Valerie A.E. Dyer

The plaintiff, a senior staff accountant, sued her former employer for wrongful dismissal, breach of contract, negligence, and intentional infliction of mental distress after her employment was terminated following a period of workplace conflict and medical leave.

The court found that the employer had acted professionally and in good faith throughout, dismissing the claims for bad faith, negligence, and intentional infliction of mental distress.

The court awarded the plaintiff 10 months' salary in lieu of notice.

Applying the principles from Sylvester, the court held that short-term disability benefits paid directly by the employer during the notice period should be deducted from the damages, but long-term disability benefits paid by a third-party insurer should not be deducted.

The respondents requested an order during proceedings to compel the applicant to comply with his pre-hearing disclosure obligations under Rules 16 and 17 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure.

The applicant had failed to provide any documents or witness statements and did not respond to the request.

The Tribunal ordered the applicant to file the required materials within 7 days, failing which the application may be dismissed as abandoned.

The respondents' request to adjourn the hearing was denied as there were no extraordinary circumstances.

The applicant filed human rights complaints against Kelly Services and IBM.

IBM requested early dismissal, arguing the complaint against it was not 'filed' with the Commission before the June 30, 2008 transition deadline.

The Tribunal reviewed the Commission's file and found that the applicant had submitted a new signed page 1 naming IBM, which the Commission treated as a properly filed complaint prior to the deadline.

The Tribunal concluded the complaint was filed in time and deferred IBM's request for early dismissal based on delay in service to a future hearing.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint against Kelly Services and IBM.

The Tribunal issued an interim decision to determine whether the complaint against IBM was 'filed' with the Ontario Human Rights Commission prior to the June 30, 2008 transition deadline under section 53 of the Human Rights Code.

After reviewing the Commission's files and practices, the Tribunal found that the Commission had treated the complaint as filed when the applicant submitted a new signed page one listing IBM as a responding party in April 2007.

The Tribunal concluded the complaint was filed prior to the deadline and could be continued as a transition application.

The appellants appealed an order regarding a claim by Investors Group Trust Co. Ltd. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the respondent's claim was a personal tort action for damages against the appellants and did not assert a claim against an asset of the bankrupt.

The Trustee would only have an interest if a specific asset belonging to the bankrupt was identified.

The respondent brought a request to strike portions of the Commission's hearing brief and reply that allegedly expanded the scope of the original human rights complaint.

The new allegations included claims that the respondent failed to accommodate the complainant's age by lowering performance standards, that early retirement packages constituted systemic discrimination, and that the respondent failed to investigate internal human rights concerns.

The parties resolved several issues at the hearing.

The Tribunal struck the allegations regarding the failure to investigate, finding that raising this issue six years after the amended complaint was filed would cause substantial prejudice to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision refusing proposed amendments to their claim.

The proposed amendments sought to add allegations of conspiracy and negligence, and to add a numbered company as a plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellants obtained loans from the respondent financial institutions to purchase mutual funds based on the advice of their financial advisors.

When the investments failed to perform, the appellants faced margin calls and suffered losses.

They sued the financial institutions, alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty for failing to advise them of the risks associated with the loans.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against the financial institutions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the relationship between a bank and its customer is generally that of debtor and creditor, and there were no special circumstances or exceptional relationships to give rise to a duty of care or a fiduciary duty to advise the borrowers.

The appellants invested in a limited partnership tax shelter, borrowing funds and providing promissory notes and guarantees secured by collateral mortgages.

Upon default, the lender obtained default judgments, transferred the mortgaged properties to its insurer under power of sale, and assigned the judgments to the insurer.

The appellants sought to declare the judgments void, alleging improvident sale, merger, de facto foreclosure, and release of guarantees.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's dismissal, finding the guarantees were independent obligations and the insurer's actions did not constitute a de facto foreclosure.

The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission ordered several persons to appear before a Hearing Officer to give evidence in an inquiry under the Combines Investigation Act.

The Hearing Officer made rulings limiting the role of counsel, including denying the right to cross-examine witnesses, excluding a potential witness, and ruling that the Director need not disclose his reasons for commencing the inquiry.

The appellants sought to quash these rulings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the inquiry was purely investigatory and that neither the Act nor the common law doctrine of fairness required the Director to disclose his reasons or permitted counsel to cross-examine witnesses at this preliminary stage.