Mike Pretsell

The plaintiff, Kaboom Fireworks Inc., brought a motion to compel several defendants (Vulcan Fireworks International Inc., Joseph Wan, Mystical Distributing Company Ltd., and Mystical Distributing International Ltd.) to answer undertakings and refusals from examinations for discovery.

The action concerns an alleged breach of an Exclusive Supply Agreement.

The court addressed various categories of refusals and undertakings, largely finding the questions relevant to the pleadings, particularly regarding the relationships between defendant entities, damage calculations, and the sale of Vulcan.

Most outstanding discovery obligations were ordered to be answered, with some resolved by consent or adjourned.

The appellant, Andrew Clifford Miracle, appealed an order appointing a receiver over his assets, which was granted to the respondent, Glenn Bogue, to satisfy a debt arising from an arbitration award.

The arbitration concerned the joint ownership of a store on Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory.

Andrew alleged the application judge erred by lacking authority for a final receiver order, miscalculating contingency fees, and, crucially, that the order contravened sections 29 and 89 of the Indian Act, which prohibit enforcement by a non-status Indian against assets situated on a reserve.

The Court of Appeal identified the Indian Act issue as a threshold matter, noting it was not fully litigated or determined in the lower court.

Consequently, the court remitted the matter to the application judge for a determination on the effect of the Indian Act, adhering to the principle that new issues are generally not decided on appeal.

No costs were awarded.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision setting aside the accused's conviction for sexual assault of a complainant with an intellectual and developmental disability, on the basis that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal majority found that the trial judge had failed to address the reliability of the complainant's evidence in light of expert evidence regarding her suggestibility, and had failed to provide reasons for rejecting the defence evidence.

The dissenting judge of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reasons permitted meaningful appellate review.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the conviction, and cautioned that courts should focus on the individual's actual capacities rather than over-relying on expert evidence attributing general characteristics to persons with disabilities, as such over-reliance can perpetuate harmful myths and stereotypes and create barriers to access to justice.