D. M. M. Goldie

The respondents were retired at age 65 pursuant to the university's mandatory retirement policy.

They sought declarations that the policy violated s. 15(1) of the Charter and that the definition of 'age' in the provincial Human Rights Act, which restricted protection to those under 65, also violated s. 15(1).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter does not apply to the university as it is not 'government' under s. 32.

The Court further held that while the age restriction in the Human Rights Act violates s. 15(1), it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit.

The plaintiff brought an action alleging he contracted mesothelioma from asbestos exposure and claimed the defendants conspired to withhold information about the dangers of asbestos.

The defendants applied to strike out the conspiracy claims as disclosing no reasonable claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a statement of claim should only be struck out if it is 'plain and obvious' that it discloses no reasonable claim.

The Court found it was not plain and obvious that the conspiracy claim would fail, and the action was allowed to proceed.

The appellant applied for a re-hearing to vary a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the Social Service Tax.

The Court granted the application and varied the judgment to include prejudgment interest at the District Registrar's rate from the date of the several remittances to March 15, 1984, and postjudgment interest for the period following March 15, 1984.

The appellant was awarded costs of the re-hearing.

The employer, Paccar, terminated its collective agreement with the union and, after negotiations reached an impasse, unilaterally imposed new terms and conditions of employment.

The union complained to the Labour Relations Board, which held that the employer had the authority to unilaterally alter terms after expiry, subject to the duty to bargain in good faith.

The British Columbia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal quashed the Board's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the courts must show curial deference to the specialized tribunal's policy choices.

The Court also held that the Board had standing to make submissions defending the reasonableness of its decision.

The appellant airlines challenged the application of British Columbia's Social Service Tax Act to their aircraft and parts, as well as to in-flight sales of alcoholic beverages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act, properly construed, did not apply to aircraft and parts brought into the province temporarily for interprovincial flights.

The Court also held that in-flight liquor sales lacked sufficient presence in the province to attract the tax.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that Air Canada could recover the taxes unlawfully collected on its aircraft and parts, despite being paid under a mistake of law, but could not recover the taxes collected from passengers for liquor sales, as it acted merely as a tax collector.

The airlines sought to recover gasoline taxes paid to British Columbia between 1974 and 1976 under a statute that was ultra vires because it imposed an indirect tax.

The province amended the statute in 1976 to make it a valid direct tax, and in 1981 enacted retroactive legislation to impose the valid tax for the 1974-1976 period and confiscate the invalidly collected taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 1976 and 1981 amendments were constitutionally valid.

The Court also held that, as a general rule, taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute are not recoverable, rejecting the application of restitutionary principles in this context due to public policy concerns about fiscal chaos.

Appeals arising from commercial contracts for the supply of industrial gearboxes used in an oil sands operation.

The Court held that the supplier-designer remained liable for design defects and for breach of the implied fitness warranty under s. 15(1) of the Ontario Sale of Goods Act because the contractual warranty did not clearly exclude the statutory protection.

The Court also held that the separate supplier's exclusion clause barred liability, rejecting use of fundamental breach to override clearly negotiated allocation of risk between sophisticated commercial parties, subject to unconscionability.

On the trust dispute, the majority allowed the cross-appeal and held the fund belonged to the respondent purchaser, rejecting the constructive trust claim for lack of unjust enrichment.