Philippe Georges Cowle

This is a Crown appeal from an acquittal in a home invasion robbery case.

The Crown alleged the respondent was one of the perpetrators.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent after erroneously removing DNA evidence and prior discreditable conduct evidence from consideration as circumstantial evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by considering the DNA evidence in isolation and by failing to appreciate the full probative value of the prior discreditable conduct evidence, particularly regarding identity.

These errors had a material bearing on the acquittal.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, child luring, making and possessing child pornography, and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

He also appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The grounds of appeal included judicial bias, unfair proceedings (jury tampering, non-unanimous verdict, failure to declare mistrial), ineffective assistance of counsel, and unreasonable verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no merit in the appellant's claims.

The court upheld the trial judge's discretion regarding mistrial, confirmed the jury's unanimous verdict, and found no evidence of bias or jury tampering.

The dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence were affirmed, as there was ample evidence of a pattern of repetitive behaviour and a substantial probability of reoffending, with no reasonable treatment plan to manage the risk.

The appellant, Danny Correa, appealed his convictions for attempted sexual assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on the intent required for attempted sexual assault, nor were the verdicts unreasonable or inconsistent.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation, finding no material misapprehension of evidence or error in accepting the psychiatric risk assessment, despite a six-year gap in the appellant's offence history.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences, his dangerous offender designation, and his indeterminate sentence.

The appeal challenged the fairness of the trial due to the complainant's detention as a material witness and the assessment of her credibility.

It also contested the dangerous offender designation, arguing errors in defining "pattern" of behaviour and reliance on disputed facts, and the indeterminate sentence, asserting the trial judge erred by presuming indeterminate detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice or error in credibility assessment.

It upheld the dangerous offender designation.

While acknowledging the trial judge's error in principle regarding the indeterminate sentence by presuming it and conflating the designation and sentencing stages, the Court of Appeal re-sentenced the appellant and ultimately imposed the same indeterminate sentence, concluding that no lesser measure would adequately protect the public given the appellant's extensive criminal history, low prospects for treatability, and manageability issues, despite mitigating factors related to systemic anti-Black racism.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of several firearm offences and assault.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds included challenges to witness credibility due to inconsistent statements and alleged improper Crown cross-examination.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge erred in principle by treating the statutory minimum sentence as a "straitjacket" and failing to adequately consider mitigating factors and rehabilitative prospects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's handling of witness credibility and the Crown's cross-examination, and upholding the sentence as a careful balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.

The appellant, Alain Joseph Boily, appealed a driving prohibition imposed following his guilty plea to criminal negligence causing death.

The central issue was whether the sentencing judge had jurisdiction to impose a driving prohibition under the amended s. 320.24(4) of the Criminal Code, which no longer explicitly lists criminal negligence causing death as an offence attracting such a prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that despite the apparent legislative oversight and the resulting absurdity (where a less serious offence would attract a prohibition but a more serious one would not), the plain language of the statute did not grant the power to impose the prohibition.

The court emphasized that correcting such a legislative gap falls to Parliament, not the judiciary.

The appeal was allowed, and the driving prohibition was set aside.

The appellant, self-represented at trial, was convicted of armed bank robbery.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct himself on a key witness's motive to lie and by relying on the appellant's uncompleted testimony after indicating it would not be used.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding witness credibility but agreed the trial judge erred in using the appellant's testimony for conviction after leading him to believe it would not be used, thereby jeopardizing trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Everton Ambrose, appealed his conviction and sentence arising from a drive-by shooting.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge's reasons carefully reviewed the evidence and amply supported the conclusion that the appellant was either the shooter or a party to the offence.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or in the fitness and reasonableness of the sentence imposed.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of arson to property for setting fire to a Jeep Cherokee.

The appeal challenged the reasonableness of the conviction, arguing misapplication of circumstantial evidence and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of guilt was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence, which included GPS data placing the appellant's tow truck at the scene and the appellant's suspicious post-offence conduct.

The Court also found the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient given the straightforward nature of the case and the lack of contradictory evidence or complex legal issues.

The appellant, T.D., appealed convictions for sexual assault and extortion, and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's W.D. analysis regarding the appellant's credibility and the assessment of the complainant's credibility, particularly her explanation for falsifying immigration documents.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.D. principle, concluding that the judge properly assessed the appellant's evidence and only relied on corroborated portions of the complainant's testimony.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The appellant, Cameron Laming, appealed a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for a weapons dangerous charge.

He argued procedural irregularities during the NCRMD hearing and sought to adduce fresh psychiatric evidence suggesting his mental state was due to drug-induced intoxication rather than a mental disorder qualifying for NCRMD.

The Court of Appeal found significant procedural deficiencies, including the appellant not having read the NCRMD report, equivocal consent, and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The fresh evidence, which cast doubt on the NCRMD diagnosis, was admitted.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD verdict was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, C.J., appealed a conviction for voyeurism and the imposed sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the conviction reasonable and the sentence appropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the factors considered by the trial judge.

The appellants, G.F. and R.B., appealed their sentences for sexual assault after their convictions were restored by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The trial judge had sentenced G.F. to three and a half years and R.B. to three years.

The appellants raised several grounds of appeal, including the trial judge's personal objections to the conduct, penalizing them for maintaining innocence, an alleged error in finding a breach of trust, inadequate distinction in culpability, and failure to consider collateral consequences (immigration for G.F. and mental health for R.B.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed all complaints, finding no errors in principle that impacted the sentences.

The court affirmed the finding of a breach of trust and reiterated that collateral immigration consequences cannot justify artificial sentences.

The sentences were deemed proportionate and not "demonstrably unfit."

The appellant, H.K., appealed convictions for various sexual assault offences, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing conflicting evidence on consent and that the global sentence of three years was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal at the outset.

Regarding the conviction appeal, the appellant contended the trial judge's credibility assessment was piecemeal and failed to resolve inconsistencies.

The Court, applying principles from R. v. G.F., affirmed the heightened deference owed to trial judges' credibility findings.

It found that the trial judge conducted a thorough and nuanced analysis, explaining which parts of the complainant's evidence were accepted or found unreliable, and considering corroborating evidence.

The Court concluded there was no error in the trial judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal from convictions.

The appellant appealed his sentence for serious offences including firearm, drug, and driving offences.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the jump principle, failing to apply Duncan credit, and failing to consider his personal circumstances including systemic issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jump principle was not engaged due to the increased seriousness of the current offences, the Duncan credit was properly considered and weighed by the sentencing judge, and the personal circumstances argument was not raised at trial and the Morris decision was not available at the time of sentencing.

The applicant brought a motion to re-open his conviction appeal and set aside the abandonment of his sentence appeal, after his appeal had been dismissed on the merits.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding his statements voluntary, that the appellate court erred in its reasons, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no real concern of a miscarriage of justice to warrant re-opening the conviction appeal, and concluding that the proposed sentence appeal had no prospect of success.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and other offences arising from a bar shooting, as well as his 17-year global sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on recognition evidence and rejecting exculpatory testimony, and failed to give sufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial identification evidence or his discretionary application of credit for harsh conditions.

The appellant, Michael Karas, appealed a global sentence of 21 years (net 15 years, 6 months, 10 days) imposed for multiple bank robberies involving an imitation firearm and forcible confinement.

He argued the sentence was disproportionate, a significant increase from prior sentences, and that the sentencing judge failed to consider relevant mitigating factors, including his guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, affirming the weight given to the guilty plea and emphasizing public protection as the overriding sentencing goal given the appellant's extensive criminal history of armed bank robberies.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder after shooting his wife in a parking lot.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, made errors of law, and that he was prejudiced by self-representing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict was reasonable and supported by ample evidence, including the appellant's own statements and eyewitness testimony.

The court also noted the appellant chose to self-represent and had the assistance of amicus curiae.

The appellant, Jesse David Harvey, appealed his sentence of 3 years' incarceration for numerous breaches of probation orders and assault, having abandoned his conviction appeal.

The primary ground of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred by referring to the Crown's consideration of a dangerous offender application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit and that the sentencing judge's brief reference to a dangerous offender application, when contextualized by the appellant's repeated failure to abide by court orders in a domestic violence situation, did not constitute an error or transform the sentencing into an informal dangerous offender hearing.