Christine Mainville

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency against his sister and appealed the conviction.

The appeal raised five issues, all concerning the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability of the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's conclusions.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to trial judges' credibility findings and affirmed that the judge correctly applied principles regarding witness demeanor and the theory of recent fabrication.

The appellant, convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and failing to stop at an accident, appealed her convictions and sentence.

The central issue at trial was the defence of necessity, claiming she drove due to fear for her safety.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to elicit evidence of the appellant's pre-trial silence regarding the alleged attack and by drawing an adverse inference from that silence, thereby breaching her right to silence.

The court held that the right to silence cannot be used to incriminate an accused or impeach credibility, and that suggesting a defence is a "recent fabrication" due to pre-trial silence undermines this right.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged breach of his Charter right under section 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time.

The trial was scheduled to conclude on January 8, 2021, which would be 18 months and 7 days from the commencement of proceedings on July 1, 2019, exceeding the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in Jordan.

The applicant demonstrated no defence delay and made sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, particularly regarding the complainant's unavailability due to high school examinations, which was foreseeable given the nature of the charges.

The court found the Crown fell short of its obligations to anticipate scheduling problems and take reasonable steps to avoid them.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The Tribunal convened a pre-hearing conference to address allegations that counsel breached a prior confidentiality order regarding restricted access motions.

The Tribunal found no intentional disclosures of confidential material by either party.

To ensure clarity moving forward, the Tribunal issued a procedural direction ordering that all materials related to the restricted access request, including third-party materials, remain confidential and sealed.

The Tribunal also established a formal motion process for third parties seeking participant or intervenor status on the restricted access motion.

The appellant, David Réal Arsenault, appealed his conviction for marijuana production and possession for trafficking, and his sentence.

He raised two grounds: the trial judge's failure to assist him as a self-represented litigant and to rule on a constitutional motion regarding a search warrant, and the violation of his linguistic rights by forcing him to proceed without French-speaking counsel.

The Crown conceded the first ground, agreeing to a new trial and undertaking to seek a stay of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on this basis, quashing the conviction and ordering a new trial.

Regarding the linguistic rights argument, the Court found that the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment was a reasonable exercise of discretion, as the appellant had not demonstrated sufficient diligence in securing French-speaking counsel over a six-year period.

The Court also found the appellant's new evidence on this point to lack credibility.

The Attorney General of Canada sought an adjournment of a judicial review application regarding a surrender order to Romania dated March 4, 2019.

The applicant had been in custody in Canada since October 31, 2016, and was subject to a three-year sentence in Romania with credit for time served.

The court granted the adjournment to permit the Minister of Justice to reconsider the surrender decision in light of alleged violations of the Extradition Act, directing reconsideration to occur as soon as possible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal negligence causing death under s. 219(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant negligent in failing to conduct a thorough daily inspection of his semi-trailer, resulting in a dual wheel detaching and striking a vehicle, fatally injuring the occupant.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in applying the legal standard for criminal negligence, and (2) the trial judge erred in using the appellant's prior compelled testimony in violation of s. 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal accepted the second ground, finding the trial judge improperly used the appellant's prior incriminating testimony to undermine his credibility and reject his defence at trial.

Following liability findings for multiple forms of professional misconduct in dental practice, the discipline panel addressed penalty and costs on an uncontested joint submission.

The misconduct included unnecessary dental services, false or misleading documentation and claims, excessive or unreasonable fees, failure to collect co-payments properly, deficient records, and misconduct tied to financial benefit.

The panel accepted a joint submission imposing a reprimand, a 12-month suspension, extensive suspension and practice conditions, remedial coursework, and monitoring.

The panel held that the proposed sanction was fair and reasonable, served specific and general deterrence, protected the public, and supported rehabilitation.

Costs of $200,000 were also ordered, representing approximately one third of the College’s hearing costs.

A professional discipline panel found that the member committed professional misconduct arising from a systemic pattern of unnecessary radiographs, false and misleading insurance billings, billing for services not performed, charging excessive or unreasonable fees, failing to collect co-payments, and failing to provide complete patient records to the regulator.

Applying the civil standard of proof from F.H. v McDougall, the panel relied heavily on documentary records and found the billing discrepancies too numerous and persistent to be explained as innocent clerical mistakes.

The panel rejected the position that responsibility for billing errors could be delegated to staff, holding the clinic owner responsible for the conduct of the office and the claims submitted under his name.

The publication restriction protecting patient identities remained in force.

The applicant, a lawyer charged with attempting to obstruct justice and perjury, sought production of third-party records held by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC).

The charges arose from her alleged representations about possessing a video recording of a police officer stealing money during a search.

The applicant sought records from three PPSC counsel.

The court applied the first stage of the O'Connor test and found that the records of two PPSC counsel were likely relevant to the charges, ordering them produced for judicial inspection.

The application for records from the third counsel was dismissed without prejudice.

Appeal from a conviction and sentence imposed by Justice Randall W. Lalande of the Ontario Court of Justice on November 2016 and January 4, 2017, respectively.

The matter was adjourned to February 15 for full argument on the merits, with one hour allocated for the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences arising from incidents alleged to have occurred 33 years prior, when the appellant was 14 years old and babysat the complainant, who was nearly 6 years old at the time.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on acceptance of the complainant's evidence over the appellant's denial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the principle from R. v. J.J.R.D. by failing to provide a "considered and reasoned" analysis of the complainant's evidence.

Although the trial judge identified the need for confirmatory evidence, he failed to identify any independent evidence supporting the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Derrick Harvey, an American citizen, appealed his 2011 guilty pleas for assault and failing to comply with a recognizance, which subsequently led to his permanent residence application being refused due to criminality.

He argued his plea was not informed as his trial counsel failed to advise him of the significant immigration consequences.

The Superior Court of Justice, on summary conviction appeal, found that Harvey's plea was not informed because he was unaware of the critical ramifications, specifically the distinction between border entry and criminal inadmissibility for permanent residence.

The court emphasized that a plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, including collateral consequences.

It was not necessary to find counsel ineffective.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the decision to re-prosecute left to the Crown.

In a professional discipline hearing, the College alleged sexual abuse of patients and disgraceful, dishonourable, unprofessional or unethical conduct by a dentist involving a long-term intimate relationship with a patient, sexualized comments and touching toward a patient-employee, and inappropriate touching of another patient-employee.

The member admitted the allegations and signed an agreed statement of facts, and the panel found the admissions informed, voluntary and unequivocal.

The panel held the admitted conduct constituted sexual abuse and professional misconduct under the Health Professions Procedural Code and the Dentistry Act Regulation.

Accepting a joint penalty submission, the panel ordered a reprimand and mandatory revocation of the member's certificate of registration effective April 25, 2017.

No costs were ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering into a dwelling house contrary to s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on fingerprint evidence linking him to a theft of over $4,000 from a condominium unit where he worked as a concierge.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the reliability of the fingerprint evidence; (2) a violation of s. 11(b) Charter rights regarding trial delay; and (3) a violation of s. 7 Charter rights regarding the failure to preserve video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellants pleaded guilty to marijuana production under section 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and received the mandatory minimum sentence of nine months imprisonment.

The appellants appealed on the grounds that their guilty pleas were not informed due to ineffective assistance of counsel and language barriers.

The police brief summarizing the facts was in English only, not shared with the appellants, and contained admissions that would establish aggravating factors triggering the mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellants were not adequately informed of these consequences.

The court found that the appellants' guilty pleas were uninformed and that they suffered prejudice, as they would not have pleaded guilty had they been aware of the relevant facts and sentencing consequences.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a young woman (A.Y.) and sentenced to two years less one day.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the ground that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's prior consistent statement—an anonymous email sent to police the morning after the alleged assault—as corroboration of her trial testimony.

The trial judge had explicitly stated that the email was "corroboration of her evidence." The Court of Appeal held that while the email was admissible for limited purposes (to rebut the defence theory regarding motive and to assess the complainant's credibility through her conduct), it could not be used as corroboration in the legal sense because it was not from an independent source and could not confirm the veracity of the complainant's testimony unless improperly used for the truth of its contents or by treating consistency as confirmatory.

The court found the trial judge erred in law and allowed the appeal, quashing the conviction and ordering a new trial.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought trial costs of over $200,000.

The respondent opposed, arguing the appellant failed to provide detailed dockets and that costs should be reduced for various reasons, including the extra time required for a bilingual proceeding.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant's costs outline provided sufficient detail and awarded partial indemnity costs.

The Court applied a 20% discount to the claimed fees, deducted costs for a motion the respondent had won, and excluded one unsupported disbursement.

The Court awarded the appellant $162,239.25 in trial costs and amended the previous appeal costs order to include $16,683.65 in disbursements.

On a civil appeal arising from historic sexual and physical abuse allegations based largely on recovered memories, the court held that the trial judge erred by using expert psychological evidence to corroborate the truth of the respondent's allegations and resolve a credibility contest.

Expert evidence could explain memory processes and damages, but could not be used to decide the ultimate issues of credibility, reliability, and liability.

The court therefore set aside the judgment, dismissed the assault claim, and held that a new trial was unnecessary because the admissible evidence was evenly balanced.

The court also allowed the appellant's defamation counterclaim in part, finding that qualified privilege did not protect defamatory communications sent to a former friend who had no reciprocal interest or duty to receive them.

The appellant was arrested for drug trafficking and subjected to a 'bedpan vigil' search authorized by a general warrant.

He was detained for 43 hours, handcuffed to cell bars, and experienced severe withdrawal symptoms without medical supervision.

The Court of Appeal held that while a general warrant can authorize a bedpan vigil search, the warrant was defective because it purported to authorize indefinite detention, violating the requirement to bring an arrested person before a justice without unreasonable delay.

The court also found the search was conducted in an unreasonable manner, violating the appellant's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the convictions were set aside, and an acquittal was ordered.