Edward Then

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of the accused's videotaped statement to Detective Parsons.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to improper leading questions and the accused's intoxication, which allegedly overbore his will and compromised his operating mind.

The court found that the police questioning was proper, the accused was the first to identify the victim as a pedestrian, and there was no evidence of oppressive circumstances or that the accused lacked an operating mind despite alcohol consumption.

The statement was deemed voluntary and admissible.

The appellant, a permanent resident, pleaded guilty to eight offences arising from assaults on his spouse.

The day before his plea, an Immigration Enforcement Officer informed him that he could be deemed inadmissible to Canada due to prior convictions and that he would lose his right to appeal a removal order if he received a sentence exceeding six months.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a joint submission of 12 months' imprisonment less 247 days pre-trial custody credit, resulting in a four-month custodial term.

A removal order was subsequently issued.

On appeal, the appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming it was uninformed because he was unaware of the specific immigration consequences regarding appellate rights, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the appellant had adequate understanding of the immigration consequences and failed to establish prejudice.

The appellant appealed her convictions on two counts of impaired operation causing bodily harm, two counts of driving over 80 causing bodily harm, and two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The charges arose from a motor vehicle accident in which the appellant's vehicle overturned after she failed to negotiate a curve.

The central issue on appeal concerned the trial judge's instruction to the jury regarding the W.(D.) direction as it applied to the appellant's statement at the accident scene: "I don't know what happened.

My car just lost control." The Court of Appeal found that while the initial charge was adequate, the recharge contained serious errors in the application of the W.(D.) direction, particularly the omission of the second and third branches of the instruction in the recharge, which constitute non-direction amounting to misdirection on a critical aspect of the defence.

The appellant was convicted of accessing and possessing child pornography contrary to sections 163.1(4.1) and 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant claimed the defence under section 163.1(6), arguing he accessed and possessed the material as research for a book he was writing.

The trial judge found that while the appellant may have initially had a legitimate purpose related to art, he subsequently accessed and possessed the material to satisfy his fascination and morbid curiosity.

The trial judge also found no objectively verifiable connection between the appellant's conduct and his stated purpose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions and rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding dual purpose, credibility findings, and objective connection.

An appeal of an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing a conditional discharge for an NCR accused.

The appellant argued that the Board's finding that he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's risk assessment was unreasonable because it was based on speculative evidence regarding the likelihood of reoffending and failed to properly balance the seriousness of potential harm against the risk of that harm materializing.

The court emphasized that lack of insight alone is not a basis to deny an absolute discharge and that the contemplated harm fell towards the least serious end of the spectrum of serious criminal offences.

The appellant was convicted of procuring a person to become a prostitute and exercising control, direction or influence over her movements to compel her to engage in prostitution, contrary to sections 212(1)(d) and 212(1)(h) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was acquitted of similar charges relating to a second complainant.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of two years' incarceration on each charge, to be served concurrently, with six months' credit for pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment and argued the verdicts were unreasonable and inconsistent.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and that a conditional sentence should be imposed.

The appellant was convicted of 21 offences including possession of cannabis, possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of a prohibited weapon, money laundering, and related offences.

He was sentenced to nine and one-half years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three grounds: the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment when counsel was removed on the morning of trial, the trial judge's failure to provide adequate assistance to a self-represented litigant, and the appellant's exclusion from trial in violation of s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appeal and the Court of Appeal allowed it, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous driving and over .80 operation of a motor vehicle, following a trial where the sole issue was the identity of the driver.

The trial judge disbelieved the appellant's evidence and accepted the arresting officer's identification, which was based on a brief "one second glance" followed by apprehension 40 seconds later.

The appellant contended that the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the officer's identification and the appellant's credibility.

The appellate court affirmed the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to credibility assessments and finding no error in the application of identification evidence principles.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's implausible version of events and accepting the officer's identification were well-supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown applied under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code for publication bans to protect the identities of three witnesses (J.D., M.S., B.S.) in a murder re-trial.

The Crown argued that non-publication was necessary to prevent harm to the witnesses' reputations and rehabilitation efforts, and to encourage participation in the justice system.

The respondents opposed, asserting the paramountcy of the open court principle and the lack of an adequate evidentiary record.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the Crown's unsworn statements were insufficient to displace the presumption of openness, and that purely personal interests like emotional distress or embarrassment do not satisfy the necessity test for a publication ban.

The appellant was convicted of assault and appealed the conviction.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence of the appellant and the complainant, and whether the trial judge misapprehended material evidence.

The appellate court found that the trial judge did apply different standards of scrutiny, rejecting the appellant's evidence for tenuous reasons while glossing over weaknesses in the complainant's account and engaging in speculation to find corroboration.

This resulted in an unfair and unsafe conviction.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, M.O., was charged with aggravated assault and firearms offences.

He brought a motion on a voir dire seeking to exclude fingerprint evidence and a derivative statement, arguing that the police conducted an unreasonable search in breach of his Section 8 Charter rights.

The police accessed his fingerprints, taken six years prior when he was a young offender for a charge that was later withdrawn, outside the access period specified in the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The court found that the police unlawfully accessed the records, constituting an unreasonable search.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that the systemic institutional indifference to YCJA provisions and the high expectation of privacy for young offender records outweighed the societal interest in adjudicating the serious offence on its merits.

Consequently, the fingerprint evidence and the derivative statement were excluded.

This case concerns the sentencing of Police Constable James Forcillo for attempted murder.

The court first addressed a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum punishment of five years for attempted murder under s.239(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, finding it did not infringe ss.12 or 7 of the Charter.

The sentencing judge then determined the appropriate sentence, rejecting the defence's submission that Forcillo's moral blameworthiness was low due to a misperception.

The court found that Forcillo acted contrary to his training by shooting a potential threat and failing to use de-escalation, constituting a high level of moral blameworthiness and an egregious breach of trust.

Despite mitigating factors such as positive personal characteristics and the impact of protective custody, the aggravating factors, including the abuse of authority and the serious actual harm caused, substantially outweighed them.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence.

A sentence of six years in the penitentiary was imposed.

Following a prior release order modifying bail conditions for multiple accused, the court was advised of a change in circumstances requiring further modification of the recognizances.

The court accepted that the proposed adjustments were necessary in the public interest despite limited disclosure of the underlying circumstances.

The conditions were amended to require each accused to inform the officer in charge of the address at which they would reside with their sureties and to remain amenable to household rules.

For one accused, an existing condition in the recognizance was vacated and replaced with the new residency condition, and a geographic restriction requiring the accused to remain in Ontario was removed.

The court also ordered that the addresses of the sureties not be publicly disclosed absent further court order.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to review a justice of the peace’s order granting judicial interim release to three accused charged with multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences.

The Crown argued that the justice erred in assessing the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under s. 515(10).

The reviewing judge held that although the case involved serious allegations including possession of handguns with obliterated serial numbers, a silencer, and drugs, the justice of the peace did not commit an error in law or principle.

The strength of the prosecution’s case was uncertain due to potential Charter issues concerning warrantless access to a safe and evidentiary concerns linking some accused to the seized items.

The Crown’s request to substitute detention orders was dismissed, though several release conditions were modified to address inconsistencies and strengthen supervision.

Two self‑represented applicants sought mandamus with certiorari in aid challenging decisions of justices of the peace who refused to issue process following private informations laid against store security guards after a shoplifting incident.

The court considered the statutory framework governing private prosecutions under s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code and the limited supervisory jurisdiction of the Superior Court on judicial review.

It found that one applicant had been denied procedural fairness during the pre‑enquete because the justice of the peace failed to assist an unrepresented litigant and prevented a fair opportunity to present evidence on several charges.

It also held that the second justice of the peace erred by refusing to issue process after finding a prima facie case while relying on irrelevant factors such as a perceived limitation period and available civil remedies.

The matter was remitted for fresh pre‑enquete hearings before a different justice of the peace on certain charges, while other requested relief and costs were dismissed.

The accused brought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after a preliminary inquiry judge revoked a prior release order under s. 523(2)(b).

The revocation was based on a modest increase in the strength of the Crown’s identification evidence and two new convictions that had been outstanding at the time of the original bail hearing.

The court held that s. 523(2)(b) does not authorize a de novo bail hearing and requires proof of a substantial or material change in circumstances.

The identified developments did not constitute a sufficient change to justify revoking bail.

The revocation order was vacated and the accused was ordered released on stricter bail with additional sureties and conditions.

The accused applied under s. 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code for the release of restrained assets to fund legal representation for pending drug charges involving large-scale marijuana grow operations.

The accused’s legal aid certificate had been cancelled after Legal Aid concluded he failed to fully disclose his financial circumstances.

The court found on a balance of probabilities that the accused had no available assets apart from property already restrained by court order and that he possessed a proprietary interest in those assets.

After considering the legal aid tariff and the anticipated length and complexity of the trial, the court authorized the release of restrained funds to pay reasonable legal expenses at the legal aid rate.

The alternative Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel was dismissed as unnecessary.