Philippe Georges Cowle

The appellant, J.J., appealed convictions for sexual assault and break and enter.

The appeal raised issues concerning the trial judge's alleged misapprehension of DNA evidence, the imposition of an onus on the appellant to provide a benign explanation for DNA presence, and trial counsel's conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the DNA evidence in his reasons, did not reverse the burden of proof regarding innocent DNA transfer, and that trial counsel's prior representation of an investigating officer did not result in an actual conflict of interest impairing trial fairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon stemming from two separate incidents.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of unsavoury witnesses under Vetrovec principles and the use of "prefer" language in evaluating witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied Vetrovec by seeking corroboration and that the use of "prefer" was a linguistic slip, not a misapprehension of the burden of proof, given the overall context of the reasons and the trial judge's self-direction on the standard of proof.

This addendum to an appeal decision addresses the Court of Appeal's inherent jurisdiction to permit publication of its reasons, which contain information subject to a statutory publication ban under s. 278.95 of the Criminal Code.

The court determined that despite the ban, and the trial judge not having lifted it, it possessed inherent jurisdiction to publish its reasons unredacted, provided the complainant's privacy (protected by a separate s. 486.4 ban) and the interests of justice were considered.

The court found that the complainant was comfortable with publication and that the development of jurisprudence on s. 276 applications would benefit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, his designation as a dangerous offender, and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge's finding that the complainant's passivity was due to fear and not consent was upheld, with the Court of Appeal affirming that silence or passivity does not constitute communicated consent.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, citing the appellant's history of sexual assaults and the intractability of his behavioural challenges, supported by expert psychiatric evidence.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Stephen Campbell, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for an order that a fresh psychiatric report be prepared to support his not criminally responsible (NCR) defence, which was rejected at trial.

The court found that nothing of substance had changed since the original psychiatric reports were prepared for trial and carefully reviewed by the trial judge.

The motion was dismissed, as there was no proper basis for ordering a fresh psychiatric report.

The appellant, Ian Bullens, appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not granting a "Downes credit" for stringent bail conditions that allegedly prevented him from seeing his children.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting that the issue was not fully brought to the sentencing judge's attention and that Downes credits are reserved for "stringent" conditions, which were not met in this case.

The conviction appeal was abandoned, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Kodie Johnston, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, possession of a prohibited weapon, uttering threats, and obstructing police, as well as his sentence.

His conviction appeal arguments included insufficient proof of identity as the shooter, issues with gunshot residue (GSR) evidence, the voluntariness of his inculpatory statement, and the reliability of the victim's testimony.

Duty counsel also argued the trial judge failed to consider the requisite intent for uttering threats and obstructing police, and did not give adequate weight to the appellant's mental health and addiction issues in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding overwhelming evidence of guilt and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice regarding the intent elements, and no unreasonable exercise of discretion in sentencing.

The appellant, Courtney Foster, appealed his conviction for attempted murder and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

He was convicted of attempted murder of his wife and sentenced to a global term of 10 years, less 4 years pre-sentence custody, for a net sentence of 6 years.

The appellant argued the trial judge did not consider all arguments and the verdict was unreasonable, claiming he lacked the requisite intent.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's finding of intent was amply supported by the record and the verdict was not unreasonable.

Regarding the sentence, the appellant argued it was too harsh and that the trial judge failed to apply appropriate "Duncan credit." The Court found no error in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, noting the trial judge properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors and applied the correct Duncan credit.

R.H. appealed sentences totaling six years for sexual interference, making child pornography, and accessing child pornography.

The Court of Appeal upheld the global sentence, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge, who properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors and the principles of denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences.

The court, however, modified a lifetime internet prohibition order to align with previous jurisprudence and granted credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings in a sexual assault case after the complainant failed to re-attend for cross-examination.

The trial judge inferred the complainant was avoiding cross-examination and found the respondent's bail conditions "torturous" leading to the stay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in refusing the Crown's request for a brief adjournment without applying the proper legal test (Darville factors) and made factual findings unsupported by evidence.

The Court emphasized that a stay of proceedings is an extreme remedy reserved for the "clearest of cases" and that less drastic alternatives were available.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

Three appellants were convicted at trial of assault causing bodily harm, with two also convicted of unlawful confinement.

Following the trial judge's reasons, the appellants moved for a stay of proceedings on the basis that their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, but the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding the net delay was below the Jordan ceiling.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal in the result and leaving several s. 11(b) legal issues — including treatment of multiple accused and post-conviction applications — to be resolved in a future case.

The accused appealed his conviction for attempted murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting improper opinion evidence from a 911 dispatcher and a homicide detective, and in admitting hearsay evidence from the complainant to EMS personnel.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in allowing opinion evidence on the accused's credibility and demeanour, and in admitting the complainant's out-of-court statements as hearsay that did not meet necessity and reliability requirements.

The court rejected applying the curative proviso, finding the errors were not trivial and the Crown's case, while strong, was not overwhelming.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of prohibited firearms, challenging the dismissal of his Charter application to exclude evidence.

He argued the search warrant for his residence was invalid because it did not specify his unit in a multi-unit dwelling, the confidential informant's information lacked corroboration, and the police unlawfully seized his vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the warrant adequately described the location, the informant's information was sufficiently corroborated, and the vehicle seizure was authorized under the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault against his former spouse, as well as his four-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting discreditable conduct evidence, dismissing his application to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity, and correcting his counsel's closing address which invoked prohibited twin myths reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal and an application to introduce fresh evidence, holding that the proposed social media evidence did not meet the Palmer test for admissibility and the four-year penitentiary sentence was fit for serious domestic sexual assaults.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against three accused (Pauls, Jamal Yusuf, and Jamis Yusuf) for assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement, citing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had attributed most of the 35-month delay to the Crown's inaccurate time estimate and mishandling of a defence disclosure request.

The Court of Appeal re-evaluated the delay, finding that while the Crown was initially responsible for the misestimate, all parties and the court shared responsibility once the trial progressed.

The defence's disclosure request was deemed unnecessary and inappropriate, contributing to delay.

After further deductions for defence-caused delay (counsel unavailability, Pauls' illness) and joint responsibility for misestimates, the net delay for all respondents fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Court also rejected the respondents' challenges to their guilt findings.

This is an appeal by Derek Halat from two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board (ORB), dated January 14, 2019, and April 24, 2019.

The first appeal was rendered moot by the subsequent, stricter disposition.

The appellant, diagnosed with treatment-resistant schizophrenia and substance abuse disorder, was ordered detained at Waypoint, a maximum-security facility, due to a history of violence and recent threatening behavior, including death threats against hospital staff.

The ORB found the appellant continued to present a significant threat to public safety and that his transfer to Waypoint was necessary and appropriate.

The Court of Appeal found the ORB's rationale and outcome reasonable, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant, Bruce Wilson, appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault, kidnapping, and uttering death threats, and his subsequent dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's corrective instruction to the jury regarding defence counsel's closing arguments about untested DNA samples.

The sentence appeal argued that "Lord Coke's principle" which generally prohibits relying on subsequent convictions to aggravate a prior offence's sentence, should apply to dangerous offender proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the corrective instruction and holding that Lord Coke's principle does not apply to dangerous offender determinations, as these proceedings are forward-looking and focus on future public safety and patterns of behaviour.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, and uttering threats to cause death, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence of three years' imprisonment.

The sole ground of appeal from conviction concerned the sequence in which the trial judge disposed of a constitutional challenge to section 119(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and a third party records application under section 278.3 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by first dismissing the third party records application and then treating the constitutional application as moot.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, holding that the appellant failed to demonstrate the extrajudicial measures record was potentially relevant, and therefore the Crown's duty to inquire was not triggered.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder following a shooting incident in which he fired multiple shots at the victim.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's instructions regarding the use of evidence of after-the-fact conduct, arguing the judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on permitted and prohibited uses of such evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the fundamental principle of proportionality and improperly considered intent to kill as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that despite some deficiencies in the jury instructions, no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred, and that the sentence of 11 years imprisonment was fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal negligence causing death under s. 219(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant negligent in failing to conduct a thorough daily inspection of his semi-trailer, resulting in a dual wheel detaching and striking a vehicle, fatally injuring the occupant.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in applying the legal standard for criminal negligence, and (2) the trial judge erred in using the appellant's prior compelled testimony in violation of s. 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal accepted the second ground, finding the trial judge improperly used the appellant's prior incriminating testimony to undermine his credibility and reject his defence at trial.