COURT FILE NO. CV-18-595745
DATE: 20210503
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MIDLAND RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. (a British Virgin Islands Company)
Plaintiff
– and –
EUGENE BOKSERMAN and ELENA KRASNOV
Defendants
– and –
MICHAEL SHTAIF
Intervenor
Kenneth Prehogan and Kayla Theeuwen, for the Plaintiff
Gregory Sidlofsky and Adin Wagner, for the Defendants
Michael Shtaif, on his own behalf
HEARD: April 9, 2021
e.m. Morgan, J.
I. The litigation background
[1] In 2014, Sanderson J. granted judgment in Court File No. 08-CL-7446 in which the Plaintiff’s corporate predecessor was plaintiff and the Defendant, Eugene Bokserman, and the Intervenor, Michael Shtaif, were two of the defendants. Justice Sanderson ruled, inter alia, that Mr. Bokserman is liable in the amount of $1,500,000 (U.S.). Within weeks of that judgment, Mr. Bokserman and his spouse, the Defendant, Elana Krasnov, transferred title to a property they owned at 42 Rollscourt Drive, Toronto (the “Rollscourt Property”) from both of their names as joint tenants into Ms. Krasnov’s name alone.
[2] The Plaintiff claims that the transfer of the Rollscourt Property was done in the wake and with full knowledge of the judgment rendered against Mr. Bokserman, and is a fraudulent conveyance. The Plaintiff moves under Rule 20.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment in connection with that claim.
[3] The Defendants state that the conveyance to Ms. Krasnov was done at fair market value. Their position is that the transfer of title had nothing to do with defeating the claims of Mr. Bokserman’s creditors.
[4] In addition, the Defendants state that the Plaintiff is incorporated as a company in the British Virgin Islands (“Midland BVI”), whereas the party in whose favour the 2014 judgment in Court File No. 08-CL-7446 was granted is a company of the same name incorporated in Guernsey (“Midland Guernsey”). Defendants’ counsel submits that Midland BVI has no standing to enforce the judgment in favour of Midland Guernsey and likewise lacks standing to bring the within fraudulent conveyance action.
[5] In his intervention, Mr. Shtaif fully supports the Defendants in their challenge to the Plaintiff’s standing. He is a resident of Alberta and so enforcement proceedings against him with respect to the underlying judgment in Court File No. 08-CL-7446 are taking place in that province. It is Mr. Shtaif’s view that any ruling in relation to the Plaintiff’s status to bring suit in Ontario will be equally applicable to the Plaintiff’s litigation against him in Alberta.
[6] The Plaintiff replies that Midland BVI is the assignee of the assets of Midland Guernsey, including the debts owed by Mr. Bokserman and the Intervenor. Plaintiff’s counsel submits that an Order to Continue has been issued by this Court in favour of Midland BVI allowing it to stand in the shoes of Midland Guernsey in pursuing this action.
II. The underlying judgment
[7] On February 19, 2014, Justice Sanderson sent all counsel a draft of her reasons for decision in Court File No. 08-CL-7446, granting judgment to Midland against Messrs. Bokserman and Shtaif in the amount of $1,500,000 (U.S.). Both Mr. Bokserman and Ms. Krasnov concede that they became aware of Justice Sanderson’s decision on that date. In sending out her draft reasons, Her Honour indicated that the purpose of doing so was to facilitate counsel’s reviewing the draft so that they could alert her to any clerical errors or factual mistakes contained therein. Counsel for the Plaintiff provided the court with their comments within one week of receiving the draft reasons.
[8] Counsel for the defendants wrote to the court on February 27, 2014 indicating that he required more time to review the decision and provide comments thereon. Justice Sanderson advised counsel that she expected to hear back from them by March 5, 2014, and that the reasons would be finalized and released to the public on March 7, 2014. Counsel for the defendants never did get back to her with comments on the draft. On March 7, 2014, Sanderson J. released her final reasons for decision in Court File No. 08-CL-7446.
[9] On March 24, 2014, the lawyer for Mr. Bokserman advised the lawyer for the Plaintiff that he approved the draft judgment as to form and content. On April 14, 2014, the formal judgment in the underlying action was issued and entered.
II. Transfer of the Rollscourt Property
[10] Sometime on or about March 4, 2014, the Defendants together retained a real estate lawyer, Harvey Swartz, to convey the Property from their joint names into Ms. Krasnov’s name alone. That transfer was effected on March 5, 2014 – i.e. two weeks after Mr. Bokserman read Justice Sanderson’s draft reasons granting judgment against him to the Plaintiff.
[11] The consideration listed on the registered transfer documents for the Rollscourt Property was $2.00 plus “natural love and affection”. Based on this declaration of consideration, the Defendants paid no Land Transfer Tax for the conveyance of the Rollscourt Property.
[12] In response to the Plaintiff’s claim herein, Ms. Krasnov has produced an agreement and promissory note dated March 5, 2014 purporting to show that she paid her spouse $391,625 (U.S.) for his interest in the Rollscourt Property. The agreement records that the amount for which Ms. Krasnov supposedly purchased Mr. Bokserman’s equity in the Rollscourt Property was calculated on the basis of 50% the 2012 appraised value of the Property less the full amounts of the two mortgages registered on title. The promissory note indicates that Krasnov was to pay Bokserman $20,000 monthly until the amount of the purchase price was paid in full.
[13] Mr. Swartz testified that he was advised by Ms. Krasnov on March 4, 2014 that she no longer wanted to fund Bokserman’s litigation and wanted to acquire his interest in the Rollscourt Property. He also stated under cross-examination that he gave no advice on the appropriate way for Ms. Krasnov to purchase Bokserman’s interest in the Rollscourt Property or on how to structure or value the transactions. He also stated that the Defendants never disclosed to him that Sanderson J. had issued draft reasons for judgment against Mr. Bokserman just two weeks before he conveyed away his interest in the Rollscourt Property.
[14] In his cross-examination, Mr. Swartz also testified that Ms.Krasnov instructed him on the transaction and told him that the matter was urgent, but did not explain to him why she and her spouse wanted the conveyance concluded expeditiously. Mr. Bokserman, in turn, confirmed in his cross-examination that he did not inform Mr. Swartz that a $1.5 million (U.S.) judgment had just recently been rendered against him.
[15] For her part, Ms. Krasnov testified that it never occurred to her that taking over Mr. Bokserman’s interest in the Rollscourt Property would prevent the Plaintiff from enforcing its judgment against him. At the same time, she confirmed under oath that she knew about Justice Sanderson’s reasons for judgment on of February 19, 2014, that she was aware that the transfer would rid Mr. Bokserman of any equity in the Rollscourt Property, and that at the time of the transfer of title Mr. Bokserman had no other assets in his name.
[16] There is no credibility to Ms. Krasnov’s statement that she did not realize or did not think about the fact that the transfer of title for the Rollscourt Property to her name alone would deprive the Plaintiff of the ability to enforce its judgment against it. She knew that it was the only asset of value that Mr. Bokserman owned; indeed, her explanation for why they engaged in this transaction – that she was not willing to continue funding Mr. Bokserman’s litigation – highlights her understanding that she could only secure herself against his financial troubles by solely owning the Rollscourt Property, as Mr. Bokserman’s one-half interest in it was his most substantial asset.
[17] Moreover, the need to complete the conveyance quickly and the secrecy with Mr. Swartz in terms of Justice Sanderson’s recently released judgment both signal that Mr. Bokserman and Ms. Krasnov were keenly aware of the need to transfer the property surreptitiously. In other words, they knew that the conveyance was for the purpose of defeating the Plaintiff’s claim and that it amounted to a fraudulent conveyance.
[18] In addition, I am not convinced that Ms. Krasnov paid the consideration to Mr. Bokserman that she says that she paid. The record establishes that she either paid Mr. Bokserman the $391,625 (U.S.) purchase price as she now contends and thereby committed a fraud on the Land Transfer Tax authorities by declaring the sale to have been for $2 plus love and affection, or she did not pay any substantial consideration to Mr. Bokserman and committed fraud on his judgment creditor, the Plaintiff. In other words, Ms. Krasnov, and by extension Mr. Bokserman, are fraudsters; the only question is whether their fraud was directed against the public tax authority or the private creditor.
[19] I have little doubt that the Defendants are capable of committing fraud against either of those parties. In fact, under the circumstances it is likely that their aim was to defeat their judgment creditor and to avoid land transfer tax in the process. There is no evidence to establish that Mr. Bokserman paid Ms. Krasnov any money that did not simply return to their joint pool of family funds. Mr. Bokserman went from enjoying the Rollscourt Property as his joint residence with Ms. Krasnov to enjoying it some more as his joint residence with Ms. Krasnov.
[20] Subsequent transactions purportedly engaged in by Ms. Krasnov alone have been similarly beneficial to Mr. Bokserman, who has by all appearances continued his life without so much as a financial ripple. The transaction between Mr. Bokserman and Ms. Krasnov was well documented by Mr. Swartz with a registered real estate conveyance, a promissory note, etc. But whether any actual money was paid by Ms. Krasnov to Mr. Bokserman is not established on the record.
[21] On August 18, 2015, Ms. Krasnov sold the Rollscourt Property to Jianhong Chen for $3,298,800. Midland’s counsel points out that had Mr. Bokserman not transferred his interest to his spouse, the net proceeds of sale of the Property, after paying off the existing mortgage, would have been approximately $1,746,000. Mr. Bokserman’s half of the proceeds would then have been available to be applied toward the judgment debt owed by Mr. Bokserman to the Plaintiff.
[22] Subsequent to this sale, on August 20, 2015, Ms. Krasnov purchased a house at 393 Cortleigh Blvd., Toronto (the “Cortleigh Property”) for $2,010,000, taking title in her name alone. She currently lives in the Cortleigh Property with her spouse, Mr. Bokserman. The proximity of this purchase to the sale of the Rollscourt Property justifies Midland’s request for a tracing Order in respect of the funds that flow from the Rollscourt Property.
[23] On April 29, 2014, the Plaintiff requested that Mr. Bokserman make himself available for a judgment debtor examination. Counsel for Mr. Bokserman took the position that Midland was not entitled to conduct a judgment debtor examination until after Mr. Bokserman’s and Mr. Shtaif’s appeal of Justice Sanderson’s judgment in Court File No. 08-CL-7446 was disposed of. Accordingly, the Plaintiff and its counsel had no opportunity to discover Mr. Bokserman’s conveyance of the Rollscourt Property at that time.
[24] In the meantime, on April 30, 2014, the Plaintiff caused a writ of seizure and sale to be issued against Mr. Bokserman and filed that writ with the Sheriff in Toronto two days later, on May 2, 2014. Since by that time the Rollscourt Property had already been transferred to Ms. Krasnov’s name alone, Mr. Bokserman had no interest in it to which the Writ could attach. A search of the property registry on the day that the Plaintiff’s writ was filed would have revealed no property, including the Rollscourt Property, registered in Mr. Bokserman’s name.
[25] Once the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Bokserman’s and Mr. Shtaif’s appeal on April 20, 2017 and their motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal’s judgment on January 15, 2018, the Plaintiff took steps to enforce its judgment against Mr. Bokserman. In a routine search, Plaintiff’s counsel then discovered the March 5, 2014 conveyance of the Rollscourt Property to Ms. Krasnov. The within action was commenced on April 12, 2018.
III. The assignment to Midland BVI
[26] In accordance with an Order of the Royal Court of Guernsey dated August 13, 2019, Midland Guernsey assigned all its assets and rights of collection and enforcement in the Sanderson J. judgment and appellate judgments – Midland Resources Holding Limited v Shtaif et al, 2014 ONSC 997 (Court File No. 08-CL-7446) and 2017 ONCA 320 (dockets C58536 and C58544) – to Midland BVI. The Instrument of Transfer putting this assignment into effect was signed by Robert Lee, an authorized signatory for Midland BVI. Signing as witness for Mr. Lee’s signature on this instrument was Mr. Lee’s then common law partner, Vanessa Brown.
[27] On October 9, 2019, Midland Guernsey moved before the registrar of the Ontario Superior Court for an Order to Continue the within action in the name of Midland BVI. Pursuant to Rule 11.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the request for an Order to Continue was made without notice to the Defendants. That Order was issued and entered on December 16, 2019. In accordance with an Order of the Royal Court of Guernsey dated November 13, 2019, Midland Guernsey was then wound up and dissolved.
[28] The Order to Continue the within action provides, among other things, that: “A party who wishes to set aside or vary this order must make a motion to do so forthwith after the order comes to the party's attention.” The Order was served on Mr. Bokserman and Ms. Krasnov on January 3, 2020 in accordance with Rule 11.02(2).
[29] The Defendants submit that although the Plaintiff served the Order to Continue, they failed to disclose the material filed in support of the Order to Continue, there is in fact no obligation under Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure that the supporting material be disclosed. It is the Order itself that must be served, and if anything else is sought by the opposing side it must be sought by motion to the court. Neither Mr. Bokserman nor Ms. Krasnov has ever brought a motion for further disclosure.
[30] In October 2020, Mr. Bokserman and Mr. Shtaif, served, filed, and made some preliminary moves toward scheduling a motion under Rule 11 to stay the enforcement of Justice Sanderson’s judgment. The basis of the stay motion related to the standing of Midland BVI to maintain proceedings in relation to the enforcement of the judgment. Mr. Bokserman and Mr. Shtaif alleged in their proposed motion materials that the assignment of rights from Midland Guernsey to Midland BVI, which was duly authorized by the court in Guernsey and never challenged in that jurisdiction, did not in fact comply with the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Guernsey), 1979. The motion has never been scheduled by Messrs. Bokserman and Shtaif and has never been heard.
[31] In the meantime, the Plaintiff brought the present summary judgment motion, which was scheduled to be heard in November 2020. On the eve of that hearing, the Defendants fired their lawyers and sought an adjournment. In an endorsement dated November 23, 2020, Pinto J. adjourned the summary judgment motion in order to give the Defendants a chance to retain new counsel and making the new return date peremptory on them. In addition, Justice Pinto ordered that no further material could be filed on the summary judgment motion. Three days later, on November 26, 2020, the Defendants’ present counsel went on record by serving their Notice of Change of Lawyer.
[32] On January 11, 2021, the Defendants served a motion for leave to admit new evidence in the present summary judgment motion. The evidence addresses two general issues: a) the Instrument of Transfer was not validly signed and did not effect the transfer or rights from Midland Guernsey to Midland BVI; and b) the assignment of rights to Midland BVI was contrary to Guernsey law and thus not valid in its purportedly authorizing jurisdiction. With respect, neither of these points is a cogent one or forms the basis for admitting new evidence in the summary judgment motion before me.
[33] Turning first to the validity of the Instrument of Transfer, the Defendants propose that the court admit new evidence in the form of a affidavit sworn by Vanessa Brown, the person named as having witnessed Robert Lee’s signature on Midland BVI’s behalf. Ms. Brown deposed, in an affidavit comprised of only two operative sentences, that she never witnessed the Instrument of Transfer. No other context or background is provided in Ms. Brown’s affidavit, and there is nothing to explain who she is or how she came to know about something that she says she did not witness.
[34] Interestingly, nowhere in Ms. Brown’s affidavit or in the Defendants’ motion record is it asserted that Mr. Lee’s signature on the Instrument of Transfer is not his own. The entirety of this point presented by the Defendants is Ms. Brown’s singular assertion that she was not a witness to the signed document.
[35] Equally interesting, and perhaps even more significant, is that Ms. Brown neglects to point out in her affidavit filed herein that she is Mr. Lee’s former romantic partner, and that in that context she is engaged in litigation against him in the U.K. courts. Mr. Lee, in his responding affidavit, explains that Ms. Brown “has embarked upon a sustained and vicious campaign” against him, his family, friends, and business associates, including Midland BVI, in legal proceedings commenced in the United Kingdom. Mr. Lee also deposes that Ms. Brown's evidence regarding the Instrument of Transfer is untrue, and that she did sign the Instrument of Transfer as Mr. Lee’s witness.
[36] I view Ms. Brown’s non-disclosure of her relationship to Mr. Lee as significant. It would be one thing for an arm’s length deponent to allege that she did not sign as a witness for a stranger’s signature; it is quite another for a former spouse or partner who is involved in hard-fought litigation with the signing party to depose that she did not sign as her estranged partner’s witness on a business document. I can think of no reason why Mr. Lee would forge a witness’ signature on the Instrument of Transfer. A witness can be anyone, from a clerical employee of the solicitor that drafted the given document to an office neighbour who happens to be sitting nearby when the party goes to sign. The witness has no stake in the substance of the document, and there is no reason why Mr. Lee would have to resort to a scheme of falsification for a witness signature.
[37] Ms. Brown, on the other hand, is described in Mr. Lee’s affidavit, and I have no evidence suggesting anything to the contrary, as being engaged in a campaign attacking Mr. Lee on multiple fronts. It seems perfectly routine for a person signing a document to ask his or her partner to sign as a witness, and entirely abnormal for someone signing a document to forge his or her partner’s signature for no apparent reason. As between those two positions, I have little reason to doubt Mr. Lee’s credibility and strong reasons to doubt Ms. Brown’s. These doubts are augmented by the fact that she did not disclose the background to her coming forward as a witness against her former romantic partner.
[38] I am not inclined to admit Ms. Brown’s affidavit into evidence, and if it were to be found admissible I would not be inclined to believe it. “New evidence” that is in reality part and parcel of an unrelated family law/matrimonial dispute is not the kind of evidence that a commercial case involving completely different parties can rely on. At the very least, the affiant providing the purportedly new evidence would have had to fully explain the litigious context that exists between her and the party she is impugning, including the background to their relationship and the timing of its demise. She would also have had to provide a clear and cogent explanation as to why and how she came to submit her affidavit, how she was alerted to the idea, and how it is timed with respect to other accusations she has made against the signing party, related parties, and his business interests.
[39] New evidence is meant to shed light on matters that were unknown prior to its submission. It is not meant to cloud the issues by casting accusations that are difficult to prove or disprove without a full inquiry, seemingly for the purpose of further delaying proceedings that the party submitting the evidence has been continuously attempting to delay. Justice Pinto’s Order stands, and I will not grant leave to the Defendants to introduce Ms. Brown’s affidavit into evidence in this motion.
[40] Turning to the Defendants’ argument that the assignment from Midland Guernsey to Midland BVI was contrary to Guernsey law, in my view the argument is not admissible in these proceedings. I see no basis for this Court to rule that an assignment of rights that has been authorized by the Royal Court of Guernsey in an Order that was never appealed or set aside, is not legally valid under Guernsey law.
[41] The Defendants present the affidavit of a Guernsey lawyer, Gareth Kevin Bell, who opines that the Plaintiff had a procedural misstep in seeking its authorization for the transfer that the Guernsey court never noticed. I have no qualms with Mr. Bell’s qualification per se – he is an English solicitor who has also been a member of the Guernsey bar since 2008. But to embark on the kind of analysis proposed by the Defendants and suggested by this affidavit would be to collaterally attack the ruling of the Guernsey court. I have no doubt that a Canadian court would not countenance that kind of challenge in a foreign court if the issue were raised in the reverse direction.
[42] Nowhere in Mr. Bell’s affidavit or in the Defendants’ materials filed herein is it explained why the Defendants have not moved in Guernsey to set aside the Royal Court’s Order or to otherwise challenge the validity of the transfer of rights in Guernsey, the jurisdiction where the transfer was carried out. Instead, the Defendants have come to Ontario seeking to have this court intervene in a foreign property transaction and court authorization that is unchallenged in its home jurisdiction. To accept the Defendants’ tactic strikes me as contrary to the accepted boundaries of judicial authority and wrongly invasive of a foreign legal system’s sovereign domain.
[43] If the Defendants wanted a ruling that a procedural misstep occurred under Guernsey law that made the Guernsey authorizing Order and the Guernsey Instrument of Transfer invalid, one would think that they would have moved in Guernsey to set aside the Royal Court’s order and reverse the transaction. The fact that they did not do so only increases my skepticism about the propriety of admitting this proposed new evidence and the cogency of the Defendants’ motion. I have no inclination to admit “new evidence” whose only relevance is to an argument that I would not entertain.
[44] In short, to make a ruling that second-guesses a Guernsey court on the application of Guernsey law would be to express an opinion that I should not express and to exercise authority that I do not possess. The Royal Court of Guernsey would likely see it as a disregard of judicial comity; it would also be the height of chutzpah.
IV. Limitation period
[45] The Defendants plead that this action was commenced beyond what they say is the applicable two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, SO 2002, c. 24, Sched. B (“LA”). It is their view that Midland ought to have been aware of the transfer of Mr. Bokserman’s interest in the Rollscourt Property from the very date that it had the Writ issued and filed it with the Sheriff’s office.
[46] Counsel for the Plaintiff submits that the LA and its 2-year limitation period does not apply here. Rather, it is the Plaintiff’s position that a 10-year limitation period under section 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, RSO 1990, c L.15 (“RPLA”) applies here. Recent caselaw has confirmed that it is this more lengthy limitation period that applies to fraudulent conveyance cases: see Anisman v. Drabinsky, 2020 ONSC 1197, at paras 55-61. “If a claim is brought under the [Fraudulent Conveyances Act] to set aside a conveyance of real property, such a claim is on its face a claim to ‘recover any land’ to which the RPLA applies a 10-year limitation period”: Conde v. Ripley, 2015 ONSC 3342, at para. 2. This approach has been confirmed without comment or qualification by the Court of Appeal: Anisman v. Drabinsky, 2021 ONCA 120.
[47] Even if a 2-year limitation period applied, this action was commenced within two years of the Plaintiff’s discovery of the conveyance to Ms. Krasnov. In assessing the discoverability issue, it is important to keep in mind the principle that “there is only a duty to investigate when there is something that leads one to investigate: Aisman v. Drabinsky, 2020 ONSC 1197, at para 54, citing Fennell v Deol, 2015 ONSC 4835, at para 8. The Defendants have produced an affidavit from a real estate lawyer stating that it is his practice to investigate title to any property owned by a judgment debtor on frequent occasions, even if there is nothing to alert the creditor to do so. That, however, is not a legal requirement; it may be ultra-prudent practice, but it is not the law and is not the test that applies to the discoverability issue.
[48] Mr. Bokserman took the position that the judgment of Sanderson J. was not enforceable by Midland until the exhaustion of his and Mr. Shtaif’s appeal. That occurred on the date of the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of their application for reconsideration – i.e. on January 15, 2018. It is contradictory – indeed, so much so that it can be seen as cynical – for Mr. Bokserman to now put forward a real estate lawyer to say that Midland should have been looking at title to all of his properties four years previously when Justice Sanderson’s judgment was first rendered.
[49] The present fraudulent conveyance action was commenced with the issuance of the Statement of Claim on April 12, 2018. That is merely 3 months after Mr. Bokserman himself says that the judgment against him became enforceable. Nothing could have alerted Midland to search title to any properties known to be associated with Mr. Bokserman prior to January 15, 2018, since, according to Mr. Bokserman himself, there was nothing yet to enforce. There is therefore neither logic nor fairness in the Defendants’ discoverability argument.
[50] Whether it is the 10-year limitation period under the RPLA or the 2-year limitation period under the LA that applies, the limitation period did not expire prior to the commencement of the within action.
V. The slander of title allegation
[51] Ms. Krasnov has counterclaimed against Midland on the basis that its registration of a Certificate of Pending Litigation (“CPL”) on the Cortleigh Property amounts to a slander of title. That claim is a non-starter. There is nothing to even suggest that the registration of the CPL was done in bad faith or with malice, which would be necessary in order to make out such a claim: Ryan in Trust v. Kaukab, 2011 ONSC 6826, at para 233. In any case, I am of the view that Midland does have a valid interest in the Courtleigh Property, since it was purchased with the proceeds of the Rollscourt Property in which Midland has a claim and an interest.
[52] Moreover, Ms. Krasnov cannot succeed on her counterclaim for slander of title unless she proves that at the time of registration of the CPL, Midland had no reasonable claim to an interest in the land: Elgrichi v. Hornstein, 2003 CarsellOnt 1790, at para. 15(4). Based on Midland’s knowledge at the time – particularly the registered conveyance of the Rollscourt Property which indicated that the consideration for the transfer of the Rollscourt Property was for “natural love and affection” – Midland had a reasonable claim to an interest in the land.
[53] Furthermore, Krasnov must prove that she suffered damages as a result of Midland’s registration of the CPL: Van v. Qureshi, 2013 ONSC 3179, at para. 72. She has not adduced any evidence of damages suffered; indeed, she has not requested or applied for the CPL to be discharged from title.
VI. Disposition
[54] The Defendants’ motion to adduce new evidence is dismissed.
[55] The Defendants’ counterclaim is dismissed.
[56] Midland shall have the following:
(a) a Declaration that Midland BVI is a proper Plaintiff with standing to bring this action.
(b) a Declaration that the transfer of Mr. Bokserman’s interest in the Rollscourt Property to Ms. Krasnov on March 5, 2014 was a fraudulent conveyance made without consideration and with the intent to defeat, hinder, delay or defraud creditors, and is void as against the Plaintiff;
(c) an Order tracing the sale of the Rollscourt Property;
(d) a Declaration that 50% of Elena Krasnov’s ownership interest in the Cortleigh Property is held in trust for the Plaintiff;
(e) an Order directing the Land Registrar to issue and register a CPL on title to the Cortleigh Property;
(f) an Order authorizing the sheriff to take possession and sell the Cortleigh Property to realize and pay to the Plaintiff the value of the Rollscourt Property that was fraudulently conveyed.
(g) An Order that any funds received by the Plaintiff from the sale of the Courtleigh Property be credited toward satisfaction of the debt owed by Mr. Bokserman pursuant to the judgment of Sanderson J. in Court File No. 08-CL-7446, and that the balance owing by Mr. Bokserman under that judgment remains due and payable to the Plaintiff.
[57] The parties may make written submissions as to costs. I would ask that counsel for Midland provide me with submissions of no more than 2 pages within two weeks of today, and that counsel for the Defendants, as well as the Intervenor, provide me with submissions of no more than 2 pages each, within two weeks thereafter.
[58] The cost submissions may be sent to my assistant by email, appending any Bill of Costs. There is no need to provide me with copies of authorities cited in their cost submissions, provided that all authorities are accessible online and the submissions contain proper citations or links to those authorities.
Morgan J.
Released: May 3, 2021
COURT FILE NO. CV-18-595745
DATE: 20210503
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MIDLAND RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. (a British Virgin Islands Company)
Plaintiff
– and –
EUGENE BOKSERMAN and ELENA KRASNOV
Defendants
– and –
MICHAEL SHTAIF
Intervenor
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
E.M. Morgan J.
Released: May 3, 2021