Patrick J. Boucher

The accused faced numerous charges including weapons offences, drug trafficking, and resisting arrest after police executed a general warrant and a CDSA warrant at a hotel room.

The accused brought Charter applications challenging the validity of the general warrant and alleging violations of his section 10(b) right to counsel.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding the general warrant was properly issued with valid preconditions and the accused failed to establish a section 10(b) breach.

On the trial merits, the court found the Crown proved constructive possession of the drugs and loaded firearms found in the hotel room, and the accused's guilt for resisting arrest and possession of proceeds of crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant sought leave to compel her brother, the respondent, to pass accounts for the period he acted as attorney for property for their late mother.

The applicant alleged the respondent misappropriated funds and sought tracing and preservation orders.

The court found that the mother remained independent until late 2018, after which the respondent provided a detailed informal accounting.

The court concluded there were no significant concerns regarding the respondent's management of the mother's affairs.

The application for leave to compel passing of accounts, as well as the requests for tracing and preservation orders, were dismissed.

The applicant sought specific performance of a share transfer agreement to acquire 25% of the shares in two privately held corporations from the respondent.

The respondent opposed, arguing the agreement was unclear, unconscionable, signed under duress, barred by estoppel, and outside the limitation period.

The court utilized its enhanced fact-finding powers to resolve the application without a trial.

The court found the agreement valid, clear, and supported by consideration in the form of significant personal guarantees provided by the applicant's principal.

The court rejected the respondent's defenses and ordered specific performance, finding that the shares were unique and damages would be inadequate.

The applicant mother and respondent father, both Swiss citizens, separated in 2022.

The mother sought to maintain primary residence of their three children in Toronto, while the father, who had to return to Switzerland due to immigration issues, sought to relocate the children to his residence in Switzerland.

The mother made numerous unsubstantiated allegations of abuse and misconduct against the father.

The court found that while both parents offered suitable plans, relocating the children to Switzerland would cause significant upheaval and sever their relationship with their older half-sibling.

The court ordered that the children's primary residence remain with the mother in Toronto, but granted the father generous parenting time during summers and holidays, along with regular virtual access.

The court also imputed income to the mother based on regular family gifts, ordered proportional sharing of special expenses, granted the divorce, and awarded $90,000 in costs to the father due to the mother's unreasonable conduct during the litigation.

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought an action for defamation against a ratepayer and misfeasance in public office against the city's election compliance audit committee after the committee ordered a compliance audit of his campaign finances.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the action.

The court granted the ratepayer's anti-SLAPP motion, finding her expressions related to a matter of public interest and were protected by qualified and absolute privilege.

The court also dismissed the action against the committee, finding it was immune from civil liability as a quasi-judicial body and the action was an abuse of process.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay full indemnity costs to the ratepayer and elevated costs to the city, and his motion to have his former counsel personally pay the costs was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a peace bond order issued under section 810 of the Criminal Code requiring them to enter into a recognizance.

The respondent had alleged the appellants engaged in various unlawful acts threatening his family's safety and property, including leaving fires unattended, cutting trees, building an illegal dock, burying garbage, setting up a shooting range, and carrying weapons in a threatening manner.

The appellants denied these allegations.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal and quashed the peace bond, finding that the justice of the peace's reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

The justice of the peace failed to explain why she preferred the respondent's evidence over the appellants' evidence on key disputed points, particularly regarding the nature and dangerousness of the appellants' conduct.

The Crown applied for summary dismissal of the accused's application alleging institutional bias in relation to cannabis-related charges.

The accused alleged that the history of the Jesuits' involvement with Indigenous peoples created a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias, and that a question posed by Crown counsel during cross-examination regarding the Pope crystallized this bias.

The accused sought a traditional Indigenous circle for resolution of the matters.

The court granted the Crown's application for summary dismissal, finding the underlying application manifestly frivolous and that the accused failed to meet the high threshold for establishing institutional bias.

The accused was convicted of second-degree murder for striking and driving over the victim with his vehicle following a confrontation outside an after-hours bar in Toronto on February 5, 2023.

The Crown had alleged planned and deliberate first-degree murder, but the jury rejected this theory.

The court imposed a life sentence with a parole ineligibility period of 11 years.

The decision addresses the sentencing principles applicable to second-degree murder, the consideration of a sentencing circle request (which was dismissed), aggravating factors including the use of a vehicle as a weapon in a public space, and mitigating factors including the accused's Indigenous background, youth, lack of criminal record, and the jury's unanimous recommendation for the minimum 10-year ineligibility period.

The defendant Danark moved to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's inherent jurisdiction, or alternatively for a timetable.

The plaintiff opposed the motion.

The action was commenced in February 2017 to perfect a lien registered in January 2017.

Discoveries were completed in August 2019, with undertakings answered by June 2020.

Significant delay occurred thereafter, attributed by the plaintiff to COVID-19 pandemic impacts on its business, loss of a major client in 2021, and difficulties in retaining new counsel due to a solicitor's lien on its file.

The court found the delay was not inexcusable and that the plaintiff had rebutted the presumption of inherent prejudice.

The trial record had been passed and the action was trial-ready.

The motion was dismissed, and the parties were ordered to schedule a judicial pre-trial.

The bankrupt applied for an absolute discharge from bankruptcy following a motor vehicle accident in which he was an uninsured driver.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, which paid a $130,000 judgment against the bankrupt, opposed the discharge, arguing the bankrupt should be required to repay the debt.

The court found this was essentially a single-creditor bankruptcy filed to avoid the judgment debt.

While the bankrupt had cooperated with the trustee and his circumstances had improved, the court determined that the integrity of the bankruptcy process required some repayment.

The court granted a conditional discharge requiring repayment of 25% of the debt.

A family law trial addressing decision-making responsibility, parenting time, child support, and spousal support following the separation of parties married for approximately ten years with two children.

The applicant sought joint decision-making and increased parenting time with both children, as well as spousal support.

The respondent sought sole decision-making regarding one child and shared parenting time.

The court ordered shared decision-making with tie-breaking authority allocated differently for each child based on their circumstances and preferences.

Parenting time arrangements were maintained as established.

Child support was set at a nominal amount reflecting shared custody of one child and sole custody of the other with the respondent.

Spousal support was awarded on a time-limited basis to recognize the applicant's economic disadvantage from having left the workforce to care for the children.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim without leave to amend, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction over matters arising from the plaintiff's employment governed by a collective agreement.

The plaintiff, a former educational assistant, challenged her termination and the arbitrator's dismissal of her grievance, as well as alleged misconduct by her union and employer.

The court found that all claims either fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board or disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The motion was granted and the claim was struck without leave to amend.

The Chalmers defendants moved for a declaration that A3 Construction Inc.'s construction lien had expired and for an order vacating the lien and certificate of action from title.

A3 opposed and cross-moved for a declaration that its action was set down for trial before the expiry of the limitation period.

The court found that A3 took sufficient steps to set the action down for trial within the required time by submitting the trial record through the Civil Submissions Online Portal before the deadline, even though the record was initially rejected for procedural deficiencies.

The court dismissed the Chalmers' motion and granted A3's cross-motion, declaring the action set down for trial as of June 6, 2023.

The court considered motions by the respondent, Mohammad Rahbar, to have the appellant, Nasya Peters, declared a vexatious litigant and for security for costs in relation to her appeal.

The court found that Ms. Peters had engaged in persistent, vexatious, and abusive litigation conduct, both in court and through communications with the respondent and his counsel.

The court declared Ms. Peters a vexatious litigant and ordered her to pay $10,000 into court as security for costs before she could continue her appeal.

The respondent, Serafim Beites, moved for an order granting him exclusive possession of real property jointly owned with the applicant, Kimberly Ann Beites, in Texas, and for an order restraining the applicant from attending that property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a preservation or restraining order under section 12 of the Family Law Act was not necessary to protect an equalization payment, and that the value of the Texas property was insignificant compared to the parties' other assets.

The court also questioned its jurisdiction to grant exclusive possession of foreign-owned real property and declined to exercise exceptional in personam jurisdiction in the circumstances.

The respondent moved for security for costs in an appeal from a Small Claims Court decision dismissing the appellant's claim for motor vehicle damage caused by snow removal.

The respondent argued the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, there was an unpaid costs order, and the appellant was deliberately prolonging the litigation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the appeal had a low prospect of success, it was not vexatious, the unpaid costs order was stayed pending appeal, and the $20,000 security sought was disproportionate to the issues.

The court considered motions regarding contempt of a prior order and the setting aside of an interim injunction in a dispute over residential construction and compliance with the Building Code Act.

The respondent was found in contempt for limited conduct but had made significant efforts to purge the contempt.

The court set aside the interim injunction, ordered the respondent to maintain engineering oversight and pay for inspections, and imposed a $7,500 fine for contempt.

The appellant, Joshua S. Westwell, appealed a decision of a reference judge who ordered the Chief Firearms Officer (CFO) to issue him a non-restricted firearms licence, but left the question of a restricted licence to the CFO.

Westwell sought both non-restricted and restricted licences.

The Superior Court found that the reference judge erred by distinguishing between types of licences, as the Firearms Act only permits the issuance of a single licence.

However, the court held it had no statutory authority to grant the relief Westwell sought, as the Attorney General had not appealed the order.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful motion by Lucien Cammaert to transfer proceedings from Toronto to Sudbury.

Lucien sought substantial indemnity costs, while Rosemary Maki, the unsuccessful party, argued for no costs or costs in the cause, asserting her initial choice of venue was reasonable and that she was seeking an accounting of assets.

The court found Lucien presumptively entitled to costs, rejecting Rosemary's arguments that her positions were unreasonable enough to warrant substantial indemnity, but also that costs should be in the cause.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to Lucien, emphasizing that the unsuccessful party's conduct did not warrant elevated costs, but also did not justify deviating from the general rule that costs follow the event.

This decision addresses competing applications for a change of venue in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to transfer the trial from Gore Bay to Sudbury, while the accused sought a transfer to Toronto, or alternatively, North Bay.

The court determined that a change of venue from Gore Bay was expedient due to the lengthy trial, daily travel for the in-custody accused, and winter travel conditions.

The court granted the Crown's application, ordering the trial to proceed in Sudbury, finding it to be the most appropriate venue given its proximity to the original community, adjacent jail facilities, and available courtroom.

The accused's arguments regarding jail conditions and proximity to counsel and family were not sufficiently supported by evidence or did not outweigh the principle of local trials.