Philippe Georges Cowle

The appellant was convicted by a jury of several firearm offences and assault.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds included challenges to witness credibility due to inconsistent statements and alleged improper Crown cross-examination.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge erred in principle by treating the statutory minimum sentence as a "straitjacket" and failing to adequately consider mitigating factors and rehabilitative prospects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's handling of witness credibility and the Crown's cross-examination, and upholding the sentence as a careful balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.

The appellant, Alain Joseph Boily, appealed a driving prohibition imposed following his guilty plea to criminal negligence causing death.

The central issue was whether the sentencing judge had jurisdiction to impose a driving prohibition under the amended s. 320.24(4) of the Criminal Code, which no longer explicitly lists criminal negligence causing death as an offence attracting such a prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that despite the apparent legislative oversight and the resulting absurdity (where a less serious offence would attract a prohibition but a more serious one would not), the plain language of the statute did not grant the power to impose the prohibition.

The court emphasized that correcting such a legislative gap falls to Parliament, not the judiciary.

The appeal was allowed, and the driving prohibition was set aside.

The appellant, self-represented at trial, was convicted of armed bank robbery.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct himself on a key witness's motive to lie and by relying on the appellant's uncompleted testimony after indicating it would not be used.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding witness credibility but agreed the trial judge erred in using the appellant's testimony for conviction after leading him to believe it would not be used, thereby jeopardizing trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Everton Ambrose, appealed his conviction and sentence arising from a drive-by shooting.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge's reasons carefully reviewed the evidence and amply supported the conclusion that the appellant was either the shooter or a party to the offence.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or in the fitness and reasonableness of the sentence imposed.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of arson to property for setting fire to a Jeep Cherokee.

The appeal challenged the reasonableness of the conviction, arguing misapplication of circumstantial evidence and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of guilt was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence, which included GPS data placing the appellant's tow truck at the scene and the appellant's suspicious post-offence conduct.

The Court also found the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient given the straightforward nature of the case and the lack of contradictory evidence or complex legal issues.

The appellant, T.D., appealed convictions for sexual assault and extortion, and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's W.D. analysis regarding the appellant's credibility and the assessment of the complainant's credibility, particularly her explanation for falsifying immigration documents.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.D. principle, concluding that the judge properly assessed the appellant's evidence and only relied on corroborated portions of the complainant's testimony.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The appellant, Cameron Laming, appealed a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for a weapons dangerous charge.

He argued procedural irregularities during the NCRMD hearing and sought to adduce fresh psychiatric evidence suggesting his mental state was due to drug-induced intoxication rather than a mental disorder qualifying for NCRMD.

The Court of Appeal found significant procedural deficiencies, including the appellant not having read the NCRMD report, equivocal consent, and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The fresh evidence, which cast doubt on the NCRMD diagnosis, was admitted.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD verdict was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, C.J., appealed a conviction for voyeurism and the imposed sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the conviction reasonable and the sentence appropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the factors considered by the trial judge.

The appellants, G.F. and R.B., appealed their sentences for sexual assault after their convictions were restored by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The trial judge had sentenced G.F. to three and a half years and R.B. to three years.

The appellants raised several grounds of appeal, including the trial judge's personal objections to the conduct, penalizing them for maintaining innocence, an alleged error in finding a breach of trust, inadequate distinction in culpability, and failure to consider collateral consequences (immigration for G.F. and mental health for R.B.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed all complaints, finding no errors in principle that impacted the sentences.

The court affirmed the finding of a breach of trust and reiterated that collateral immigration consequences cannot justify artificial sentences.

The sentences were deemed proportionate and not "demonstrably unfit."

The appellant, H.K., appealed convictions for various sexual assault offences, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing conflicting evidence on consent and that the global sentence of three years was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal at the outset.

Regarding the conviction appeal, the appellant contended the trial judge's credibility assessment was piecemeal and failed to resolve inconsistencies.

The Court, applying principles from R. v. G.F., affirmed the heightened deference owed to trial judges' credibility findings.

It found that the trial judge conducted a thorough and nuanced analysis, explaining which parts of the complainant's evidence were accepted or found unreliable, and considering corroborating evidence.

The Court concluded there was no error in the trial judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal from convictions.

The appellant appealed his sentence for serious offences including firearm, drug, and driving offences.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the jump principle, failing to apply Duncan credit, and failing to consider his personal circumstances including systemic issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jump principle was not engaged due to the increased seriousness of the current offences, the Duncan credit was properly considered and weighed by the sentencing judge, and the personal circumstances argument was not raised at trial and the Morris decision was not available at the time of sentencing.

The appellant, Michael Karas, appealed a global sentence of 21 years (net 15 years, 6 months, 10 days) imposed for multiple bank robberies involving an imitation firearm and forcible confinement.

He argued the sentence was disproportionate, a significant increase from prior sentences, and that the sentencing judge failed to consider relevant mitigating factors, including his guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, affirming the weight given to the guilty plea and emphasizing public protection as the overriding sentencing goal given the appellant's extensive criminal history of armed bank robberies.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jesse David Harvey, appealed his sentence of 3 years' incarceration for numerous breaches of probation orders and assault, having abandoned his conviction appeal.

The primary ground of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred by referring to the Crown's consideration of a dangerous offender application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit and that the sentencing judge's brief reference to a dangerous offender application, when contextualized by the appellant's repeated failure to abide by court orders in a domestic violence situation, did not constitute an error or transform the sentencing into an informal dangerous offender hearing.

The appellant, J.J., appealed convictions for sexual assault and break and enter.

The appeal raised issues concerning the trial judge's alleged misapprehension of DNA evidence, the imposition of an onus on the appellant to provide a benign explanation for DNA presence, and trial counsel's conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the DNA evidence in his reasons, did not reverse the burden of proof regarding innocent DNA transfer, and that trial counsel's prior representation of an investigating officer did not result in an actual conflict of interest impairing trial fairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon stemming from two separate incidents.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of unsavoury witnesses under Vetrovec principles and the use of "prefer" language in evaluating witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied Vetrovec by seeking corroboration and that the use of "prefer" was a linguistic slip, not a misapprehension of the burden of proof, given the overall context of the reasons and the trial judge's self-direction on the standard of proof.

This addendum to an appeal decision addresses the Court of Appeal's inherent jurisdiction to permit publication of its reasons, which contain information subject to a statutory publication ban under s. 278.95 of the Criminal Code.

The court determined that despite the ban, and the trial judge not having lifted it, it possessed inherent jurisdiction to publish its reasons unredacted, provided the complainant's privacy (protected by a separate s. 486.4 ban) and the interests of justice were considered.

The court found that the complainant was comfortable with publication and that the development of jurisprudence on s. 276 applications would benefit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, his designation as a dangerous offender, and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge's finding that the complainant's passivity was due to fear and not consent was upheld, with the Court of Appeal affirming that silence or passivity does not constitute communicated consent.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, citing the appellant's history of sexual assaults and the intractability of his behavioural challenges, supported by expert psychiatric evidence.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Stephen Campbell, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for an order that a fresh psychiatric report be prepared to support his not criminally responsible (NCR) defence, which was rejected at trial.

The court found that nothing of substance had changed since the original psychiatric reports were prepared for trial and carefully reviewed by the trial judge.

The motion was dismissed, as there was no proper basis for ordering a fresh psychiatric report.

The appellant, Ian Bullens, appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not granting a "Downes credit" for stringent bail conditions that allegedly prevented him from seeing his children.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting that the issue was not fully brought to the sentencing judge's attention and that Downes credits are reserved for "stringent" conditions, which were not met in this case.

The conviction appeal was abandoned, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Kodie Johnston, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, possession of a prohibited weapon, uttering threats, and obstructing police, as well as his sentence.

His conviction appeal arguments included insufficient proof of identity as the shooter, issues with gunshot residue (GSR) evidence, the voluntariness of his inculpatory statement, and the reliability of the victim's testimony.

Duty counsel also argued the trial judge failed to consider the requisite intent for uttering threats and obstructing police, and did not give adequate weight to the appellant's mental health and addiction issues in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding overwhelming evidence of guilt and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice regarding the intent elements, and no unreasonable exercise of discretion in sentencing.