Brian J. Gover

The young offender appellant challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's alternative measures programme, arguing that its admission criteria infringed sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on its concurrent judgment in R. v. S. (G.), which held that section 4 of the Young Offenders Act does not oblige provinces to implement such a programme and that the admission criteria do not infringe the Charter.

The respondent, a young offender, was charged with possession of stolen goods in Ontario.

He argued that Ontario's failure to implement alternative measures programs under section 4 of the Young Offenders Act violated his equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter, as such programs were available in other provinces.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that section 4 is valid federal criminal law that grants provinces the discretion, but not the obligation, to establish alternative measures programs.

The Court further held that the differential application of the law based on province of residence did not violate section 15(1) of the Charter, as province of residence in this context is not a personal characteristic and differential application is a legitimate feature of the federal system.

The appellant, a young offender, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's alternative measures program, arguing its admission criteria violated sections 15(1) and 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as moot, relying on a concurrent judgment which held that section 4 of the Young Offenders Act does not oblige provinces to implement such programs.

The appellant conceded that if the programs are a matter of provincial option, no remedy is available.

The appellant, a young offender, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's alternative measures programme, arguing that its admission criteria infringed sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on its concurrent judgment in R. v. S. (G.), which held that section 4 of the Young Offenders Act does not oblige provinces to implement such a programme and that the admission criteria do not infringe the Charter.

The appellant was charged with murder and underwent two trials, the first resulting in a conviction that was overturned on appeal, and the second ending in a mistrial.

A third trial was scheduled five years after the initial charge.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing that the Crown's refusal to accept a manslaughter plea and its objection to a judge-alone trial constituted an abuse of process, and that the five-year delay violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no prosecutorial misconduct to justify an abuse of process.

The Court also held that the s. 11(b) right was not infringed, as the overall delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own tactical decisions, particularly his delays in retaining counsel, and the inherent time requirements of appellate and retrial proceedings.

The appellants were arrested in the middle of the night for break and enter and advised of their right to counsel.

After unsuccessfully attempting to reach their lawyers by phone, they were placed in a police line-up where they were identified by witnesses.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police violated the appellants' rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel and by failing to refrain from eliciting evidence before they had done so.

The Court concluded that the line-up evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, rendering it inadmissible under s. 24(2).

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to defraud the government.

The Crown's case relied on wiretap evidence obtained from listening devices installed in the appellants' motor vehicles.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, finding that the motor vehicles should have been specifically described in the judicial authorizations since they were known targets.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the trial judge's ruling was an impermissible collateral attack on the authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that a motor vehicle is a 'place' under the Criminal Code and that the general description in the authorization was sufficient.

The Court also agreed that challenging the lack of specific description constituted a collateral attack.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge and ordered a new trial.

The stay had been entered based on allegations that the Crown's conduct at trial infringed the appellants' rights to fundamental justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's decision.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed an appeal by the Crown and ordered a new trial, overturning a stay of prosecution.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that there was no basis in law for the stay of the prosecution.