Philippe Georges Cowle

The Crown appealed a sentence of 6.5 years imposed on the respondent for 102 counts of sexual offences against 18 young boys committed over more than 20 years while employed in positions of trust.

The respondent pleaded guilty to 43 counts of indecent assault on a male, 47 counts of gross indecency, and 10 counts of sexual assault, and was found guilty of 2 additional counts of gross indecency.

The sentencing judge found the respondent posed a very low to low risk for future sexual offending and imposed a concurrent sentence of 6.5 years, less six months' credit for pre-trial bail.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit and varied it to 10 years' imprisonment, less six months' credit for a net sentence of 9.5 years.

The appellants were convicted of sexual assault of a 16-year-old complainant who was intoxicated during a camping trip.

The appellants appealed their convictions on the grounds that the trial judge erred in his analysis of consent and capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to separately consider the issues of consent and capacity, and failed to apply the proper legal framework for determining incapacity due to intoxication.

The court held that the trial judge appeared to equate any degree of impairment with incapacity, which is an error of law.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and sexual interference.

The trial judge found that the appellant had sexually assaulted a 15-year-old complainant at a property he owned, holding a knife to her throat and forcing her to perform fellatio.

The appellant's defence relied on a medical condition affecting his genitals and a theory of innocent secondary transfer of semen.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, treatment of DNA evidence, or application of the collateral fact rule.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation of a young girl aged 14-15 years at the time of the offence, contrary to section 153(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to follow his directive that the trial proceed in French and that the interpretation provided was inadequate, thereby violating his language rights under section 530 of the Criminal Code and his right to interpreter assistance under section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal rejected these claims, finding that the appellant had full knowledge of his language rights, freely chose to proceed in English, and raised no objections at trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition dated February 1, 2018, ordering the appellant's detention subject to conditions.

The appeal became moot when the Board issued a new disposition on January 14, 2019, before the appeal hearing.

The Court of Appeal declined to hear the moot appeal, applying the two-step analysis from Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General).

The court found no live controversy affecting the parties' rights and determined that the Borowski factors did not justify exercising discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The court indicated willingness to hear an appeal from the 2019 disposition at an early date.

The Court allowed the appeals and held that the mandatory victim surcharge in section 737 of the Criminal Code violates section 12 of the Charter for impecunious offenders.

The provision was declared of no force and effect immediately.

L'accusé, Robert Vanier, a été déclaré coupable par un jury d'avoir publié un faux prospectus en violation de l'article 400 du Code criminel, dans l'intention d'inciter à l'investissement ou de frauder les actionnaires d'Onco Petroleum Incorporated.

Le prospectus affirmait faussement que la société avait levé 22 377 600 $ d'un placement privé d'actions.

La cour a pris en compte des circonstances aggravantes, notamment l'ampleur, la complexité et la durée de la fraude, son impact sur la confiance des investisseurs, le nombre élevé de victimes, la valeur de la fraude dépassant 1 million de dollars, l'abus de confiance, le rôle central de Vanier et son lourd casier judiciaire pour malhonnêteté.

Aucune circonstance atténuante n'a été retenue.

La Couronne a demandé une peine de 7 à 9 ans consécutive à une peine antérieure de 3 ans pour parjure, tandis que la défense a suggéré 3 à 5 ans concurrents.

Le tribunal a imposé une peine de 8 ans de prison, concurrente à la peine précédente, et a ordonné un prélèvement d'échantillons d'ADN.

The appellant appealed his conviction for armed robbery and related offences, as well as his eight-year sentence.

The trial judge found that police unlawfully detained the appellant by deliberately delaying his appearance before a justice of the peace beyond the 24-hour requirement under section 503 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge declined to stay proceedings, finding that the integrity of the justice system would be better served by proceeding to trial on the merits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction but modified the sentence, correcting errors in the application of the Kienapple principle and reducing the global sentence to five years concurrent with one-year sentences on related charges.

The offender was convicted of two counts of perjury for swearing false personal information forms submitted to the TSX and CNQ to take his company public.

He concealed his true identity and extensive criminal record for fraud and dishonesty.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors, including the offender's high moral blameworthiness, his position of trust, and the potential harm to the Canadian financial markets, against his health issues.

The court sentenced the offender to 3 years of imprisonment.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board declaring him unfit to stand trial and ordering his detention at the Brockville Mental Health Centre.

The appellant did not contest his unfitness or the finding that he posed a significant risk to the community due to serious mental illness, but argued he should be transferred to the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre instead.

The Court of Appeal found the Review Board erred by failing to investigate when the complainant would be discharged from the Royal Ottawa Centre, which was the primary basis for the transfer order.

The court also identified unresolved questions regarding the appellant's linguistic rights under the Criminal Code and the French Language Services Act.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Review Board for a new hearing.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of four years' imprisonment on convictions for assault with a weapon, assault, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He argued the sentence was unfit compared to his co-accused and that the sentencing judge should have reduced the sentence due to alleged Crown misconduct involving late disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the fitness of sentence, finding the sentencing judge properly considered relevant principles and the appellant's significant role in a brutal joint attack.

The court also rejected the Crown misconduct argument, finding the late disclosure did not warrant mitigation.

However, the court allowed a minor correction to the pre-sentence custody calculation, reducing the sentence by 13 days.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code and possession of a prohibited firearm under s. 92(1).

He was sentenced to 96 months on the first offence and 80 months concurrent on the second, with 44 months credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown opposed bail on the basis that detention was necessary in the public interest.

The motion judge found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the appellant would surrender as required, the appellant failed to demonstrate that detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The accused, charged with making, circulating, or publishing a false prospectus contrary to s. 400 of the Criminal Code, brought a motion for a directed verdict after the Crown closed its case.

The accused argued there was insufficient evidence that she knew the prospectus contained a material misrepresentation regarding a $20 million private placement, or that she actively circulated it.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including her role as a founding member, her signing of the prospectus, and her failure to act when informed of severe financial discrepancies—was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt by a properly instructed jury.

The court held that the limited weighing of circumstantial evidence on a directed verdict motion does not permit the judge to resolve competing inferences, which remains the province of the jury.

The self-represented applicant, facing serious fraud-related charges in a lengthy jury trial, suffered a severe cardiac event during the trial.

Medical evidence from his cardiologists indicated a 100% blockage of a main artery and recommended two to three months of rest to avoid a potentially fatal heart attack.

The court granted the motion for a mistrial, finding that continuing the trial posed a serious risk to the applicant's health and his ability to make full answer and defence.

The applicant agreed to waive any s. 11(b) Charter arguments arising from the delay.

The appellant appealed his conviction from June 10, 2014, arguing he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at trial and that he would have testified in his defence had his counsel been effective.

The appellant sought to introduce new evidence consisting of his testimony and that of his spouse to support his claim of ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal rejected the new evidence due to lack of credibility and implausibility, finding that cross-examination revealed falsehoods in the affidavits regarding contact between the appellant and his counsel during trial preparation.

The court also found the appellant's account of events on the night of the alleged abduction lacked logic and was inconsistent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal on second degree murder and conviction for manslaughter.

The respondent stabbed and killed his girlfriend, admitting to the killing but claiming lack of intent for murder or alternatively acting under provocation.

The jury found him not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.

The Crown advanced two grounds of appeal: whether the trial judge erred in leaving the provocation defence with the jury, and whether expert psychiatric evidence was admissible.

The appellate court dismissed the first ground, finding the Crown could not advance a contradictory position on appeal after accepting provocation was available at trial.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding significant portions of the psychiatrist's evidence regarding the accused's disposition and mental state were inadmissible as they invaded the jury's province and went beyond the proper scope of expert psychiatric opinion.

The court ordered a new trial on the charge of second degree murder.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants were impoverished offenders with mental and physical disabilities, unemployment, and substance abuse issues.

The trial judges had refused to impose the surcharge, finding it unconstitutional.

The Crown appealed and the Superior Court judges overturned these decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge, finding that while it engages the appellants' liberty interests, it does not violate section 7 because impoverished offenders cannot be imprisoned for non-payment (inability to pay is a reasonable excuse), extensions of time to pay are available, and the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate to the important objectives of the surcharge regime.

The court also found the surcharge does not violate section 12 of the Charter as it is not cruel and unusual treatment, being disproportionate but not grossly disproportionate.

The appellant was convicted at a second trial of four counts of sexual exploitation involving two teenaged girls from the Netherlands who stayed at his family home in 1997 and 2001.

The appellant's first convictions were overturned on appeal and a new trial was ordered.

At the second trial, the trial judge admitted evidence concerning a "mouse incident" that had resulted in an acquittal at the first trial, to challenge the credibility of one complainant.

The trial judge found both complainants credible and rejected the appellant's categorical denials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and reasoning.

Appeal from conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum correcting an error in the prohibition order.

The trial judge had failed to specify the duration of the prohibition order.

The Court varied the order to impose a 15-year term to the prohibition order as a whole, in accordance with the appellant's request and the Crown's concession.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his six-year-old son and sentenced to five years imprisonment with ancillary prohibition orders.

He appealed against conviction and sought an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal aspects of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no evidence of collusion between the complainant and his mother and no error in the admission of similar fact evidence regarding the appellant's prior conviction for sexual assault of an eight-year-old girl.

The Court granted a limited sentence appeal, varying the prohibition order by deleting a provision regarding communication with persons under 16 and reducing a lifetime proximity ban to 15 years, following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. K.R.J.