The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal allowed.

This decision addresses an application for a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, brought by Nicholas Aaron Martin and Mackenzie Doyle.

The applicants, charged with serious offences including robbery and pointing a firearm, argued that the delay in bringing their case to trial—over 52 months—exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the sources of delay, including the presence of multiple accused and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and found that the net delay still exceeded the ceiling.

The court ordered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant, A.N., appealed convictions for three counts of sexual interference and three counts of sexual assault, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The appeal focused on whether a 60-day period of delay, attributed by the trial judge to COVID-19 as an exceptional circumstance, was properly deducted from the total delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s reliance on local knowledge and internal court statistics to find the delay was justified, and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, despite the delay being below the Jordan ceiling.

The application judge erred by assessing the reasonableness of the delay against a hypothetical scenario where judicial vacancies were filled, rather than the actual systemic circumstances.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the constitutional yardstick for below-ceiling delays is not an ideal state but the real-world conditions, and that delays due to judicial vacancies, while concerning, are not per se "unreasonable" under s. 11(b) if the overall delay remains presumptively reasonable.

The appeal was granted, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to stay drug trafficking charges against the respondent, Angelo Kirkopoulos, on the grounds of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application judge had found a net delay of 35.5 months, exceeding the Jordan ceiling, after accounting for defence delay and 14 months attributed to COVID-19 as an exceptional circumstance.

The Crown argued that an additional 8-month period, which the application judge classified as institutional delay due to court backlogs, should also be considered an exceptional circumstance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the application judge's characterization of the 8-month period as institutional delay.

The court emphasized that while the pandemic caused exceptional circumstances, the Crown must still demonstrate reasonable efforts to mitigate delay, and deference is owed to a trial judge's factual findings and local knowledge regarding delay attribution.

A member of the Canadian Armed Forces posted abroad was convicted of voyeurism, possession of a device for surreptitious interception of private communications, sexual assault, and disgraceful conduct, following a search of his residence and electronic devices by Canadian military investigators and local police operating under a Virginia warrant.

The appellant challenged the search as violating s. 8 of the Charter, arguing the search was unauthorized and unreasonably expanded to cover unanticipated offences.

The majority held that the search was authorized by law under the Virginia warrant, which expressly covered electronic devices; that the warrant met the Vu standard for specific prior authorization of digital searches; and that evidence of sexual assault discovered inadvertently during triage of electronic devices was admissible under the plain view doctrine.

The Court declined to reconsider the extraterritorial application of the Charter as established in R. v. Hape.

The appeal was dismissed and convictions affirmed.

The appellant law society brought disciplinary proceedings against a member lawyer in 2012, resulting in a finding of guilt on four charges and disbarment in 2019.

The respondent applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of inordinate delay amounting to an abuse of process; the Hearing Committee dismissed the application but the Court of Appeal granted the stay, setting aside the penalty.

The Supreme Court clarified the three-step test from Blencoe for determining whether administrative delay constitutes an abuse of process: the delay must be inordinate, it must have directly caused significant prejudice, and a final assessment must find the delay manifestly unfair or otherwise bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court also held that in statutory appeals, questions of procedural fairness and abuse of process are subject to appellate standards of review, not the correctness standard applicable on judicial review.

Applying these principles, the majority found no palpable and overriding error in the Hearing Committee's conclusions that the delay was not inordinate and that no significant prejudice was established, and accordingly allowed the appeal.

The appellant, Carlos Pavao, appealed his convictions for fraud and his sentence.

He was convicted of defrauding ten investors and the public through the sale of non-existent shares in gold mining companies.

His appeal of conviction was based on alleged misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge and a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and that the delay was justified under the Morin transitional exception.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the restitution and fine orders by $45,000, as these amounts related to individuals who were not named complainants in the indictment.

The defendants, Jamal and Jamis Yusuf, sought to reopen their trial after conviction for assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement, and subsequent appeals to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada.

The application was based on a new affidavit from co-accused Aziz Pauls, who did not testify at trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence failed to meet the credibility and impact requirements of the test for reopening a trial after conviction, particularly given the strong video evidence and prior judicial findings.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court order staying charges against three respondents (two brothers and their mother) due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had calculated the delay at 32 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by including the period from the end of evidence and argument until the stay decision in the Jordan ceiling calculation, based on the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. K.G.K. Correcting this error reduced the net delay to 29.25 months, falling below the ceiling.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's characterization of other delay periods and concluded that the delay was not unreasonable, even if below the ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge to release the verdict.