S. David Frankel

The appellant was acquitted at trial of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking after the trial judge excluded the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction, concluding only s. 10(b) was violated and exclusion was unwarranted.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the Court of Appeal impermissibly substituted its own findings of fact for those of the trial judge, who made no reviewable error in finding the cumulative Charter violations warranted exclusion of the evidence.

The appellants were convicted of drug-related offences based in part on wiretap evidence obtained under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code.

At trial, they challenged the admissibility of the wiretap evidence under s. 8 of the Charter and sought leave to cross-examine the police officer who swore the affidavit in support of the authorization.

The trial judge, applying the Garofoli threshold test, denied leave to cross-examine and admitted the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Garofoli leave requirement remains constitutional and that the trial judge did not err in finding no reasonable likelihood that cross-examination would elicit evidence of probative value.

The respondents' fish were lawfully seized and sold by the Crown under the Fisheries Act.

After the respondents' convictions were overturned and proceedings stayed, the Crown returned the net proceeds of the sale but refused to pay interest.

The respondents claimed interest based on unjust enrichment, fiduciary duty, and trust.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Fisheries Act constitutes a complete code for the return of seized property and does not require the payment of interest.

The claims for unjust enrichment, fiduciary duty, and trust were dismissed.

The appellant, a store owner who sold hemp products and marihuana seedlings, was convicted of possession and trafficking of cannabis sativa.

He challenged the constitutionality of the prohibition on simple possession of marihuana under the Narcotic Control Act, arguing it infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the availability of imprisonment engages the right to liberty, the prohibition accords with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court rejected arguments based on privacy, overbreadth, and statutory interpretation regarding THC levels.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Narcotic Control Act provisions prohibiting the possession of marihuana for personal use and for the purpose of trafficking.

They argued that the prohibition, and the potential for imprisonment, violated section 7 of the Charter because marihuana use causes little or no harm to others (the 'harm principle').

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the prohibition is a valid exercise of Parliament's criminal law power.

The Court rejected the argument that the 'harm principle' is a principle of fundamental justice under section 7.

The Court found that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting vulnerable groups and society from the harms associated with marihuana use, and that the availability of imprisonment is not grossly disproportionate.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant taxpayer was audited by revenue officials who obtained documents and statements using their statutory requirement powers.

The file was subsequently transferred to special investigations, and the taxpayer was charged with tax evasion.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the principles from R. v. Jarvis to determine when the audit became an investigation engaging the taxpayer's Charter rights.

The Court concluded that the investigation commenced after a specific meeting, meaning evidence gathered prior to that point was admissible, while evidence gathered afterward using audit powers violated the Charter and was subject to exclusion under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial was confirmed.

The accused was acquitted of trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay evidence under the Carter test.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, confirming that the trial judge made two clear misdirections in formulating the Carter test.

The Court held that the Crown met the heavy burden of establishing with reasonable certainty that, had the jury been properly charged, the verdict would not necessarily have been the same.