HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Adèle Mercier

Applicant

-and-

Queen’s University

Respondent

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Adjudicator: Maureen Doyle

Date: June 7, 2016

Citation: 2016 HRTO 779

Indexed as: Mercier v. Queen’s University

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Adèle Mercier, Applicant

Ron Ellis, Counsel

1This is an Application filed under section 34 of the Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

2The applicant has made a request for reconsideration of my Interim Decision Mercier v. Queen’s University 2015 HRTO 1517 addressing the issue of deferral of this Application.

3In her request for reconsideration, she indicates that she is making her request because “other factors exist that outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions”. She submits that the above-noted Interim Decision is based in significant measure on an “understanding that the human rights issues which Professor Mercier’s Application presents would also be addressed in parallel grievance arbitration proceedings”. She submits, however, that the grievances do not include any alleged violation of the Code.

4In her original submissions regarding the issue of deferral of this Application, she submitted that while there would be overlapping facts in each of the two proceedings, the “important dispute in the grievance arbitration proceeding is the interpretation of the collective agreement. It is not a proceeding that will address the issue of the University’s breach of the applicant’s human rights”. In support of her request for reconsideration, the applicant essentially repeats arguments made orally before the Tribunal. A request for reconsideration is not an opportunity to restate or re-argue a position already advanced and considered. I find that the submissions in this Request amount to additional argument on issues already fully canvassed before the Tribunal.

5At paragraph 10 of the above-noted Interim Decision the Tribunal notes the remedies sought in the grievance, which did not include a declaration that the respondent had violated the Code. In paragraph 11 of the above-noted Interim Decision, the Tribunal noted that the remedies sought by the applicant were not identical in the grievance and in the Application, but found nevertheless that they “bear sufficiently close relationship to each other to indicate commonality of issues”.

6Further and in any event, Rule 26.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure provides that a party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal. A decision will only be considered a final decision where the decision has the effect of finally determining the substance of the dispute or a central element of the dispute between the parties. See for example Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Ontario Teachers’ Federation, 1994 CanLII 10578 (ON CTGD), 19 O.R. (3d) 371.

7In Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34, the Tribunal considered at length the question of when a decision should be considered final for the purposes of the reconsideration power. After carefully considering the policy issues and the relevant authorities the Tribunal concluded:

As a general principle, having regard to the approach taken in other forums as well as the above discussion, it is reasonable to view a “final decision” as one that disposes of some or all of the central issues in the complaint as between the parties. This general principle will take on a more precise shape as the Tribunal applies it to cases before it.

8Having considered these authorities and the context in which the issue arises, I have concluded that the Decision is not a final one. I find that it does not deprive the applicant of “any prospect of a remedy” as against the respondent and does not dispose of the entirety of the complaint. Not being a final decision, it cannot, at this time, be the subject of a reconsideration request. See Galuego v. Kensington Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 49. For these reasons the Request for Reconsideration is dismissed.