COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Miller, Trotter and Paciocco JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Shantel Mahadai
Appellant
Mark C. Halfyard and Robert Nanni, for the appellant
Andrew Cappell, for the respondent
Heard: June 15, 2026
On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Michael J. Valente of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury, on March 27, 2024, and from the sentence imposed on October 31, 2024, with reasons reported at 2024 ONSC 6076.
OVERVIEW
1Shantel Mahadai, who was the getaway driver in the robbery of a Cambridge Freedom Mobile store (the “cellphone store”), was convicted as a party to the robbery after a jury trial. She was acquitted of committing a robbery with an imitation firearm and of occupying a motor vehicle in which she knew there to be a firearm. She appeals her robbery conviction and seeks leave to appeal her sentence of two years, four months and 17 days after presentence credit.
2For the following reasons, I would dismiss the conviction appeal. I would grant leave to appeal sentence but dismiss the sentence appeal as well.
MATERIAL FACTS
3The cellphone store robbery occurred at approximately 1:00 p.m. on February 24, 2022. The robbers, who were masked and armed with firearms, issued threats and applied force to the store clerk. They made their getaway in a stolen vehicle.
4Only minutes before the robbery, at 12:40 p.m., men who participated in the robbery had entered a Cambridge, Ontario bank, again while masked. The Crown theory was that they had intended to rob the bank, but for unknown reasons changed their plan before selecting the cellphone store as their target.
5One of the cellphones taken during the cellphone store robbery was equipped with a tracking device, permitting police to trace its path from the cellphone store. It was tracked from a residential Cambridge neighbourhood, where the stolen car was abandoned, to a Mississauga Airbnb condominium (the “condominium”). Ms. Mahadai’s boyfriend had been staying there prior to the robbery and according to her testimony, she had picked him up at the condominium that morning before driving him to Cambridge.
6After the robbery, Ms. Mahadai’s vehicle was captured on security footage following the stolen getaway vehicle in the Cambridge residential neighbourhood prior to the getaway vehicle’s abandonment. It is common ground that after abandoning the stolen vehicle, the robbers moved into her vehicle for the trip to the Mississauga condominium, where she dropped at least some of them off. She then drove her vehicle into the parking lot at a nearby building, where it was taken down by police and she was arrested. Her boyfriend was in the front passenger seat, and a man possessing a bag containing the fruits of the cellphone store robbery was in the back. Both men had firearms. Clothing worn by the robbers was discovered in the trunk of her vehicle.
7Ms. Mahadai testified at her trial, claiming that she travelled to Cambridge to pick up some of her boyfriend’s friends who had experienced car trouble, before driving them back to Mississauga. Although she claimed that her boyfriend remained with her in the car at all material times, she denied there was any talk of the robbery in the car, either before or after the other men joined them. It is obvious from the jury’s verdict that they rejected her testimony.
THE CONVICTION APPEAL
8Ms. Mahadai pursues two grounds of appeal from her conviction. First, she argues that the conviction was unreasonable. Second, she argues that the trial was rendered unfair by prejudicial closing submissions made by the prosecutor. I would reject both grounds of appeal.
a. The verdict was not unreasonable
9In substance, there are three possible modes of committing robbery arising from these facts: (1) stealing while armed (Criminal Code,R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 343(d)); (2) stealing with violence (ss. 343(a), (b) or (c)); or, (3) stealing with threats of violence (s. 343(a)). To convict Ms. Mahadai for aiding the robbery, the Crown was obliged to prove that she had knowledge prior to the robbery not only that items would be stolen from the cellphone store, but that one or more of the modes of robbery would be used.
10Ms. Mahadai argues that since she was acquitted of the two firearm offences, the jury necessarily had a reasonable doubt that she knew that the robbers were armed. Given this, it would have been an unreasonable, inconsistent verdict if they had convicted her based on the theory that she knew the men were going to commit robbery using mode of commission (1), by stealing while armed. She argues that a proper conviction could only be based on a finding that she knew the men would use either violence or threats of violence when stealing from the cellphone store, but she submits the evidence does not reasonably support either finding. She submits that since it would not be reasonable to convict her using any of the modes of robbery, she must be acquitted.
11Relatedly, Ms. Mahadai argues that the failure by the trial judge to direct the jury on the different modes of robbery opens the reasonable possibility that they convicted her of aiding robbery after finding that she had knowledge that the men were going to steal from the store, which is an inadequate and unreasonable basis for her conviction.
12Ms. Mahadai also argues that even if it can be inferred that she knew of the robbery after the men entered her vehicle, there is insufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that she knew before it happened, which would be required for conviction. She points out that the evidence does not establish that she was at or even near the scene either of the bank or the cellphone store robbery at the time of those incidents.
13I do not accept these submissions. The trial judge properly identified the pathway to a reasonable conviction when resolving the factual basis for the jury verdict for the purpose of sentencing. He found that:
The verdict of guilty of robbery necessarily represents a finding by the jury that Ms. Mahadai knew that the plan was to steal cell phones from the Freedom Mobile store, and that violence, or a threat of violence was going to be necessary to carry out the plan and that she intended to help the robbers commit the robbery by driving the getaway car.
14There is ample evidence permitting a trier of fact, acting judicially, to reasonably be satisfied that Ms. Mahadai’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the evidence taken as a whole: see R. v. Lights, 2020 ONCA 128, 149 O.R. (3d) 273, at para. 39.
15On her own evidence, she acknowledged that shortly after 10:00 a.m., she was on route to Cambridge from the condominium where her boyfriend was staying. It is the same condominium where she would later drop off some of the robbers. She is therefore linked, both before and after the robbery, to the location where the robbers fled. Indeed, she is linked to the events of the entire day.
16Crucially, at 11:07 a.m., an internet search was conducted on her cellphone for the address of the Cambridge bank where what can reasonably be inferred to have been an aborted robbery occurred less than two hours later involving the same men she would later pick up. Around the same time as the aborted robbery, a call was made on her cellphone to the cellphone store where the robbery occurred. It follows that her phone was implicated in the planning of the crime and there was ample evidence extracted from the phone to enable jurors to infer that she was using it during the relevant period. The natural inference from this evidence and her ownership of the phone is that she was participating in the planning as events unfolded and therefore knew of the robbers’ intentions.
17Indeed, given that it is not reasonably possible to rob a bank without a threat or violence, it can be inferred that she knew that the men intended to use threats or violence in that intended robbery. A reasonable jury could infer that since she knew this prior to the cellphone store robbery, she either knew that the men would use threats or violence in robbing the cellphone store or was willfully blind to the likelihood that they would.
18These reasonable inferences are solidified by the remaining evidence. There was evidence as to the nature of her relationship with her boyfriend, suggesting that he would not have hidden his criminal activity from her. Ms. Mahadai was also present when the stolen getaway car drove around a residential neighbourhood before it was abandoned. Her presence when the robbers engaged in this incriminating act suggests that she was trusted. It can also be inferred that the fleeing robbers entrusted her to drive them and the fruits of their crime to Mississauga, and that they were comfortable leaving the clothes they had worn during the robbery in her vehicle. These things are unlikely to have occurred if she was not a participant.
19When all this evidence is viewed cumulatively, as it must be, the foundation for the conviction is not only reasonable, but compelling. In the face of such strong evidence of her knowing participation in events, we reject the suggestion that Ms. Mahadai could have been convicted based on the jury’s mistaken belief that she intended to aid a mere theft, not a robbery.
20Any lingering risk the jury might take this path was removed by the jury charge, even though (at the urging of the parties) the trial judge did not conduct a complete canvas of the different modes of committing robbery, something that ideally should have been done. The charge the trial judge gave explained to the jurors that to find Ms. Mahadai guilty of robbery, they would have to be satisfied that she knew that the offence was going to be committed. It also made clear that the offence of robbery cannot be committed by stealing alone, but that weapons, violence or threats are also required. Jurors would therefore have understood that to convict Ms. Mahadai of robbery, they needed to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew not just that a theft would occur, but that the theft would involve weapons, violence or threats of violence.
21The verdict of guilty of robbery was not unreasonable. I would reject this ground of appeal.
b. The trial was not unfair
22It is not only appropriate but expected for Crown counsel to identify and promote incriminating inferences that are supported by the evidence: R. v. Mathisen, 2008 ONCA 747, 242 O.A.C. 139, at paras. 128-29; and see R. v. Chiarelli, 2025 ONCA 428, 178 O.R. (3d) 641, at paras. 40-41. Unfortunately, in his closing argument, Crown counsel employed the inappropriate strategy of presenting scripted and detailed conversations between the robbers that, in his view, could be inferred to have taken place in Ms. Mahadai’s presence. These “conversations” supported the inference that Ms. Mahadai was actively involved in the robbery. Crown counsel asked jurors to imagine the conversations, suggesting they could “hear” such conversations taking place.
23This tactic of creating a full dialogue and encouraging jurors to find that such conversations must have occurred is dangerous and should not be employed. It presents the risk of inviting jurors to accept speculative content not grounded in the evidence, and of causing confusion between the submissions and the evidence. This tactic also runs the risk of making inferred facts seem more concrete than they are. And when a Crown prosecutor pledges their belief in the inferences that they are inviting, as the trial Crown did in this case, they are placing the credibility of their office behind the submission. The tactics employed during the closing submissions, which inherently invite speculation, were inconsistent with the obligations of the Crown as a minister of justice: see R. v. Boudreau, 2012 ONCA 830, at para. 16, leave to appeal refused, [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 330; R. v. McGregor, 2019 ONCA 307, 145 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 179.
24Ms. Mahadai argues that these tactics were prejudicial enough to have caused a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial when coupled with the failure by the trial judge to issue a timely and sufficiently sharp correction to prevent the damage done. She submits that this prejudice was aggravated by improper arguments the Crown made about her character, including by commenting on her knowledge of her boyfriend’s prior misconduct and her poor “taste in men.”
25Although the tactics used by the Crown courted injustice, I am not persuaded that the trial was rendered unfair, even when coupled with the gratuitous comment the Crown made about Ms. Mahadai’s poor taste in men.
26First, it would have been plain to the jurors that the Crown created the dialogue that he was describing and that it was not evidence. He made clear during his closing arguments that he was only inferring that such conversations took place and was not claiming that they had. At times he acknowledged he could be wrong, asked jurors to “imagine” or “hear” the conversations, qualified his submissions by saying that he did not know or could be speculating, and he identified the evidentiary basis or the commonsense assumptions supporting his submissions. The tactic remained improper, but the qualifications the Crown offered about the hypothetical conversations reduced the risk of confusion.
27Second, the material factual inferences reflected in the constructed dialogues were grounded in the evidence or in common sense, ameliorating the risk of prejudicial speculation. For example, the fact that Ms. Mahadai searched her boyfriend’s home address on her phone after she claimed to have picked him up at the Airbnb condominium does suggest that he was not the one that she picked up at the condominium, opening the reasonable possibility that she picked up and drove the same robbers she later drove to that address from Cambridge. The theory that the robbers aborted a bank robbery and would communicate with her boyfriend after doing so, at a time when, on Ms. Mahadai’s evidence, he was in the car with her, was also reasonable. And the suggestion that the criminal activity would not have been hidden from her, given the content of prior texts between her and her boyfriend, the readiness of the men to get into her car with firearms in their waistbands, and the contraband found in the condominium where she had been invited, was not speculative but grounded in common sense. In my view, this was not impermissible bad character evidence.
28Third, the judicial correction that the trial judge provided was adequate. The risk of unfairness was only moderate given the circumstances just described. An immediate sharp correction when the Crown began to cast his submissions as recreated dialogue would have been appropriate, but considering the qualifications that the Crown expressed, it was not required. In any event, it is difficult for Ms. Mahadai to challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the correction that was given, since it was approved by her counsel, including the removal of the last clause directing jurors not to base decisions “on the suggestions of counsel in explanation for the events [they] heard in evidence.” The trial judge did well to remove that language. It is confusing and could be understood as a warning not to base the verdict on the inferences suggested by the parties. The correction the judge provided was sufficient to address the risk of prejudice that arose.
29I would deny this ground of appeal.
THE SENTENCE APPEAL
30Ms. Mahadai seeks leave to appeal her sentence and asks us to substitute a conditional sentence, given her youth and the absence of a criminal record. She argues that the trial judge committed three errors, removing the need to defer to the sentence he imposed. I am not persuaded that the trial judge committed any of the errors alleged.
31First, his finding that her crime was aggravated because she knew about the planned and deliberate robbery “from the beginning” was not inconsistent with her acquittal on the firearms charges. This finding was well grounded in the evidence and arrived at without palpable or overriding error. I do not accept the submission that the trial judge erred in his assessment of the aggravating factors.
32Second, I do not agree that the trial judge erred by failing to treat Ms. Mahadai as less morally blameworthy than the other robbers. There is no basis for concluding that the trial judge misunderstood the passages he quoted from R. v. Hilbach, 2023 SCC 3, [2023] 1 S.C.R. 116, at paras. 101-3, and interpreted them as requiring that principals and aiders be treated the same for sentencing purposes. His reasons show that he conducted a close assessment of a fit sentence for Ms. Mahadai, based on her individual circumstances and her involvement. The trial judge did not apply incorrect principles in evaluating her degree of responsibility.
33Third, the trial judge did not err by failing to explain why a conditional sentence would not provide sufficient denunciation and deterrence. His view of the aggravated nature of the criminal conduct Ms. Mahadai participated in is communicated clearly in his decision. It was up to him, as the sentencing judge, to determine the sentence that would be needed to satisfy the principles of sentencing.
34In any event, even if this submission had been made out, it is moot. After instructing himself to impose the least onerous sentence possible, the trial judge concluded that a penitentiary-length sentence was required, which alone would disentitle Ms. Mahadai to a conditional sentence. This was an assessment the trial judge was entitled to make, and I see no basis for interfering.
CONCLUSION
35I would deny the appeal of the conviction. I would grant leave to appeal sentence but dismiss the sentence appeal.
Released: July 6, 2026 “B.W.M.”
“David M. Paciocco J.A.”
“I agree. B.W. Miller J.A.”
“I agree. Gary Trotter J.A.”