Donald J. Jordan

The respondent objected to producing records ordered by subpoenas duces tecum in a contempt proceeding, arguing it would be contrary to Charter values to do so before an admissibility ruling.

The Federal Court held that the admissibility objection was premature and that production of the records as required by the subpoenas was not inconsistent with Charter values.

The Court ordered the parties to exchange all anticipated records before the show cause hearing.

The employer, Viterra Inc., brought a motion to quash two subpoenas duces tecum issued to its employees in the context of a contempt proceeding initiated by the Grain Workers' Union Local 333 ILWU.

The employer argued that compelling its employees to testify and produce documents was tantamount to compelling the corporation to testify against itself, contrary to Rule 470(2) of the Federal Courts Rules.

The Federal Court dismissed the motion, holding that a corporation does not enjoy the protection against self-incrimination under Rule 470(2) or section 11(c) of the Charter, and that compelling an employee to testify is not compelling the corporation itself.

The issue of document admissibility was deferred to the contempt hearing judge.

The appellants sued the respondent for defamation after the respondent posted an article on his website containing hyperlinks to other websites with allegedly defamatory information about the appellants.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a hyperlink, by itself, is content-neutral and merely refers to other content without repeating it.

Therefore, creating a hyperlink does not constitute publication of the defamatory material to which it links.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant posted federal election results from Atlantic Canada on his website before polling stations had closed in other parts of the country, violating s. 329 of the Canada Elections Act.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it infringed his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the publication ban infringes freedom of expression, it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The majority found that the ban serves the pressing and substantial objective of ensuring informational equality among voters and maintaining public confidence in the electoral system, and that the salutary effects of the brief delay in publication outweigh its deleterious effects.

The appellants appealed judgments declaring unconstitutional a hospital regulation requiring medical staff retirement at age 65 unless an exception was granted.

The principal issue was whether the hospital, in adopting and administering the regulation, was subject to the Charter under s. 32.

The majority held the hospital was not part of government and its internal management regulation therefore fell outside the Charter's ambit.

Assuming the Charter applied, the majority further held the regulation and its application were discriminatory under s. 15(1) but justified under s. 1 because they were rationally connected to maintaining excellence in a major acute care teaching hospital and minimally impairing in a resource-allocation context.

The respondents were retired at age 65 pursuant to the university's mandatory retirement policy.

They sought declarations that the policy violated s. 15(1) of the Charter and that the definition of 'age' in the provincial Human Rights Act, which restricted protection to those under 65, also violated s. 15(1).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter does not apply to the university as it is not 'government' under s. 32.

The Court further held that while the age restriction in the Human Rights Act violates s. 15(1), it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit.

The appellant union, involved in a labour dispute with Purolator, threatened to picket the respondent, a third-party courier company doing business with a company connected to Purolator.

The respondent obtained an interlocutory injunction based on the common law tort of inducing breach of contract.

The union appealed, arguing the injunction violated its freedom of expression under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while picketing is a form of expression, the Charter does not apply to private litigation between private parties relying solely on the common law.

The Court further noted that even if the Charter applied, the injunction against secondary picketing would be a reasonable limit under section 1.