Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-25-1754-00AP; CR-25-1755-00AP Date: 2025-11-04 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

Donald Walter Carter – Applicant/Respondent

And

Edward Antler and Rita Antler – Defendants/Appellants

On his own behalf On their own behalf

Heard: October 14, 2025

P. J. Boucher, RSJ

Decision on Appeal

Introduction

[1] The appellants appeal against the March 24, 2025 order made in the Ontario Court of Justice by Justice of the Peace E. Olesen-Schinke, in which Her Worship ordered that the appellants enter into a recognizance, or "peace bond", pursuant to section 810 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

[2] The appellants raise jurisdictional and legal arguments. The jurisdictional argument relates to the authority of the learned justice of the peace to make determinations regarding property rights. Among the legal issues I need only engage one, which is determinative of this appeal.

[3] At the time that they drafted their notice of appeal, the self-represented appellants offered the following ground of appeal, among many others: "I beg this court to allow me to go beyond the scope to rebut Donald Carter's testimony with my evidence." For the reasons that follow I find that this ground of appeal engages a fundamental question about what consideration the learned justice of the peace gave to the evidence provided by the appellants.

[4] Both parties sought leave to adduce fresh evidence, but for the reasons set out below, their motions are dismissed.

Background

[5] The parties have been involved in a protracted dispute about whether the appellants can occupy land pursuant to the terms of a disputed lease.

[6] In late 2021 the respondent's parents became owners of several acres of rural recreational land described here as Part 1 and Part 3 (the "property"), which are separated by a Crown road described as Part 2. The parties used the Crown road to access Part 1 and Part 3.

[7] The appellants had since 2011 occupied Part 3 during the summer with the permission of the previous owners, the Barnstables. Their evidence is that they renewed that lease agreement for a further ten years just prior to the respondent's purchase of the property. They produced to the respondent a receipt from the previous owner as evidence of the lease. The respondent argues that receipt is insufficient to establish a lease, suggesting that at best it permitted only parking of a recreational vehicle ("RV") by the appellants. The respondent submits that it was doctored by the appellants.

[8] Much like the appellants, the respondent and his family had occupied a "rental" site on land owned by the Barnstables for many years, prior to purchasing the property in late 2021.

[9] The respondent occupies Part 1 with his family, including his elderly parents.

[10] The record indicates police involvement as early as the Spring of 2022. In that year the respondent issued trespass notices to the appellants. The OPP and the Crown determined the dispute between the parties was civil, believing the police lacked the authority to remove the appellants from Part 3. The respondent lodged with the OPP a public complaint against two of the officers involved.

[11] In early 2023 the appellants brought an application before the Landlord and Tenant Board (the "LTB") pursuant to the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (the "Act"), seeking a declaration that their lease interest in Part 3 was governed by the Act. A hearing took place in the absence of the respondent, and the LTB granted the requested relief.

[12] At a rehearing held at the request of the respondent, the LTB held the Act did not apply to the appellants' interest in Part 3, finding it was a seasonal rental. In a decision dated November 19, 2024, the Divisional Court dismissed the appellants' appeal of the LTB decision.

[13] On February 22, 2024 the respondent filed a peace bond application before the Ontario Court of Justice. On May 21, 2024 Justice of the Peace Olesen-Schinke accepted the application, ordered that a hearing take place and required the respondent to attend before the court to swear an information. This was the second time the respondent filed a request for a peace bond hearing in this matter, the first having been denied by the court on July 13, 2023.

[14] The peace bond hearing took place in the Ontario Court of Justice on December 09, 2024 and March 24, 2025.

The Fresh Evidence

[15] The appellants filed two USB sticks containing audio recordings and video recordings as well as a Small Claims Court endorsement. They submit they were caught by surprise during the peace bond hearing and were unable to properly respond and place this evidence before that court. They seek leave to file this evidence together with some photographs and letters from solicitors.

[16] The respondent filed numerous documents, most of which formed part of the record in the Ontario Court of Justice. The respondent believed all of them formed part of that record, except for Deputy Judge Mongenais' endorsement of June 19, 2025. However, my review of the record reveals that in addition, several photographs, some letters from police, a copy of the purported lease and a copy of an agreement of purchase and sale between the respondent's parents and the Barnstables, are fresh evidence on this appeal.

[17] In Palmer v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759 the Supreme Court set out the following test to determine whether fresh evidence should be admitted on appeal:

a. The evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial provided that this general principle will not be applied as strictly in a criminal case as in civil cases;

b. The evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the trial;

c. The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief; and

d. It must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result.

[18] The endorsements from the Small Claims Court are court records and not subject to this test. The balance of the fresh evidence, in my view, fails the first stage of the test. At the time of the peace bond hearing, these parties had been engaged in protracted litigation before courts and tribunals for years. They were acutely aware of their dispute and they could have tried to have this evidence admitted at first instance. Moreover, there was a lengthy adjournment from December 2024 to March 2025, which provided additional time to marshal this evidence. In any event, the fresh evidence supplements evidence adduced during the hearing and does not add anything new to the protracted dispute and the issues that must be decided on this appeal.

[19] The motions to admit fresh evidence are accordingly dismissed.

The Peace Bond Hearing

[20] The respondent's evidence was that the appellants engaged in various unlawful acts that threatened and continued to threaten his family's safety and their property, including:

a. Leaving fires unattended;

b. Cutting trees and brush;

c. Building an illegal dock;

d. Burying garbage;

e. Setting up a shooting range on Part 3;

f. Taking down barriers installed by the respondent's family to prevent access to Part 3;

g. Mr. Antler driving an ATV with a rifle across his lap; and

h. Mrs. Antler walking around with a modified weapon in a threatening manner.

[21] The appellants, both of whom are in their eighties, testified and denied these allegations. For example, Mr. Antler testified that he always transports his rifle with a trigger lock. He also testified that he set up a target on a sand berm to line up the sights on his rifle, that he only fired a few shots, and that the direction of the target was away from Part 1, therefore not endangering anyone. Mrs. Antler testified that the alleged modified weapon she carried was an old brush cutter that she used to cut brush, not to threaten anyone. As well, the appellants testified that the dock was located across from Crown land, not the respondent's land, and that it had in any event been removed.

[22] The appellants' daughter, Janice Ramsay, testified and acknowledged she put a smiley face on one of the respondent's no trespassing signs. She said she did this so that company that they had invited would not be afraid to visit.

[23] The facts in this case were hotly disputed by the parties on issues of the right to the use of the land and the conduct alleged against the appellants and their rebuttals. The learned justice of the peace's reasons purported to resolve those issues as follows:

Upon consideration of the totality of the information before the court, on the balance of probabilities, the court is satisfied that the test for issuance of a peace bond has been met. That the informant does have reasonable fear that the defendants will cause injury to him or to his property. It is the court's finding that there is reasonable basis of this fear. The court is satisfied that there have been incidents where the informant's property has been damaged, bush and trees removed, signs defaced, fires left unattended, and I do note that Mr. Antler testified to the court directly that there are propane tanks on Parcel 3, that access has been blocked, that guns are being discharged on the property.

The court has to weigh and consider both Parcel 1 and Parcel 3. That there may have been an agreement with the previous owner to an allowance for parking. The court accepts the testimony of the informant that this agreement did not extend to his ownership, that the activities of the defendants collectively rise to the bar of a reasonable concern in relation to the safety of the informant, the safety of his family, potential damage or destruction of his property.

[24] On the basis of these reasons, the justice of the peace granted the application and required the appellants to enter into a twelve-month recognizance with a monetary pledge of $250 without deposit, together with the following conditions:

a. Keep the peace and be of good behaviour;

b. Not communicate directly or indirectly by any physical electronic or other means with the respondent and his immediate family, except through legal counsel; and

c. Not be within 500 metres of any place they know him to live, work, go to school frequent or any place they know the person to be except to attend the informant's property, which would be Parcel 3, on only one occasion in the presence of a uniformed police officer to collect any personal belongings.

The Law

[25] A justice or summary conviction court may order a defendant to enter into a recognizance, with or without sureties, to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a period not exceeding twelve months: Criminal Code, s. 810(3). Prior to making such an order, subsection 810(3) of the Code requires that the justice or summary conviction court be satisfied on a balance of probabilities by the evidence adduced that the informant or the person on whose behalf the information was laid has reasonable grounds to fear another person:

a. Will cause personal injury to the informant or to the person on whose behalf the information was laid, or to their intimate partner or child or will damage their property; or

b. Will commit an offence under section 162.1

[26] In assessing whether there exist reasonable grounds for the informant's fear, the court must consider not only the informant's subjective fear, but also whether that fear is objectively established. In making its determination, the court may rely on evidence that is credible and trustworthy: R. v. Budreo at paras. 52 and 53.

Sufficiency of Reasons

[27] The legal ground of appeal dealing with the appellants' evidence implicates the sufficiency of the reasons of the learned justice of the peace and is determinative of the appeal.

[28] I read the ground of appeal set out above in paragraph 3 as an expression of concern that the learned justice of the peace had not considered the appellants' evidence that was put before the court at the hearing for the peace bond. And indeed, there is merit to this concern.

[29] In the decision R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 at para. 24, the Supreme Court explained that "the requirement of reasons is tied to their purpose and the purpose varies with the context." Where, as here, a trial level decision is made,

the reasons justify and explain the result. The losing party knows why he or she has lost. Informed consideration can be given to grounds for appeal. Interested members of the public can satisfy themselves that justice has been done, or not, as the case may be.

[30] The Court continued at paragraph 28,

It is neither necessary nor appropriate to limit circumstances in which an appellate court may consider itself unable to exercise appellate review in a meaningful way. The mandate of the appellate court is to determine the correctness of the trial decision, and a functional test requires that the trial judge's reasons be sufficient for that purpose. The appeal court itself is in the best position to make that determination. The threshold is clearly reached, as here, where the appeal court considers itself unable to determine whether the decision is vitiated by error. Relevant factors in this case are that (i) there are significant inconsistencies or conflicts in the evidence which are not addressed in the reasons for judgment, (ii) the confused and contradictory evidence relates to a key issue on the appeal, and (iii) the record does not otherwise explain the trial judge's decision in a satisfactory manner. Other cases, of course, will present different factors. The simple underlying rule is that if, in the opinion of the appeal court, the deficiencies in the reasons prevent meaningful appellate review of the correctness of the decision, then an error of law has been committed.

[31] Time and workload constraints are relevant considerations when determining the sufficiency of reasons: Sheppard, at para. 55; R. v. Leonard, 2025 ONCA 63 at para. 19. Trial judges are not held to standards of perfection, and their reasons are not expected to "provide the equivalent of a jury instruction": Sheppard, at para. 55.

[32] While a peace bond hearing is not a criminal trial, and the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities, providing reasons that allow meaningful appellate review is no less important on these applications. Peace bonds restrict the liberty of the defendant, and they can lead to criminal consequences, on allegations that terms of the peace bond have been breached (s. 811). In short, they are not to be taken lightly: R. v. Musoni at para. 28.

[33] In my view, taking a functional approach and considering the demands of a busy court, the justice of the peace's reasons prevent meaningful review. While she recited the testimony of the witnesses and set out the correct legal test, she failed to demonstrate how she engaged with the evidence of the appellants on key points where it diverged from the respondent's evidence. In other words, she failed to explain why she preferred the evidence of the respondent over the appellants.

[34] Reviewing the reasons in the context of the record, I conclude the justice of the peace must have rejected the defendants' evidence on key points but failed to explain why she did so. The reasons simply offer conclusory statements favouring the evidence given by the respondent without commenting on the evidence offered by the appellants. And it is not obvious on the record why she would have rejected the appellants' evidence. For example, a rifle that is transported with a secured trigger lock is not in and of itself dangerous. Mr. Antler testified he fired his rifle a few times into a sand berm, in the opposite direction from the respondent's property, not placing anyone in danger. The Antlers denied leaving fires unattended. Mrs. Antler testified that she did not threaten anyone with the brush cutter.

[35] Judicial officers must offer reasons for their factual findings where the evidence is disputed by the parties. It is only in this way that the parties and reviewing courts can understand the basis for the decisions that were made. As the Court of Appeal stated in Liquid Capital Exchange Corp. v. Daoust, 2024 ONCA 489 at para. 31, an appeal involving sufficiency of reasons in a case of fraudulent misrepresentation, "[t]he assessment of credibility is quintessentially a matter for the trial judge as the finder of fact." In my view, that assessment is not present in this case, and the parties and this court are left wondering why the learned justice of the peace reached the conclusions she did. Given the legal consequences of being subjected to a peace bond, the appellants had a right to know the learned justice of the peace's reasoning process.

Conclusion

[36] For these reasons, the appeal is allowed, and the s. 810 recognizance is quashed.

Regional Senior Justice P. J. Boucher

Released: November 04, 2025