Court of Appeal for Ontario
Date: 2025-06-12
Docket: COA-24-CR-0883
Coram: S. Gomery, J. Dawe, L. Madsen JJ.A.
Between:
His Majesty the King (Respondent)
and
Ahmed Ali Debouk (Appellant)
Appearances:
Ahmed Debouk, acting in person
Philippe Cowle, for the respondent
Heard: June 4, 2025
On appeal from the conviction entered on April 12, 2024 by Justice Geoffrey Griffin of the Ontario Court of Justice.
Reasons for Decision
Background
1The appellant was charged with extortion, uttering death threats, two counts of criminal harassment, and a charge of breaching a non-communication condition in a bail undertaking. The victims named in these charges were his former employers. On April 12, 2024, the appellant pleaded guilty to these five charges. He was convicted, and on a joint submission received a sentence of time served and two years’ probation.
Grounds of Appeal
2The appellant appeals against his convictions on two grounds. First, he argues that his guilty pleas were involuntary because he was coerced into entering them by the prospect that if he did so he would be released from custody after having spent nearly 8 months in pre-trial detention. Second, he contends that his Charter rights were violated by the non-disclosure of the recording of the voice mail message on which the breach of undertaking charge was based. He notes that the recording was not made an exhibit in the court below and the Crown did not include it in the appeal book on his appeal.1
3We do not find that either ground of appeal has merit.
Voluntariness of Guilty Plea
4With respect to the first ground, a guilty plea must be “voluntary, unequivocal and informed”: R. v. Wong, 2018 SCC 25, para 43. The transcript of the guilty plea and sentencing proceedings shows that the appellant entered his pleas unequivocally, and that he acknowledged that the facts alleged by the Crown were accurate. He does not suggest otherwise, nor does he argue that his guilty pleas were uninformed. Rather, he argues that the harsh conditions of his pre-trial detention undermined the voluntariness of his actions.
5The appellant entered his guilty pleas in open court, with the assistance of experienced counsel. As this court explained in R. v. Cherrington, 2018 ONCA 653, para 21:
A plea of guilty is voluntary if it represents the conscious volitional decision of an accused for reasons that the accused regards as appropriate. Pleas of guilty entered in open court in the presence of counsel are presumed to be voluntary. [Emphasis in original.]
6On appeal, it is the appellant’s burden to rebut the presumption of voluntariness by establishing that at least one of the necessary preconditions for a voluntary guilty plea were absent. As this court explained in Cherrington, at para. 21:
To enter a voluntary plea of guilty, an accused need only be able to understand the process leading to the plea, communicate with counsel, and make an active or conscious choice. Whether the choice to plead guilty is wise, rational or in the accused’s best interest is not part of the inquiry. [Citations omitted.]
7Here, the transcript shows that the appellant understood the process, and that he was able to communicate with counsel. Indeed, he does not argue otherwise.
8The appellant may well have been motivated to enter his guilty pleas in order to secure his release from custody. However, it is not enough for him to say that he was under emotional pressures that may have influenced his decision. Rather, he must establish that his “emotions reached a level where they impaired [his] ability to make a conscious volitional choice”: R. v. T. (R.), p. 520. The appellant has not presented any evidence that the conditions he faced while in custody affected his ability to make a conscious volitional choice to plead guilty. As Epstein J.A. observed in R. v. Krzehlik, 2015 ONCA 168, para 35:
Individuals must normally decide whether to plead guilty in difficult circumstances. They are under pressure. They are faced with options none of which are favourable. However, as this court has said, without more, circumstances such as these cannot invalidate a guilty plea, on appeal: see R. v. Carty, 2010 ONCA 237, para 37.
Alleged Non-Disclosure
9With respect to the second ground of appeal, the appellant has not adduced any evidence to substantiate his claim that the recording of the voice mail message was not disclosed to him, nor did he raise this issue in the court below.
10During the guilty plea proceedings Crown counsel summarized the contents of this voice mail message, and the appellant agreed that what had been read out was truthful and accurate. His admission made it unnecessary for the Crown to make the recording an exhibit. Since the recording was never put before the trial court, Crown counsel on appeal was correct not to include it in the appeal book: see r. 58(2) of the Criminal Appeal Rules.
Conclusion
11The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
“S. Gomery J.A.”
“J. Dawe J.A.”
“L. Madsen J.A.”