CITATION: Bousselmi v. Keyes, 2026 ONSC 3993

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-00000642-0000 DATE: 20260709

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT

BETWEEN:

SOFIENE BOUSSELMI

Guzina Petar, for the Appellant

Appellant

– and –

SHARI KEYES and AMANDA HOWELL

Michelle Choe, for the Respondent

Respondent

HEARD at Toronto: August 13, 2025

Shore j.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1This is an appeal of the decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB), dated July 16, 2024, dismissing the Landlord’s request to terminate the tenancy, and the review decision, dated September 27, 2024, dismissing the review.

2The appellant landlord, Sofiene Bousselmi (“Landlord”), owns a 12-unit residential complex at 1016 O’Connor Drive, East York, Ontario. The respondent tenants, Ms. Shari Keyes and Ms. Amanda Howell (the “Tenants”), who are mother and daughter, have occupied Unit #304 since 2015, along with Ms. Howell’s 15-year old daughter.

3Ms. Keyes is disabled and relies on the Ontario Disability Support Program. Ms. Howell works at a convenience store and, until the summer of 2021, as a cleaner in the Landlord’s building. She also relies on Ontario Works.

4In July 2022, a number of outstanding maintenance issues were put into writing by the Tenants, including a broken toilet, a broken kitchen fan, holes in the cupboards where mice were coming through, a hole in the wall, covering of the peep hole in the front door, cockroaches, and a damaged floor in one of the bedrooms. In August 2022, Ms. Keyes slipped and fell on wet stairs in the stairwell, and she asked the Landlord to install tractions so the stairs would be safer.

5On August 31, 2022, the Landlord served an N12 Notice to Evict Tenants for Personal Use, on the basis that he required possession in order to move his daughter and parents into the unit.

6The Landlord’s parents immigrated to Canada in October 2022 and moved to Brampton, into a house owned by the Landlord.

7The initial application was dismissed in March 2023, because the Landlord failed to include compensation in an amount equal to one month’s rent or an offer of another rental unit acceptable to the Tenants.

8In June 2023, the Landlord served the Tenants with his second notice of termination under s. 48(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (the “RTA”). By this time, all of the units in the building had been converted to short term rentals, or “Airbnbs”, except the Landlord’s apartment, the Tenant’s apartment, and one other long-term rental, who had also been served with eviction proceedings, on the same “own use” ground.

9The hearing took place over 2 days, on January 5, 2024 and March 26, 2024. In dismissing the application, the LTB found that the Landlord had not acted in good faith and that the family members who claimed to need the apartment did not have "a genuine intention to occupy the rental unit, but rather a genuine intention to assist the Landlord in whatever he requires them to do": at para. 61.

10The Landlord sought a review of the decision. The two-page LTB decision explained why the request was denied.

11The Landlord appealed these decisions. At the commencement of the appeal, counsel confirmed that the only ground of appeal that the Landlord would be pursuing was whether the LTB erred by considering the availability of alternative units when assessing the Landlord’s good faith intention.

Standard of review:

12Pursuant to section 210 of the RTA, an appeal from an order of the LTB lies to this Court only on a question of law. Where a party seeks to appeal an order of the LTB on a question of fact or of mixed fact and law, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

13The applicable standard of review on questions of law raised in an appeal from the LTB is correctness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at paras. 36-37; citing Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, at para. 8; see also Zhou v. Cherishome Living, 2020 ONSC 500 (Div. Ct.), 443 D.L.R. (4th) 485, at paras. 36-37.

Analysis:

14Section 48(1) provides:

48 (1) A landlord may, by notice, terminate a tenancy if the landlord in good faith requires possession of the rental unit for the purpose of residential occupation for a period of at least one year by

(a) the landlord;

(b) the landlord’s spouse;

(c) a child or parent of the landlord or the landlord’s spouse; or

(d) a person who provides or will provide care services to the landlord, the landlord’s spouse, or a child or parent of the landlord or the landlord’s spouse, if the person receiving the care services resides or will reside in the building, related group of buildings, mobile home park or land lease community in which the rental unit is located.

15To determine an application under s. 48(1), the relevant question is whether, on a balance of probabilities, the Landlord genuinely intends to occupy or have his family member occupy the unit as a residence.

16The Landlord submits the LTB erred in law by considering the availability of other units as a factor in determining the good faith intention to occupy the rental unit. The Landlord relies on Salter v. Beljinac (2001), , 201 D.L.R. (4th) 744, (Ont. Div. Ct.), which provides:

26While it is relevant to the good faith of the landlord's stated intention to determine the likelihood that the intended family member will move into the unit, the Tribunal properly stops short of entering into an analysis of the landlord's various options: Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal Interpretation Guidelines (Eviction for Personal Use), at p. 3.

27Once a landlord is acting in good faith, then necessarily from the landlord's subjective perspective the landlord requires the unit for the purpose of residential occupation by a family member. That is sufficient to meet the s. 51(1) standard. The fact that the landlord might choose the particular unit to occupy for economic reasons does not result in failing to meet the s. 51(1) standard.

17The Landlord also relies on Caputo v. Newberg, , 251 O.A.C. 281 (Div. Ct.), at para. 10:

10Finally, the appellant submits that the Board erred in law in considering that the appellant could live in one of the other units. While we would agree that pursuant to Salter v. Beljinac (2001) , 201 D.L.R. (4th) 744, para. 26 (Div. Ct.), this factor could not be considered in the determination of whether the application was made in good faith, the legislation does not preclude this as a consideration in considering whether to exercise discretion under s.83(1).

18The LTB decision properly identifies the legal test, as set out in Salter, as well as the law that “good faith” refers to the genuine intention to occupy the rental unit, and not the reasonableness of the landlord’s request: Feeney v. Noble, , 19 O.R. (3d) 762 (Div. Ct.).

19The LTB also correctly recognized that they may draw inferences about the Landlord’s good faith from the Landlord’s conduct and motives. In Fava v. Harrison, 2014 ONSC 3352 (Div. Ct.) starting at paragraph 17, this Court explained:

We accept, as reflected in Salter, supra, that the motives of the landlord in seeking possession of the property are largely irrelevant and that the only issue is whether the landlord has a genuine intent to reside in the property. However, that does not mean that the Board cannot consider the conduct and the motives of the landlord in order to draw inferences as to whether the landlord desires, in good faith, to occupy the property.

In our view, Board Member Van Delft's conclusion restricts the meaning of the term "good faith" to an unreasonable degree. By excluding any consideration of the landlord's motives in deciding whether the landlord has acted in good faith, she has unduly restricted the consideration the Board must give to that term. We see nothing in Salter or Feeney, supra, to the contrary.

20In Boomer v. Arvane Farms Ltd, 2025 ONSC 1772, at para. 37, this Court clarified that Fava remains good law, finding that the Board applied the correct test by looking at the motives and intentions of the landlord to establish good faith, where the evidence before the Board showed that the landlord did not really intend to convert the tenants' property to non-residential use.

21The LTB found that the Landlord did not act in good faith. At paragraph 55 of the decision the LTB concludes as follows: “In this case, having considered the totality of the evidence, I am not persuaded, on a balance of probabilities of MH, HH and SB’s good faith intention to reside in the unit.”, and again at paragraph 62, conclude that:

In this context, I have considered the totality of oral and documentary evidence, and I am not persuaded, on a balance of probabilities, that MH, HH and SB genuinely intend to occupy the rental unit.

22The LTB found that these family members intended to assist the Landlord in whatever he requires them to do and did not have a genuine intention to move into the unit.

23At paras. 56-57, the LTB begins to tackle the Landlord’s evidence and find that “the Landlord’s evidence lacks the ring of truth” and that he “was not a credible witness”. The LTB found that “[t]he Landlord’s testimony and credibility were very seriously undermined by cross-examination”: at para. 18. He did not explain why he served an eviction notice in August if he only decided in September that he wanted the unit. He failed to mention that he also served an eviction notice on the only other long-term tenant. He was “evasive, aggressive and argumentative” when answering questions: see para. 21. The relevant sections of the decision, for the purpose of the appeal, are set out in paragraphs 56-62.

24The Landlord had the onus to prove that he acted in good faith. The LTB found that he did not.

25The issue of the availability of other units went to the Landlord’s motives. It was also used as an example of why the Landlord was found not to be a credible or reliable witness. The LTB also concludes that “I am unable to find that the Landlord simply wants his family to live close to him and to have more space available to them”.

26Even if the LTB made an error in this regard, the issue of the availability of other units was not the sole or primary reason for finding the Landlord did not act in good faith and would not have changed the outcome.

27Having applied the correct legal test, the finding that the Landlord did not act in good faith was a finding of mixed fact and law, and not subject to appeal under s. 210.

28The appeal is dismissed.

29The parties agreed they would each bear their own costs and as such there shall be no order for costs.

“Shore J.”

Released: July 9, 2026

CITATION: Bousselmi v. Keyes, 2026 ONSC 3993

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-00000642-0000 DATE: 20260709

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

BETWEEN:

SOFIENE BOUSSELMI

Appellant

– and –

SHARI KEYES and AMANDA HOWELL

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

Shore J.