CITATION: R. v. Jasbir Singh, 2026 ONSC 1440

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-736-AP

DATE: 2026 03 10

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Ryan Mullins for the Respondent Crown

• and –

JASBIR SINGH

Myles Anevich for the Appellant

HEARD: September 10, 2025

PUBLICATION BAN (Under s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, there is a ban on publishing any information that could reveal the complainant’s identity. This judgment conforms with this ban.)

REASONS FOR DECISION

[On appeal from the conviction entered on June 7, 2024, by Justice A. Cornelius of the Ontario Court of Justice.]

D.E HARRIS J.

1Jasbir Singh appeals his conviction on one count of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46.

2Mr. Singh and the complainant, Ms. H., became friends. He is a driving instructor and gave her and her family driving lessons as well as helping to find her a house and acquire a mortgage. She testified that on the day of the offence, October 31, 2021, he called her to tell her that she had to sign some forms for the written part of the driving course, saying that the previous documents she had signed had been misplaced. He arrived at her home and, instead of having the documents with him, told her that she would have to accompany him to his office to sign them. He drove with her to his office.

3No one else was present at his office when they arrived. After she signed the papers, the complainant alleged that the Appellant grabbed her by the arms and tried to pull her on to his lap. She resisted. When she tried to leave the room, he wrapped his arms around her breast and pushed up against her. She was able to wrest herself free and leave the office.

4Mr. Singh testified. He suggested in his evidence that the events took place on October 30, not October 31. Mr. Singh admitted that on October 30 there was a meeting with the complainant in his office but denied the sexual assault allegations.

5This was largely a credibility case. The trial judge believed the complainant and rejected the evidence of the Appellant. He found the allegations proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

6The Appellant argued in his factum that based on the disagreement about what day the offence took place--either October 30 or 31-- this was an alibi defence. Although time of the offence is not generally an essential averment, it is in alibi cases.

7At the oral hearing, based on R. v. G.G., 2025 ONCA 574 at paras. 55-76, released after the Appellant’s factum was filed, defence counsel resiled from this argument. In my view, even before G.G., this argument had little merit. The judgment in G.G. clarified the well-established rule that if there is no defence prejudice, the date and time of the offence is not a crucial part of the trial nor an essential element of the offence.

8The argument that was maintained at the oral hearing was that the trial judge erred in one very narrow respect. He said towards the end of his judgment, responding to a defence argument:

Lastly, my confidence in Ms. H.’s evidence was not shaken by Mr. Saggi’s [defence counsel] production of Mr. Singh’s phone record and the fact that the records presented did not disclose the call that initiated the contact between the two parties. Were individuals limited to the use of one phone, this may have been a significant point for the Court’s consideration. However, Ms. H. testified that she had seen Mr. Singh with multiple phones. I accept her evidence on this point. It is not difficult to believe that a man who has multiple business interests would possess multiple phones or phone numbers.

9The complainant had said that the Appellant called her twice the day of the offence, including the initial call to tell her that she had papers to sign. The defence argued that based on the Appellant’s phone records which showed no calls to the complainant that day, this evidence was refuted and clearly incorrect.

10One cannot be faulted for wondering why this mattered. The Appellant admitted that the scenario with him alone in his office with the complainant occurred but said that it was the day before she said it was. How the two got together was of only trivial significance. The fact is they did. There was no controversy about this. How this issue could have affected the outcome of this trial is difficult to imagine.

11Furthermore, I do not find merit in the Appellant’s attack on the trial judge’s finding that there may have been more than one phone number used by the Appellant and that this explained why the calls to the complainant did not appear on his cell phone bill. First, even without direct evidence, the trial judge’s musing that, “It is not difficult to believe that a man who has multiple business interests would possess multiple phones or phone numbers” was well justified. Inferences of this kind are well within the purview of a trial judge: R v Kruk, 2024 SCC 7.

12Second, there was specific evidence to support the trial judge’s finding that the Appellant may have had more than one phone number. The Appellant argues that Ms. H.’s evidence that the Appellant may have had more than one phone line was hearsay based as it was on her husband’s word. It is true that the complainant testified that she knew that the Appellant had more than one number because her husband had the numbers. But there was some ambiguity about whether Ms. H. saw the numbers on her husband’s phone or whether she was told.

13Although he denied calling on any other line, the Appellant had two other lines at least. The Appellant testified that he had a business number different than the cell number for which the phone records were produced. His cell phone also had two SIM cards. He also had a home line.

14There was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to make the finding that he did that the absence of the calls on the Appellant’s cell phone records was of little significance due to the possibility that he called from another number.

15The appellate case law on misapprehension of evidence demonstrates that it is a difficult ground on which to succeed. Binnie J. said in R. v. Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80 at para. 4:

Morrissey [R. v. Morrissey (1995), 1995 3498 (ON CA), 38 C.R. (4th) 4, 22 O.R. (3d) 514, (Ont. C.A.)] it should be emphasized, describes a stringent standard. The misapprehension of the evidence must go to the substance rather than to the detail. It must be material rather than peripheral to the reasoning of the trial judge. Once those hurdles are surmounted, there is the further hurdle (the test is expressed as conjunctive rather than disjunctive) that the errors thus identified must play an essential part not just in the narrative of the judgment but “in the reasoning process resulting in a conviction”.

16Here, there was no misapprehension of the evidence. Nor was the subject matter central to the reasoning of the trial judge. Lastly, if there was a misapprehension, it did not play an essential part in the reasoning process leading to the conviction.

17For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.