Kenneth John Morris

The plaintiff, Hayley Szeto, brought a medical negligence claim against her gynecologist surgeon, Dr. Sari Kives, after suffering a bowel perforation during a reproductive organ surgery.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant fell below the standard of care by failing to detect and repair the perforation.

The court found that the bowel injury occurred during the surgery and was significant (1-2 cm), and that the defendant failed to adequately inspect the bowel, especially given additional risk factors like significant adhesions, uterine fundus perforation, obesity, and epiploica.

The court concluded that the defendant's failure to meet the standard of care caused the plaintiff's damages, leading to emergency surgery and severe complications.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against two radiologists for failing to detect a lung lesion on three chest x-rays taken between April 2012 and June 2013.

The court found that both radiologists breached the standard of care by failing to identify the abnormality.

On causation, the court held that 'but for' the first radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in April 2012, the plaintiff would not have required adjuvant chemotherapy, suffered a recurrence of his lung cancer, or experienced the associated psychological harm.

However, the court found that the second radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in October 2012 did not cause the plaintiff's outcome, as the cancer had already progressed to a stage requiring the same treatment.

The first radiologist was found liable for the agreed-upon damages, and the action against the second radiologist was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal, the respondents requested to make submissions on the costs of the lower court proceeding, arguing the motion judge made no costs award due to the novelty of the issues.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its decision to award the appellants costs of both the appeal and the lower court motion, applying the general principle that costs follow the event and noting that the appellants were entirely successful in being permitted to continue their actions against new defendants.

The plaintiff, who suffered severe brain damage at birth rendering him mentally incompetent, commenced a medical malpractice action in 2002 against his mother's obstetrician and the hospital.

In 2006, a second action was commenced against the doctors who treated him post-birth.

The motion judge struck the second action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the transition provisions in s. 24, the former limitation period applied because the claim was discovered by the litigation guardian before January 1, 2004.

Under the former Limitations Act, the limitation period was suspended due to the plaintiff's mental incompetence, meaning the second action was commenced in time.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their medical malpractice action on a motion for summary judgment because it was commenced outside the one-year limitation period under the Health Professions Procedure Code.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by refusing to consider medical evidence acquired after the action was commenced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the relevant period for the discoverability doctrine is before the action is commenced, and the appellants knew or should have known the material facts to base their claim prior to the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellants, construction lien claimants, appealed a decision holding that the proceeds of a court-approved asset sale by a company under CCAA protection did not constitute trust funds under ss. 7 and 9 of the Construction Lien Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the statutory prerequisites for a trust were not met, as the sale proceeds were not 'received by' or 'in the hands of' the owner, but were instead paid to a court-appointed monitor and stood in substitution for the company's fully secured assets.