John Sopinka

The appellant was charged with the murder of four infants and discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

She sued the Crown, the Attorney General, and police officers for malicious prosecution.

The respondents moved to strike the claim on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Crown itself enjoys absolute immunity under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, the Attorney General and Crown Attorneys do not enjoy absolute immunity at common law from suits for malicious prosecution.

The Court found that public policy does not justify absolute immunity where a prosecutor acts maliciously in fraud of their duties.

The respondent sued the appellant for price discrimination under s. 31.1 of the Combines Investigation Act, which creates a civil cause of action for certain infractions of the Act.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 31.1, arguing it fell under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Combines Investigation Act is valid federal legislation under the general trade and commerce power (s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867).

The Court further held that s. 31.1 is intra vires Parliament because it is functionally related to the general objective of the legislation and is an integral part of the regulatory scheme.

Minority shareholders and debenture stockholders challenged the sale of surplus railway lands under nineteenth-century perpetual railway leases and a related agreement transferring lands to a subsidiary of the majority shareholder.

The Court held that the lessee had acquired, under the lease and statutory framework, the power to sell surplus lands, that the debenture stock constituted an incumbrance for purposes of the 1891 statute, and that reinvestment of sale proceeds in the railway satisfied the statutory scheme.

The Court further held that approved rail line abandonments did not breach the lease, the shareholder meeting approving the later transaction was validly called, and the majority shareholder lawfully held and voted shares.

The lessor was not entitled in law or equity to recover its reversionary interest in lands sold.

Appeals were dismissed and the respondent’s cross-appeals were allowed in part.

The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission ordered several persons to appear before a Hearing Officer to give evidence in an inquiry under the Combines Investigation Act.

The Hearing Officer made rulings limiting the role of counsel, including denying the right to cross-examine witnesses, excluding a potential witness, and ruling that the Director need not disclose his reasons for commencing the inquiry.

The appellants sought to quash these rulings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the inquiry was purely investigatory and that neither the Act nor the common law doctrine of fairness required the Director to disclose his reasons or permitted counsel to cross-examine witnesses at this preliminary stage.

The appellants appealed a decision denying them deferred benefits under a multi-employer pension plan established by an international union, after a new plan was established for members of the local union.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower courts that the benefits under the original plan had not yet vested and that the respondents had complied with the requirements of the plan.

The Court noted that neither the federal nor provincial pension legislation was designed to deal with the specific circumstances of the case.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the applicant's application for leave to appeal from the judgment below.

The appellant, a retail employee, converted to the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, which required her to strictly observe the Sabbath from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.

Her employer required full-time sales clerks to work on Saturdays.

When the appellant refused to work Saturdays, she was demoted to part-time status.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an intent to discriminate is not a necessary element of discrimination under the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Court recognized the concept of adverse effect discrimination and established that employers have a duty to take reasonable steps to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs, short of undue hardship.

As the employer provided no evidence of undue hardship, the appeal was allowed.

The appellant, a former bank manager in the Bahamas, was called as a Crown witness in a Canadian income tax prosecution.

He refused to testify about specific bank customers and transactions, arguing that doing so would subject him to criminal prosecution under Bahamian bank secrecy laws and violate his rights under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was a compellable witness and that section 7 of the Charter did not apply, as any deprivation of liberty would result from the operation of foreign law, not Canadian law.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal concerning corporate criminal liability for mens rea offences arising from collusive dredging tenders submitted to public authorities.

The Court confirmed that the identification doctrine attributes the acts and intent of a directing mind to the corporation where the directing mind acted within the assigned field of operation, was not acting totally in fraud of the corporation, and acted at least partly for the corporation's benefit.

The Court rejected proposed defences based on partial fraud on the corporation, partial personal benefit, and acting contrary to corporate instructions.

On the record, the directing minds pursued a scheme benefiting both themselves and their corporate employers, so the convictions were upheld.

The contractor entered into a fixed-price construction contract with a developer after receiving assurances from the developer's bank that adequate interim financing was in place.

The developer subsequently ran out of funds and the bank refused to advance further money.

The contractor sued the bank in contract and tort, and also claimed priority over the bank's mortgage under the Mechanics' Lien Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while no contract existed between the bank and the contractor, the bank was liable for negligent misrepresentation because it negligently assured the contractor of adequate financing without disclosing the limitations of the loan.

The Court also held that section 4 of the Interest Act did not apply to limit the bank's interest rate, and the bank was not estopped from asserting its priority as mortgagee.

The contractor entered into a fixed-price construction contract with a developer after receiving assurances from the developer's bank that adequate interim financing was in place.

The developer subsequently ran out of funds and the bank refused to advance further money.

The contractor sued the bank in contract and tort, and also claimed priority over the bank's mortgage under the Mechanics' Lien Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while no contract existed between the bank and the contractor, the bank was liable for negligent misrepresentation because it negligently assured the contractor of adequate financing without disclosing the limitations of the loan.

The Court also held that section 4 of the Interest Act did not apply to limit the bank's interest rate, and the bank was not estopped from asserting its priority as mortgagee.

The appeal concerned the constitutional validity of provincial legislation that repealed a statutory lease, revested water and water power rights in the province, vested hydro-electric works in the Crown, and limited compensation to creditors and shareholders.

The Court held that extrinsic evidence was admissible in constitutional cases to determine both the operation and effect of legislation and its true object and purpose, particularly where colourability was alleged.

Applying pith and substance analysis, the Court found the legislation was a colourable attempt to interfere with contractual rights to the delivery of power in Quebec under a long-term power contract.

Because those civil rights were situated outside Newfoundland, the legislation was ultra vires.

The appeal was allowed and the Act, taken as a whole, was held invalid.