Christopher O’Connor

This decision concerns a Crown appeal from sentence, focusing on the tension between proportionality and public protection in sentencing a repeat violent offender.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give sufficient weight to the respondent’s extensive criminal record and the seriousness of her recent offences, and by anchoring the analysis solely to a previous sentence.

The Court substituted a penitentiary sentence and imposed a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO), emphasizing the need for public protection and the proper application of sentencing principles.

The appellant was convicted of importing a controlled substance (cocaine) and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to exclude a prior exculpatory statement under the Edgar exception, the application of the W.(D.) analysis, or the treatment of circumstantial evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the trial judge's imposition of a sentence at the low end of the established range for cocaine importation, and clarified the reconciliation of the Cunningham sentencing range with the proportionality principles emphasized in Parranto.

The offender pled guilty to sexual assault with a weapon and sexual assault against his former partner.

The offences involved non-consensual penetration with a bottle and touching while the victim was asleep, both of which were recorded on video.

The court determined the appropriate sentence was 33 months in custody.

After applying credit for pre-sentence custody, including enhanced credit for frequent lockdowns at the detention centre, the remaining sentence was four months.

Due to the risks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the offender's compromised immune system, the court further reduced the sentence to one day in custody followed by two years of probation.

The three accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The police entered an apartment, detained the accused, and later arrested them, seizing crack and powder cocaine.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging arbitrary detention, failure to inform of reasons for arrest, and denial of the right to counsel.

During the trial, it was revealed that an arresting officer falsely attributed a chunk of crack cocaine to one of the accused and gave false testimony.

The court found this constituted an abuse of process and stayed the proceedings against that accused.

For the other two accused, the court found their s. 10(b) rights were violated due to unreasonable delays in facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and acquitted the remaining two accused.

The appellant, Peter Bothwell, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol, arguing a violation of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel due to insufficient privacy during his calls.

At trial, the judge found no breach, concluding that Bothwell's concerns about privacy were remedied by him lowering his voice and that officers did not overhear his conversations.

The Superior Court, on appeal, upheld the trial judge's finding, determining that it was open to the trial judge to conclude that Bothwell had not met the burden of proving a Charter breach on a balance of probabilities, and that the finding was not a palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed.

Two accused were charged with possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of a prohibited device, and possession of a prohibited firearm without a licence after police discovered a loaded handgun and over-capacity magazine in a closet in their shared apartment during execution of a search warrant.

The Crown relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to establish knowledge and control.

The defence argued that guests attending a party at the apartment had access to the room and closet and may have placed the firearm there, and adduced alternate suspect evidence relating to individuals with prior firearm convictions.

Applying the principles governing circumstantial evidence and the framework in R. v. W. (D.), the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge of the firearm.

Both accused were acquitted.