Philippe Georges Cowle

The appellant, Courtney Foster, appealed his conviction for attempted murder and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

He was convicted of attempted murder of his wife and sentenced to a global term of 10 years, less 4 years pre-sentence custody, for a net sentence of 6 years.

The appellant argued the trial judge did not consider all arguments and the verdict was unreasonable, claiming he lacked the requisite intent.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's finding of intent was amply supported by the record and the verdict was not unreasonable.

Regarding the sentence, the appellant argued it was too harsh and that the trial judge failed to apply appropriate "Duncan credit." The Court found no error in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, noting the trial judge properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors and applied the correct Duncan credit.

R.H. appealed sentences totaling six years for sexual interference, making child pornography, and accessing child pornography.

The Court of Appeal upheld the global sentence, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge, who properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors and the principles of denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences.

The court, however, modified a lifetime internet prohibition order to align with previous jurisprudence and granted credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings in a sexual assault case after the complainant failed to re-attend for cross-examination.

The trial judge inferred the complainant was avoiding cross-examination and found the respondent's bail conditions "torturous," leading to the stay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in refusing the Crown's request for a brief adjournment without applying the proper legal test (Darville factors) and made factual findings unsupported by evidence.

The Court emphasized that a stay of proceedings is an extreme remedy reserved for the "clearest of cases" and that less drastic alternatives were available.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

Three appellants were convicted at trial of assault causing bodily harm, with two also convicted of unlawful confinement.

Following the trial judge's reasons, the appellants moved for a stay of proceedings on the basis that their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, but the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding the net delay was below the Jordan ceiling.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal in the result and leaving several s. 11(b) legal issues — including treatment of multiple accused and post-conviction applications — to be resolved in a future case.

The accused appealed his conviction for attempted murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting improper opinion evidence from a 911 dispatcher and a homicide detective, and in admitting hearsay evidence from the complainant to EMS personnel.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in allowing opinion evidence on the accused's credibility and demeanour, and in admitting the complainant's out-of-court statements as hearsay that did not meet necessity and reliability requirements.

The court rejected applying the curative proviso, finding the errors were not trivial and the Crown's case, while strong, was not overwhelming.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against three accused (Pauls, Jamal Yusuf, and Jamis Yusuf) for assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement, citing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had attributed most of the 35-month delay to the Crown's inaccurate time estimate and mishandling of a defence disclosure request.

The Court of Appeal re-evaluated the delay, finding that while the Crown was initially responsible for the misestimate, all parties and the court shared responsibility once the trial progressed.

The defence's disclosure request was deemed unnecessary and inappropriate, contributing to delay.

After further deductions for defence-caused delay (counsel unavailability, Pauls' illness) and joint responsibility for misestimates, the net delay for all respondents fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Court also rejected the respondents' challenges to their guilt findings.

This is an appeal by Derek Halat from two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board (ORB), dated January 14, 2019, and April 24, 2019.

The first appeal was rendered moot by the subsequent, stricter disposition.

The appellant, diagnosed with treatment-resistant schizophrenia and substance abuse disorder, was ordered detained at Waypoint, a maximum-security facility, due to a history of violence and recent threatening behavior, including death threats against hospital staff.

The ORB found the appellant continued to present a significant threat to public safety and that his transfer to Waypoint was necessary and appropriate.

The Court of Appeal found the ORB's rationale and outcome reasonable, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant, Bruce Wilson, appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault, kidnapping, and uttering death threats, and his subsequent dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's corrective instruction to the jury regarding defence counsel's closing arguments about untested DNA samples.

The sentence appeal argued that "Lord Coke's principle," which generally prohibits relying on subsequent convictions to aggravate a prior offence's sentence, should apply to dangerous offender proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the corrective instruction and holding that Lord Coke's principle does not apply to dangerous offender determinations, as these proceedings are forward-looking and focus on future public safety and patterns of behaviour.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, and uttering threats to cause death, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence of three years' imprisonment.

The sole ground of appeal from conviction concerned the sequence in which the trial judge disposed of a constitutional challenge to section 119(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and a third party records application under section 278.3 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by first dismissing the third party records application and then treating the constitutional application as moot.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, holding that the appellant failed to demonstrate the extrajudicial measures record was potentially relevant, and therefore the Crown's duty to inquire was not triggered.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder following a shooting incident in which he fired multiple shots at the victim.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's instructions regarding the use of evidence of after-the-fact conduct, arguing the judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on permitted and prohibited uses of such evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the fundamental principle of proportionality and improperly considered intent to kill as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that despite some deficiencies in the jury instructions, no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred, and that the sentence of 11 years imprisonment was fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal negligence causing death under s. 219(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant negligent in failing to conduct a thorough daily inspection of his semi-trailer, resulting in a dual wheel detaching and striking a vehicle, fatally injuring the occupant.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in applying the legal standard for criminal negligence, and (2) the trial judge erred in using the appellant's prior compelled testimony in violation of s. 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal accepted the second ground, finding the trial judge improperly used the appellant's prior incriminating testimony to undermine his credibility and reject his defence at trial.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 6.5 years imposed on the respondent for 102 counts of sexual offences against 18 young boys committed over more than 20 years while employed in positions of trust.

The respondent pleaded guilty to 43 counts of indecent assault on a male, 47 counts of gross indecency, and 10 counts of sexual assault, and was found guilty of 2 additional counts of gross indecency.

The sentencing judge found the respondent posed a very low to low risk for future sexual offending and imposed a concurrent sentence of 6.5 years, less six months' credit for pre-trial bail.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit and varied it to 10 years' imprisonment, less six months' credit for a net sentence of 9.5 years.

The appellants were convicted of sexual assault of a 16-year-old complainant who was intoxicated during a camping trip.

The appellants appealed their convictions on the grounds that the trial judge erred in his analysis of consent and capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to separately consider the issues of consent and capacity, and failed to apply the proper legal framework for determining incapacity due to intoxication.

The court held that the trial judge appeared to equate any degree of impairment with incapacity, which is an error of law.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and sexual interference.

The trial judge found that the appellant had sexually assaulted a 15-year-old complainant at a property he owned, holding a knife to her throat and forcing her to perform fellatio.

The appellant's defence relied on a medical condition affecting his genitals and a theory of innocent secondary transfer of semen.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, treatment of DNA evidence, or application of the collateral fact rule.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation of a young girl aged 14-15 years at the time of the offence, contrary to section 153(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to follow his directive that the trial proceed in French and that the interpretation provided was inadequate, thereby violating his language rights under section 530 of the Criminal Code and his right to interpreter assistance under section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal rejected these claims, finding that the appellant had full knowledge of his language rights, freely chose to proceed in English, and raised no objections at trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition dated February 1, 2018, ordering the appellant's detention subject to conditions.

The appeal became moot when the Board issued a new disposition on January 14, 2019, before the appeal hearing.

The Court of Appeal declined to hear the moot appeal, applying the two-step analysis from Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General).

The court found no live controversy affecting the parties' rights and determined that the Borowski factors did not justify exercising discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The court indicated willingness to hear an appeal from the 2019 disposition at an early date.

L'accusé, Robert Vanier, a été déclaré coupable par un jury d'avoir publié un faux prospectus en violation de l'article 400 du Code criminel, dans l'intention d'inciter à l'investissement ou de frauder les actionnaires d'Onco Petroleum Incorporated.

Le prospectus affirmait faussement que la société avait levé 22 377 600 $ d'un placement privé d'actions.

La cour a pris en compte des circonstances aggravantes, notamment l'ampleur, la complexité et la durée de la fraude, son impact sur la confiance des investisseurs, le nombre élevé de victimes, la valeur de la fraude dépassant 1 million de dollars, l'abus de confiance, le rôle central de Vanier et son lourd casier judiciaire pour malhonnêteté.

Aucune circonstance atténuante n'a été retenue.

La Couronne a demandé une peine de 7 à 9 ans consécutive à une peine antérieure de 3 ans pour parjure, tandis que la défense a suggéré 3 à 5 ans concurrents.

Le tribunal a imposé une peine de 8 ans de prison, concurrente à la peine précédente, et a ordonné un prélèvement d'échantillons d'ADN.

The appellant appealed his conviction for armed robbery and related offences, as well as his eight-year sentence.

The trial judge found that police unlawfully detained the appellant by deliberately delaying his appearance before a justice of the peace beyond the 24-hour requirement under section 503 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge declined to stay proceedings, finding that the integrity of the justice system would be better served by proceeding to trial on the merits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction but modified the sentence, correcting errors in the application of the Kienapple principle and reducing the global sentence to five years concurrent with one-year sentences on related charges.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board declaring him unfit to stand trial and ordering his detention at the Brockville Mental Health Centre.

The appellant did not contest his unfitness or the finding that he posed a significant risk to the community due to serious mental illness, but argued he should be transferred to the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre instead.

The Court of Appeal found the Review Board erred by failing to investigate when the complainant would be discharged from the Royal Ottawa Centre, which was the primary basis for the transfer order.

The court also identified unresolved questions regarding the appellant's linguistic rights under the Criminal Code and the French Language Services Act.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Review Board for a new hearing.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of four years' imprisonment on convictions for assault with a weapon, assault, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He argued the sentence was unfit compared to his co-accused and that the sentencing judge should have reduced the sentence due to alleged Crown misconduct involving late disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the fitness of sentence, finding the sentencing judge properly considered relevant principles and the appellant's significant role in a brutal joint attack.

The court also rejected the Crown misconduct argument, finding the late disclosure did not warrant mitigation.

However, the court allowed a minor correction to the pre-sentence custody calculation, reducing the sentence by 13 days.