted.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the employer's appeal, holding that the employment contract did not intend for the employee to receive both disability benefits and damages for wrongful dismissal simultaneously.

Consequently, the disability benefits received during the notice period must be deducted from the wrongful dismissal damages.

The appellant city hired a temporary employee through a personnel agency.

The respondent union sought to have the employee included in its bargaining unit, arguing the city was the real employer.

The Labour Court found that the city was the real employer based on its control over the employee's working conditions and day-to-day work.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Labour Court's decision was not patently unreasonable, affirming that a comprehensive approach considering multiple factors is appropriate for identifying the real employer in a tripartite relationship.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown did not call the victim of the assault to testify, relying instead on other witnesses and forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that the Crown had a duty to call the victim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, ruling that the Crown has broad discretion in deciding which witnesses to call, including the victim, and is not required to call all material witnesses absent an abuse of process.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder after shooting his stepfather and his stepfather's companion.

At trial, the appellant admitted the actus reus but raised a mental disorder defence under s. 16 of the Criminal Code and argued he lacked the requisite intent.

The trial judge extensively reviewed the mental disorder evidence when discussing the s. 16 defence but only briefly referred back to it when instructing the jury on planning and deliberation.

The trial judge also instructed the jury that hiding the murder weapon could indicate consciousness of guilt.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury charge as a whole sufficiently related the mental disorder evidence to the issue of planning and deliberation.

While the trial judge erred in failing to limit the consciousness of guilt instruction to the s. 16 issue, the Court applied the curative proviso as the error was minor and would not have affected the verdict.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that affirmed the dismissal of his application for certiorari.

The appellant sought to quash his committal to stand trial on a charge of possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal orally, holding that there was sufficient evidence to justify the committal.

The appellant companies were defrauded by their bookkeeper, who issued 155 fraudulent cheques payable to third parties and deposited them into her own accounts at the respondent bank.

The bank accepted many of the cheques without endorsement, and the bookkeeper forged endorsements on the rest.

The appellants sued the bank for conversion.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was strictly liable for conversion.

The cheques were not payable to fictitious persons under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act because the intention of the corporate drawer, not the fraudulent employee, governed.

Furthermore, the bank could not rely on s. 165(3) to claim the rights of a holder in due course, as that section only protects a bank when a cheque is deposited to the credit of the legitimate payee or endorsee.