David Brown

Opposed discharge hearing under s. 172 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act following a voluntary assignment in bankruptcy.

The trustee’s report recommended an absolute discharge despite calculated surplus income obligations, citing the bankrupt’s advanced age, dementia, and financial circumstances.

The court reviewed the trustee’s discretion regarding surplus income calculations and emphasized that trustees are not required to rigidly apply the Superintendent’s standards where an agreement exists and has been complied with.

Finding the trustee and bankrupt had agreed on the surplus income obligation and that the bankrupt had paid the agreed amount, the court fixed the surplus income at the amount already paid into the estate.

An absolute discharge was granted.

The applicant union sought to adjourn the hearing of its certification application so it could be heard together with a newly filed section 96 unfair labour practice application concerning the termination of an employee.

The responding party employer opposed the adjournment, arguing the matters should be heard separately and it needed time to prepare.

The Board granted the adjournment, finding the applicant's explanation for the late filing reasonable and noting an overlap in evidence and witnesses between the pre-vote and post-vote events.

The Board directed the matters be scheduled together.

The applicant union sought certification for its traditional craft bargaining unit, arguing that the respondent's shipbuilding and repair business fell within the definition of the construction industry under the Labour Relations Act.

The applicant relied on recent amendments to the Occupational Health and Safety Act, which deemed shipbuilding a 'project'.

The Board ruled that repairing or building ships in dry docks does not constitute a business in the construction industry under the Labour Relations Act.

Following this ruling, the applicant withdrew its application with leave.

The appellant was charged with the murder of four infants and discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

She sued the Crown, the Attorney General, and police officers for malicious prosecution.

The respondents moved to strike the claim on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Crown itself enjoys absolute immunity under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, the Attorney General and Crown Attorneys do not enjoy absolute immunity at common law from suits for malicious prosecution.

The Court found that public policy does not justify absolute immunity where a prosecutor acts maliciously in fraud of their duties.

The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission ordered several persons to appear before a Hearing Officer to give evidence in an inquiry under the Combines Investigation Act.

The Hearing Officer made rulings limiting the role of counsel, including denying the right to cross-examine witnesses, excluding a potential witness, and ruling that the Director need not disclose his reasons for commencing the inquiry.

The appellants sought to quash these rulings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the inquiry was purely investigatory and that neither the Act nor the common law doctrine of fairness required the Director to disclose his reasons or permitted counsel to cross-examine witnesses at this preliminary stage.

The appellant union sought to apply union dues check-off and wage entitlement provisions of its collective agreement to summer vacation relief staff hired by the respondent employer.

The summer students were not members of the bargaining unit and did not qualify as employees under the Public Service Labour Relations Act or the collective agreement.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the word 'person' in the collective agreement referred to prospective employees and did not include summer students who would not qualify as employees.