Court of Appeal for Ontario
Trotter, Zarnett and Copeland JJ.A.
Between
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Martin James Stover
Appellant
Counsel:
Haider Ashraf, for the appellant
Samuel Mazzuca, for the respondent
Heard: June 29, 2026
On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice Graeme Mew of the Superior Court of Justice on March 11, 2025, with reasons reported at 2025 ONSC 1590.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1The appellant, Martin Stover, was the investment adviser for Harry and Cheryl Whitehead and for Shawn Voight. He was convicted, after a judge-alone trial, of two counts of fraud and theft1 arising out of his dealings with them. He was also convicted of one count of obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duties.
2The appellant argues that the verdicts should be set aside because the elements of the offences were not established beyond a reasonable doubt. He submits that the trial judge misapplied the reasonable doubt standard and the framework set out in R. v. W.(D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. We disagree.
3The trial judge carefully instructed himself on the elements of the offences, the reasonable doubt standard, and the principles in W.(D.). He found the elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt following the approach in W.(D). The appellant in essence challenges the trial judge’s fact finding. It is not our role to retry the case.
4The trial judge found that the Whiteheads provided the appellant with $150,000 in 2015, and that they did so on the basis of the appellant’s knowingly false representations that the funds would be invested in a GIC that would earn a better than usual rate. He also found that the appellant falsely confirmed to the Whiteheads that he had obtained such a GIC for them. In fact, the appellant took the money, never truthfully accounted for it, and never returned it, with the intention of depriving the Whiteheads of these funds.
5These findings clearly support the convictions on the counts relating to the Whiteheads. Contrary to the appellant’s arguments, the trial judge was not required to acquit because the Whiteheads did not maintain a copy of the instrument by which they paid the $150,000 to the appellant, or because Mr. Whitehead said it was a bank draft and Mrs. Whitehead said it was a cheque. The trial judge noted these matters but gave cogent reasons for believing the Whiteheads’ evidence that they provided the funds to the appellant. These included (i) the fact that their bank records showed that a $150,000 bank draft was obtained, payable to Mrs. Whitehead on June 30, 2015, which was consistent with the conclusion that the draft was turned over to the appellant, and (ii) the fact that the appellant’s confirmation statements, which were provided to the Whiteheads in 2019 and listed investments he was managing for them, showed a $150,000 GIC in their favour. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s evidence that the Whiteheads had not given him $150,000 to invest, and that the confirmations were prepared in error. The trial judge’s factual findings and credibility determinations are entitled to deference on appeal.
6With respect to Mr. Voight, the trial judge found that in 2014, Mr. Voight provided the appellant’s company, Mohave Holdings, with a cheque for $75,000, believing he was investing in that company. The appellant knowingly deceived him about the nature of the investment and answered deceptively when Mr. Voight and his accountant asked for information about the investment. The trial judge found the appellant took the funds, never truthfully accounted for them, and never returned them, all with the intention to deprive Mr. Voight of the funds. He rejected the appellant’s evidence that he told Mr. Voight, and that Mr. Voight agreed, that the funds would be invested with Allstate Financial Service (AFS), and that AFS had defrauded both of them. Although the trial judge did not rule out the possibility that the appellant had actually given the funds to AFS and expected to earn a return, he rejected the contention that Mr. Voight ever authorized an investment of his funds with AFS. These findings clearly support the convictions on the counts related to Mr. Voight.
7The appellant argues that the trial judge, in making these findings, failed to take into account that Mr. Voight’s signature appears on a copy of one document on AFS letterhead. However, the trial judge did note that Mr. Voight identified his signature on that document. Although that document referred to an application to AFS, it did not indicate what the application was for or the terms of any investment. Other documents that did refer to a $75,000 investment in AFS did not have Mr. Voight’s signature, and the trial judge accepted Mr. Voight’s evidence that he had never seen any of the documents before they were presented to him at trial. He noted that the appellant made no mention of AFS when Mr. Voight and his accountant made enquiries about the investment, and that the confirmation statement the appellant provided to Mr. Voight listing his investments made no mention of AFS. Accordingly, it was open to the trial judge to find that Mr. Voight had not been told that he would be investing in AFS and that he was misled about the nature of the investments of his funds. The trial judge did not lose sight of any of the evidence, or of the burden or standard of proof.
8On the obstruction charge, the trial judge found that the appellant initiated contact with the police officer investigating what happened to Mr. Voight’s money, and made statements to the officer that were evasions and half-truths designed to delay or distract him. The appellant argues that the trial judge mischaracterized the communications, failing to appreciate that the appellant was being cooperative. We reject this argument. For example, when the officer asked the appellant about Mohave Holdings, the appellant did not respond that it was his company. He made statements to the officer suggesting it was a company connected to AFS, which was untrue. There is no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s conclusions.
9The appeal is therefore dismissed.
“Gary Trotter J.A.”
“B. Zarnett J.A.”
“J. Copeland J.A.”
Footnotes
- The convictions for theft were stayed under the principle in Kienapple v. The Queen, 1974 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729.