Sarah Fooks

The applicants sought judicial review of an administrative directive redirecting frozen racing funds to the benefit of the Ontario racing industry rather than re-distributing them race by race.

The court held that the applicants had no remaining right or interest to challenge the directive because the earlier forfeiture order had finally disposed of the entire frozen account and any argument that some funds were from non-purse sources should have been raised in the original proceedings.

The court also held that judicial review is discretionary and declined relief because the application was perfected more than six years after commencement, the delay was excessive and inadequately explained, and prejudice was presumed.

The application was dismissed with agreed costs.

The appellant property developer sued the respondent municipal councillor for defamation after she made a police complaint about him following an altercation.

The motion judge dismissed the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the action lacked substantial merit as the mere making of a police complaint that is closed without charges does not constitute defamation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to add three non-LSO defendants as necessary parties to his action and to amend his pleadings to include a negligence claim against them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision on three grounds: (1) the issue of whether the non-LSO defendants were necessary parties had been finally determined in prior proceedings and raising it again constituted an abuse of process; (2) the negligence claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the appellant had discovered the relevant facts by December 2020, well before the proposed amendment in June 2023; and (3) the negligence claim constituted an abuse of process as it could have been made in the original statement of claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The applicants sought to remit an arbitration matter back to the arbitrator under section 46(8) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, arguing that the arbitrator failed to address certain issues and that the purported transfer of shares in Power Investment Properties Inc. should be declared invalid.

The respondents sought enforcement of the arbitral awards.

The court dismissed the applicants' application as time-barred under section 47 of the Arbitration Act, finding that the 30-day deadline for bringing a section 46 application applies to all applications under section 46, including those seeking remittance under section 46(8).

The court granted the respondents' application to enforce the arbitral awards.