Eric Bowie

The appellants applied under Rule 62 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada to review the Registrar's taxation of costs, which had been awarded to the respondent on a solicitor and client basis.

The appellants argued the Registrar erred in principle by deferring to counsel's estimate of preparation time rather than applying the proper factors.

The Court dismissed the application, finding that the Registrar had properly considered the relevant factors and that the total time allowed, while seemingly high, was not clearly wrong or the result of an error in principle.

The appellants, Ministers of the Crown, were found guilty of contempt of court by the Federal Court of Appeal for failing to comply with an order to produce a file.

The order was served on their solicitor, but there was no evidence the Ministers had actual personal knowledge of it.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that contempt of court requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual knowledge of the order.

The Court found that service on a solicitor under the Federal Court Rules does not create a presumption of actual knowledge for the purposes of a quasi-criminal contempt proceeding, nor does vicarious liability apply to hold the Ministers responsible for the actions of their officials.

The appellant was charged with tax evasion and his assets were placed in receivership.

During the trial, the trial judge took eleven months to decide a motion for a directed verdict, initiating nineteen adjournments.

The appellant applied to the superior court under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The superior court granted a stay of proceedings, but the Court of Appeal reversed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the superior court had jurisdiction to hear the application since the trial judge caused the delay.

The Court found the eleven-month delay unreasonable and held that a stay of proceedings is the appropriate remedy for a violation of s. 11(b).

The appellant union challenged the federal Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act, which extended collective agreements and fixed wage increases for public sector employees, arguing it violated freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter and equality before the law under s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the guarantee of freedom of association does not include a constitutional guarantee of the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike.

The Court also found no violation of the Canadian Bill of Rights, as the legislation was directed at a valid federal objective of dampening inflationary expectations.