Caitlin Jamie Sharawy

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision setting aside the accused's conviction for sexual assault of a complainant with an intellectual and developmental disability, on the basis that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal majority found that the trial judge had failed to address the reliability of the complainant's evidence in light of expert evidence regarding her suggestibility, and had failed to provide reasons for rejecting the defence evidence.

The dissenting judge of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reasons permitted meaningful appellate review.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the conviction, and cautioned that courts should focus on the individual's actual capacities rather than over-relying on expert evidence attributing general characteristics to persons with disabilities, as such over-reliance can perpetuate harmful myths and stereotypes and create barriers to access to justice.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault of his daughter, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning his sex offender treatment.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's factual error regarding the date of the appellant's treatment was material, impacting the assessment of his propensity to re-offend and the weight given to similar fact evidence.

This misapprehension played an essential part in the reasoning leading to the conviction.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

A dissenting judge argued the error was not material to the overall reasoning.

The appellant was convicted of threatening death, intimidation by threats of violence, obstruction of justice, and criminal harassment arising from two separate incidents: a 2013 Family Court proceeding and a 2015 incident involving the distribution of nude photographs.

The trial judge admitted evidence of prior discreditable conduct (a 2012 similar nude photo incident) and used cross-count evidence from the Family Court incident when convicting on the criminal harassment charge.

The appellant appealed his convictions; the Crown appealed the sentence as illegal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's use of evidence.

The Crown's sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was modified from a blended custodial and conditional sentence exceeding two years to a global custodial sentence of two years less a day.

The appellant appealed his sentence for making an arrangement to commit a sexual offence against a child contrary to s. 172.2 of the Criminal Code and breach of probation.

The trial judge imposed 4 years' imprisonment, a DNA order, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a lifetime blanket prohibition on Internet and digital network use.

The appellant sought to reduce the custodial sentence to three years and to narrow the Internet prohibition.

The appellate court upheld the custodial sentence but found the lifetime blanket Internet prohibition to be overbroad and varied it to impose more measured restrictions tailored to the offender's circumstances.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash the decision of a preliminary inquiry judge who discharged the respondent on charges of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by drawing inferences favourable to the respondent and failing to consider the evidence as a whole.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge properly applied the Shephard test and engaged in the permissible limited weighing of circumstantial evidence without choosing between competing inferences.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Canada, appealed his conviction on the basis that his guilty pleas were uninformed.

He was unaware of the serious immigration consequences of his pleas, specifically that he would be deported without a right of appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearm-related offences and possession of cocaine.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that trial counsel did not adequately inform the appellant of the specific immigration consequences, and that the appellant would have proceeded to trial had he been aware of the deportation consequences.

The court found the appellant satisfied both prongs of the test for setting aside a guilty plea: lack of awareness of a legally relevant consequence and prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty pleas were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident on January 31, 2016, where he met the complainant in a bar and took her to his parents' apartment.

The complainant testified that after consensual kissing, she expressed that she did not want to have sex, but the appellant proceeded with non-consensual vaginal intercourse and anal contact.

The appellant testified that the intercourse was consensual and denied anal contact.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on acceptance of the complainant's credibility and rejection of the appellant's evidence.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: insufficiency of reasons, improper use of prior consistent statements, and uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a young woman with an intellectual disability.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence reliable and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the majority held that the trial judge's reasons were deficient in several respects: the trial judge failed to adequately address the complainant's reliability, particularly her heightened suggestibility as established by expert evidence; the trial judge appeared to find the complainant's evidence self-corroborating when it was not; and the trial judge failed to explain why the defence evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The majority concluded these deficiencies, taken together, foreclosed meaningful appellate review and set aside the conviction, ordering a new trial.

The dissent argued the trial judge's reasons were adequate and that the trial judge was clearly alive to the reliability issues.

The appellant was convicted of forcible confinement by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown alleged that the appellant, his brother, and a third man confined the complainant in a car and drove him around Rexdale to force him to contact his brother about a debt.

The confinement lasted approximately one hour with no physical harm.

The key issue at trial was identity.

The appellant appealed his conviction on grounds of unreasonable verdict, insufficient reasons, and interference with cross-examination.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence of 60 days' intermittent custody followed by 18 months' probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

An appeal from the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated July 18, 2018, regarding the detention of an individual with a major mental illness.

The appellant challenged the Board's finding that he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and that a detention order was necessary.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding no error in the Board's application of the legal test for assessing ongoing risk or in its determination that detention was the appropriate disposition given the appellant's mental condition, history of non-compliance with medication, substance abuse, and prior violent conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft from mail contrary to s. 356(3) of the Criminal Code.

Both the Crown and the appellant agreed that the guilty plea was uninformed because the appellant was not aware of the immigration consequences of a conviction for that offence.

The parties agreed that had the appellant been fully informed, he would have pled guilty to the lesser included offence of theft under $5,000 contrary to s. 334(b) of the Criminal Code.

On consent, the appeal was dismissed, the conviction for theft from mail was set aside, and a conviction for theft under $5,000 was substituted.

The sentence remained unchanged and had already been served.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated April 26, 2018, continuing a conditional discharge for an NCR accused.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing the Board erred in finding she continues to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The Board's decision was based on the appellant's schizoaffective disorder, substance abuse disorder, history of violence, lack of insight into her mental illness, medication compliance issues, and actuarial risk assessment placing her at moderate-high risk.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition fell within the range of reasonable outcomes supported by evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside convictions on counts 2, 3, and 4 and ordering a new trial on those counts.

The sentence was reduced from 18 months to 6 months imprisonment, and the lifetime weapons prohibition order was set aside.

Upon further consideration, the court addressed whether it had jurisdiction to correct an omission regarding the weapons prohibition order, which should have been reduced to 10 years rather than entirely set aside, as the remaining conviction for criminal harassment is a designated offence under the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted of pointing a firearm, possession of a firearm contrary to prohibition, possession of a firearm knowingly unauthorized, and operating a motor vehicle disqualified.

He received nine months' incarceration (after credit for pre-trial custody) and three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on four grounds: inadequate consideration of inconsistencies in complainant evidence, misapprehension of evidence regarding whether the meeting was accidental or pre-arranged, erroneous reliance on precedent regarding firearm possession, and unreasonableness of verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 45 months for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and 12 months consecutive for breach of a firearm prohibition order.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by disregarding principles of totality and parity, engaging in double counting, ignoring mitigating factors, and misapprehending evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global sentence was well within the range for similar offenders and similar offences, and that the sentencing judge properly considered the relevant factors.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment, mischief under $5,000, possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and using an imitation firearm in the commission of an offence.

He was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the convictions for the weapons and mischief offences and ordering a new trial on those counts.

The court found that the trial judge failed to conduct a voluntariness voir dire regarding statements made by the self-represented accused to police and failed to inquire into potential Charter breaches.

The sentence was reduced to six months' imprisonment for the criminal harassment conviction, which was upheld.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following conviction on multiple charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, simple assault, threatening to cause death, mischief, and criminal harassment, as well as guilty pleas to breach of recognizance and breach of probation.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of nine years less four years credit for time served.

The appellant argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit and sought a reduction of two years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's approach and noting that sentencing ranges are guidelines, not straitjackets, and that the trial judge had adequately explained her reasons rooted in the facts.