Lauren Alyssa Binhammer

The appellants, in separate incidents, committed violent acts while in states of drug-induced psychosis and automatism.

At trial, they were precluded from raising the defence of non-mental disorder automatism due to section 33.1 of the Criminal Code, which removes the defence for violence-based offences where automatism is self-induced by voluntary intoxication.

The Court of Appeal held that section 33.1 violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by permitting convictions without proof of voluntariness or the requisite fault element, and by substituting voluntary intoxication for the essential elements of the offence.

The Court further held that these violations could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.

Section 33.1 was declared to be of no force or effect.

The appeals were allowed, with a new trial ordered for one appellant and acquittals entered for the other on the violence-based charges.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual interference against a child victim between 2008 and 2011, when the victim was eight to ten years old.

The offender was involved in an extra-marital affair with the victim's mother, who facilitated the abuse.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less-a-day in the reformatory followed by two years' probation, rejecting the Crown's submission for four years in the penitentiary.

The court found that while the offence was serious and caused significant harm, the offender was not a predator and did not systematically groom the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's guilty plea, lack of criminal record, remorse, low risk of reoffending, and excellent prospects for rehabilitation.

A professional discipline panel found that the member committed professional misconduct arising from a systemic pattern of unnecessary radiographs, false and misleading insurance billings, billing for services not performed, charging excessive or unreasonable fees, failing to collect co-payments, and failing to provide complete patient records to the regulator.

Applying the civil standard of proof from F.H. v McDougall, the panel relied heavily on documentary records and found the billing discrepancies too numerous and persistent to be explained as innocent clerical mistakes.

The panel rejected the position that responsibility for billing errors could be delegated to staff, holding the clinic owner responsible for the conduct of the office and the claims submitted under his name.

The publication restriction protecting patient identities remained in force.

The appellant appealed a 54-month global sentence imposed following conviction for possession for purposes of trafficking methamphetamine, marijuana, and morphine, as well as simple possession of other controlled substances.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, that the judge failed to consider relevant mitigating circumstances, improperly considered defence conduct as aggravating, and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The appellate court found the trial judge's paramount concerns of denunciation and deterrence were appropriate, that mitigating factors were properly considered, and that the sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record spanning over three decades with approximately eight prior convictions for possession for purpose of trafficking.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision that imposed concurrent victim surcharges on an offender convicted of two counts of theft under $5,000.

The central issue was whether sentencing judges have discretion to impose victim surcharges concurrently or whether surcharges must be imposed separately for each offence.

The Court of Appeal held that victim surcharges are imposed automatically by statute for each and every offence, and sentencing judges have no discretion to order concurrent surcharges.

The court distinguished surcharges from time-based sentences and fines, finding that the legislative history and statutory language clearly demonstrate Parliament's intent that surcharges be imposed for each conviction.