Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FS-21-23621-0000 Date: 2025-08-26 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

Aimey Lee Lyne Cousineau – Appellant and Alain Normand Dupuis – Respondent

Counsel:

• Brooke Rogers, for the Appellant
• Dhiren Chohan, for the Respondent
• Gerald Brouillette, for the OCL

Heard: February 24, 25, 26 and 27, 2025

Reasons for Judgment

Introduction

[1] The trial of this application took place over a four-day period. Decision-making, parenting time, child and spousal support (ongoing and retroactive) are in dispute.

[2] The parties started living together in February 2005, were married on January 12, 2011, and separated on September 15, 2021. Together they are the biological parents of the children Valerie Lucie Dupuis (born August 15, 2009) and Pascal Gerald Dupuis (born October 25, 2015).

[3] Since the date of separation, Pascal has shared his time with his parents. Valerie's parenting time has varied from shared, to primarily with the applicant and then primarily with the respondent. She has lived with the respondent since the Fall of 2023 and has had little contact with the applicant. Since early 2022 the parties have lived in homes down the street from each other in Val Caron.

[4] The children were represented by the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL). The OCL appointed a social worker to assist with counsel for the children. The social worker testified at trial.

[5] The applicant is a paramedic by education and trade, though she spent ten years at home with the children. She is currently employed by Glencore Canada as first aid security and earns approximately $112,000 per year. The respondent is employed as the general manager with E & R Jewell Contracting. His stated income is approximately $224,000 per year, though that is the subject of dispute in these proceedings.

Issues in Dispute and Position of the Parties

Decision-making and parenting time

[6] The applicant asks for joint decision-making regarding Valerie and parenting time in accordance with her views. The respondent agrees Valerie's parenting time with the applicant should be in accordance with Valerie's wishes; however, he seeks sole decision-making.

[7] The applicant seeks sole decision-making regarding Pascal. She asks for a 70-30 split of parenting time in her favour, based on her work schedule. The respondent asks for joint decision-making and shared parenting time on a week-about basis.

[8] The OCL recommends the status-quo is working in the best interests of the children and should continue. In terms of Valerie, he submits her parents should share decision-making, keeping in mind she is turning 16 years old and will make most decisions on her own, including where she will reside and the terms of her parenting time with the applicant. By the time this judgment is released, Valerie will have recently turned 16 years of age. For the purposes of this judgment, I will treat Valerie as being 16 years of age.

[9] Regarding Pascal, the OCL submits the week-about parenting time should continue. He argues the parties should continue to discuss important decisions regarding Pascal; however, in the event of disagreement, the applicant should have the final say.

Child support and spousal support

[10] The applicant asks the court to expunge any arrears of child and spousal support as of December 31, 2024. She seeks a fresh start as of January 01, 2025 and asks for a child support order based on the parenting arrangement ordered.

[11] With respect to spousal support, she asks for high-end support based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines from January 01, 2025 to May 31, 2025, and thereafter medium range support. She submits spousal support should terminate either when she obtains a management position or on September 15, 2031, whichever first occurs.

[12] The applicant asks the court to impute annual income of at least $250,000 to the respondent, arguing he receives bonuses and material benefits from his employer, the latter of which are not reflected in his declared taxable earnings. The applicant also argues that when the respondent's declared income is less than $250,000 per year, it reflects intentional under-employment, and the court should impute income of $250,000. Further, any income earned by the respondent over $250,000 should inform the child and spousal support awards.

[13] The respondent argues his income for support purposes should be based on his line 150 income on his tax return. He does not dispute entitlement to spousal support. However, depending on the parenting arrangement ordered and the income determinations made by the court, he submits if spousal support is payable, it should be at the low end of the range. He further submits the duration of spousal support should be from 5 to 8.5 years from the date of separation. Finally, he argues that as of December 31, 2024, he is entitled to credit for an overpayment of $22,805 in child and spousal support.

The Law

[14] The following definitions are set out in subsection 2(1) of the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp):

child of the marriage means a child of two spouses or former spouses who, at the material time,

a. is under the age of majority and who has not withdrawn from their charge,

or

b. is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life;

decision-making responsibility means the responsibility for making significant decisions about a child's well-being, including in respect of

a. health;

b. education;

c. culture, language, religion and spirituality; and

d. significant extra-curricular activities;

[15] Parenting orders regarding decision-making, or any aspect of that responsibility, may be made in favour of either or both spouses: Divorce Act, s. 16.3. Parenting orders regarding parenting time may be made in accordance with a schedule, and unless ordered otherwise by the court, the person to whom parenting time is allocated has exclusive authority to make day-to-day decisions about the child during that time: Divorce Act, ss. 16.2(1), (2).

[16] The court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the children of the marriage when making parenting orders: Divorce Act, s. 16(1). The Act sets out the following test to be applied when determining the children's best interests:

16(2) When considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), the court shall give primary consideration to the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

(3) In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including

(a) the child's needs, given the child's age and stage of development, such as the child's need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child's relationship with each spouse, each of the child's siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child's life;

(c) each spouse's willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child's relationship with the other spouse;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child's views and preferences, giving due weight to the child's age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child's care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under paragraph (3)(j), the court shall take the following into account:

(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

(5) In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact with the child under a contact order.

(6) In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.

[17] The Federal Child Support Guidelines are used to determine a spouse's income for child support, and they are the starting point in determining income for spousal support under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAGs): SSAGs, s. 6.1. The relevant portions of the Guidelines read as follows:

15(1) Subject to subsection (2), a parent's or spouse's annual income is determined by the court in accordance with sections 16 to 20.

(2) Where both parents or spouses agree in writing on the annual income of a parent or spouse, the court may consider that amount to be the parent's or spouse's income for the purposes of these guidelines if the court thinks that the amount is reasonable having regard to the income information provided under section 21.

16. Subject to sections 17 to 20, a parent's or spouse's annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading "Total income" in the T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency and is adjusted in accordance with Schedule III.

17(1) If the court is of the opinion that the determination of a parent's or spouse's annual income under section 16 would not be the fairest determination of that income, the court may have regard to the parent's or spouse's income over the last three years and determine an amount that is fair and reasonable in light of any pattern of income, fluctuation in income or receipt of a non-recurring amount during those years.

(2) Where a parent or spouse has incurred a non-recurring capital or business investment loss, the court may, if it is of the opinion that the determination of the parent's or spouse's annual income under section 16 would not provide the fairest determination of the annual income, choose not to apply sections 6 and 7 of Schedule III, and adjust the amount of the loss, including related expenses and carrying charges and interest expenses, to arrive at such amount as the court considers appropriate.

19(1) The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:

(a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse;

(b) the spouse is exempt from paying federal or provincial income tax;

(c) the spouse lives in a country that has effective rates of income tax that are significantly lower than those in Canada;

(d) it appears that income has been diverted which would affect the level of child support to be determined under these Guidelines;

(e) the spouse's property is not reasonably utilized to generate income;

(f) the spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so;

(g) the spouse unreasonably deducts expenses from income;

(h) the spouse derives a significant portion of income from dividends, capital gains or other sources that are taxed at a lower rate than employment or business income or that are exempt from tax; and

(i) the spouse is a beneficiary under a trust and is or will be in receipt of income or other benefits from the trust.

(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(g), the reasonableness of an expense deduction is not solely governed by whether the deduction is permitted under the Income Tax Act.

Analysis

Decision-making and parenting time – Valerie

[18] The dispute between the parties is whether decision-making should be shared or the exclusive responsibility of the respondent.

[19] Since the date of separation, the parties have essentially followed Valerie's lead in terms of her residential arrangements. She shared her time with her parents, then lived exclusively with the applicant for almost a year, and for almost the past two years has lived with the respondent, with contact with the applicant in accordance with her wishes.

[20] The parties' communication has often been poor since separation. They blame each other wholly for this problem, but in my view, they each play a part. The applicant has blocked the respondent from contacting her other than through the Our Family Wizard parenting application (OFW), which they began using in May 2022. The respondent let his OFW subscription lapse for many months in 2023, which resulted in essentially no communication between them, and has often been slow to respond to the applicant's inquiries, if at all.

[21] In Decaen v. Decaen, 2013 ONCA 218 the Court of Appeal set out at paragraph 42 the factors to be considered in assessing the weight to be attributed to the views and preferences of a child:

(i) whether both parents are able to provide adequate care;

(ii) how clear and unambivalent the wishes are;

(iii) how informed the expression is;

(iv) the age of the child;

(v) the maturity level;

(vi) the strength of the wish;

(vii) the length of time the preference has been expressed for;

(viii) practicalities;

(ix) the influence of the parent(s) on the expressed wish or preference;

(x) the overall context; and

(xi) the circumstances of the preferences from the child's point of view.

[22] In my view, Valerie's views and preferences carry significant weight. She explained her decision to leave the respondent's home (to avoid consequences) and the applicant's home (due to a conflict). She has not bounced back and forth; rather, each of her decisions to change her residence were followed by a lengthy period in the next residence. She states she currently prefers the respondent's approach to discipline and consequences. She worries the applicant is too strict and severe in her approach. She has maintained her current wishes for almost two years. I see no evidence of interference from the respondent regarding Valerie's wishes.

[23] She is also at the age when she can withdraw from parental control and is only two years away from the age of majority. Valerie has chosen at different periods to live exclusively with each of her parents and I conclude it is in her best interests that both parents be aware of and have a say in major decisions involving her. Keeping the applicant aware of her needs is important to Valerie's well-being. In the event she needs or seeks out the input or help of the applicant, it is best that the applicant is up to date on Valerie's circumstances. Accordingly, the respondent needs to consult with the applicant regarding major decisions, but he will have the final say. This is to avoid deadlocks that could negatively impact Valerie. And ultimately, Valerie will have a significant if not deciding voice.

[24] The same applies to Valerie's parenting time with the applicant. Valerie is mature and old enough to decide the terms of that parenting time.

Decision-making and parenting time – Pascal

[25] Pascal will be 10 years old in a few months. For the purposes of this judgment, I will treat him as such.

[26] Pascal has spent the last four years living equally with his parents. The current week-about exchange on Mondays after school has been in place for about three years.

[27] In my view, Pascal's best interests require that his parents share decision-making. However, if they are unable to agree, the applicant will have the final say.

[28] Pascal spends significant periods with each parent and accordingly they should both be up to date in terms of important matters affecting him such as education and health care. I find the applicant has been primarily responsible for interacting with his schools and health care providers. She has made efforts to communicate with and include the respondent in important decisions (except during the period when his OFW was suspended). She has thereafter made decisions where agreement could not be reached, or the respondent's position on an issue was not provided in a timely way.

[29] For example, Pascal was diagnosed with a learning disability in late 2023. He started his schooling in French but switched to immersion. He was experiencing difficulties going to school in two languages and his therapist recommended he stick to one language. In December 2023 the applicant consulted the respondent about the need for Pascal to attend an English school. The parties emailed back and forth about the issue and ultimately the applicant enrolled Pascal in an English school and advised the respondent.

[30] As the Summer of 2024 approached, the applicant encouraged the respondent to work on Pascal's language skills during the summer prior to starting at the new school. No response appears to have been received to this request. However, in October 2024 the respondent enrolled both children in an after-school program with Oxford Learning. He pays for this tutoring during the week Pascal is with him. The applicant chose not to spend the money on this tutoring during her week but instead works with Pascal on flashcards provided by the school.

[31] This process has worked in Pascal's best interests. Granting the applicant sole decision-making would remove a significant caregiver of information, insight and input into important decisions impacting Pascal. The importance of this arrangement is heightened by Pascal's learning disability, which requires both caregivers to work together to ensure Pascal's educational needs are met. This process of consultation and decision-making has played out in an informal way, without the benefit of a court order. Pascal's best interests require that it continue.

[32] The applicant asks that Pascal's parenting time be varied so that he spends extended alternate weekends from Thursday to Monday morning with the respondent, as well as two after-school visits in the weeks he does not spend the weekend with the respondent. The applicant argues this schedule would work best with her current work schedule, ensuring she can spend more time with Pascal when he is not at school.

[33] For several years the applicant has worked in a relief position which can require changes to her schedule. Typically, she works from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. two days on, two days off, or three days on and then three days off. She has been able to switch shifts with co-workers to make sure she does not work overnight shifts when Pascal is with her. Normally, she works only two days during the week Pascal is at her home.

[34] On those days, Pascal is alone in the morning for about an hour and a half. He feeds himself and heads outside to a neighbour's home to wait for the bus. There is GPS monitoring on the bus, so the applicant knows when he gets on. She has ensured he has communication tools as well, such as Messenger Kids. After school, he spends a few hours alone before the applicant arrives. He took a staying alone at home course and the Children's Aid Society has approved this plan. It has worked well.

[35] The respondent has a new spouse that lives with him. Her two daughters spend alternate weeks with her, which align with the weeks Pascal spends in the respondent's home. This brings four children, including Valerie, into the home in those weeks. Not surprisingly, Pascal described his time at the applicant's as quiet compared to when he is at the respondent's. Pascal has a routine and limits imposed at his father's place. For example, he can take the quad out but must tell the respondent where he is going. The respondent is usually gone to work when Pascal gets up in the morning, so his new spouse watches over Pascal, as well as after school. But he spends time with Pascal after work. Pascal told the OCL that he feels safe in both homes and would not change anything.

[36] I pause at this point to discuss two incidents raised by the respondent which caused him to call the police as "a last resort." Time was spent in the affidavits and at trial regarding an incident that took place involving Pascal in the applicant's home in October 2024, and a text message exchange between the applicant and Valerie in September 2024. Apparently, the applicant became upset with Pascal about homework, resulting in damage to her stove and a bowl. Pascal had no memory of this incident when asked about it by the OCL.

[37] This took place not long after the applicant sent a text message to Valerie that caused her concern for her boyfriend's safety. The respondent called the police about these incidents, suggesting in his evidence that the Children's Aid Society had been contacted previously to no avail. He took the opportunity to also mention he was concerned Pascal spent some time alone while in his mother's care, though he had known about this for over a year before he raised it with the police. In cross he appeared to admit he did this as a trial strategy, though he backed down from this in re-examination. In any event, it is an example of unnecessarily involving the police. In cross the respondent agreed he had no real safety concerns for Pascal when he is in the applicant's care. And his position at trial is that the current parenting time arrangement should remain in place.

[38] The current arrangement allows Pascal to maximize his time with his parents. His best interests have been met by this week-about schedule for years. Both parties make sure he is safe when he is in their home, when they cannot provide their own supervision. He has a routine in each home that includes outside activities, chores, and homework. He enjoys the differences in their homes as well, taking advantage of being the only child at the applicant's home and being part of a larger family at the respondent's.

[39] Pascal's views and preferences carry important weight in this analysis. They have remained consistent throughout the OCL's involvement. There is no evidence that he is being influenced by either parent. He is mature for his age, which is acknowledged by his parents. Each of them has given him responsibilities at home, including staying alone at times or venturing out alone on his quad. He has responded appropriately to this trust placed in him by his parents.

[40] In conclusion, I find Pascal's best interests require that his parents share decision-making, with the applicant having the final say in the event of disagreement. As well, the long-standing parenting time arrangement works in his best interests and should continue.

Should support be adjusted retroactively?

[41] For reasons I will explain, I conclude any child and spousal support arrears, or overpayment should be set at zero as of December 31, 2024.

[42] The parties provided conflicting evidence about the amount of support paid by the respondent to the applicant for the years 2022, 2023 and 2024. The applicant's evidence is that the respondent paid her sporadically, often in lump sums reflecting several months of payments, there being no support order in place which the Family Responsibility Office could otherwise enforce. The respondent agrees that he often went months without paying support but states he would catch up. There was no differentiation between child support and spousal support, though in at least one year the applicant reported on her taxes the monies she received from the respondent as spousal support.

[43] Not only were the payments sporadic and without explanation, but the respondent failed to live up to his income disclosure obligations. In June 2022 he provided his T4 for the previous year. He did not provide his 2022 income tax return and 2023 year to date income until after September 2023. How was the applicant to determine if the amount he was sending was accurate? The applicant instead accepted the monies as they came and declined to bring the matter to the court for an interim support order. The respondent unilaterally stopped paying support in May 2024.

[44] Throughout this time, Valerie's residence changed from shared, to with the applicant and then with the respondent. This necessarily complicated the support payments.

[45] In total, the applicant's evidence is that she received $59,056 from the respondent over the three years.

[46] The respondent's evidence on this point was complicated and difficult to understand. He filed a spreadsheet he prepared containing payments for spousal support and child support and amounts he determined were proper for the particular year, based on his own determination of their incomes. He did not provide the back-up documentation to support his calculations. Initially, his evidence was that he paid to the applicant $74,647 over the three years. He concluded he had overpaid $22,805 in combined child and spousal support.

[47] But at trial the respondent agreed with the applicant's figure of $59,056 in total payments. He instead argued the overpayment claimed was a result of setting spousal support in different ranges.

[48] In cases where a party seeks to decrease support retroactively there is a presumption the court will go back to the date of effective notice. However, this presumes "proper communication and disclosure by the payor showing a decrease in income that is lasting and genuine": Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 at para. 82.

[49] Here, the respondent's spreadsheet was provided as part of his affidavit sworn December 20, 2024. This can hardly be considered proper notice. In addition, the respondent failed to properly communicate and disclose his income information during the period in question. In the absence of effective notice, certainty and predictability for children "are to be prioritized over the payor's interest in flexibility": Colucci, at para. 84. In addition, unlike in Colucci, this is not a case where the recipient relied on an outstanding support order. Here, there was no order in place, and the applicant simply accepted payments from the respondent without proper income disclosure. The court accordingly declines to consider the respondent's request for an adjustment to support prior to January 01, 2025.

The respondent's income for support purposes

[50] In determining annual income, the default position under the Guidelines is to use the spouses' line 150 income on their most recent tax return, unless the court determines it "would not be the fairest determination of that income." Under section 17 of the Guidelines the court may consider income over the last three years in determining an amount that is fair and reasonable. This accounts for fluctuations in income as well as receipt of non-recurring amounts during that time.

[51] In addition, the court may impute income if any of the factors in section 19 of the Guidelines are present.

[52] The respondent asks the court to use the line 150 income for the parties in determining their income under the Guidelines. The applicant asked that her line 150 income be considered, but argued this was not an appropriate approach for the respondent.

[53] The respondent's income information provided at trial was as follows:

a. 2021 - $185,277 b. 2022 - $258,315 c. 2023 - $223,889 d. 2024 – approx. $223,889

[54] The respondent testified that his income in 2021 was lower because a client did not want him physically attending at the mine where his employer works. This necessarily restricted the number of hours he could work, which I accept. This was a discreet event, after which time his income increased. Indeed, he testified that a fair estimate of his income, including bonuses is about $250,000. I am unable to find on this record that the respondent was underemployed in 2021.

[55] As an aside, the applicant appeared to suggest in her closing submissions, contrary to her opening statement, that if I impute income to the respondent for 2021, child support would be owing to her, but not spousal support. I have declined to impute income for that year and so I take the applicant's position to mean that child and spousal support should be set at zero as of December 31, 2024.

[56] The respondent's income includes hourly pay for 80 hours every two weeks plus bonuses and a premium hourly rate, which I infer is an increased rate for overtime. Clearly there are fluctuations in his income.

[57] There remains the question of whether income should be imputed to the respondent. The respondent testified that he received several financial benefits from his employer. The first involves a rental property. His employer provided him with the downpayment of $65,000 in 2018 to purchase the property. He also pays him a bonus each month to cover the mortgage payment. This bonus is in addition to other bonuses he receives at Christmas and sometimes in January. The respondent explained his employer did this to keep him from leaving for work with the competition. The bonus is claimed as income by the respondent on his tax returns.

[58] The respondent testified in cross that the verbal agreement with his employer is that if he stays for 10 years (from 2018) the respondent will not have to pay back the $65,000 and the employer will pay off the rest of the house at that time. The respondent declares in his income the bonus he receives to make the mortgage payments. Although he initially testified he could not recall if he declared the $65,000 as income, upon reflection he testified, without corroborating evidence, that he had. He provided no evidence about whether the tax consequences of claiming the downpayment as income would be covered by his employer in the event the downpayment was forgiven.

[59] I am unable to conclude at this time the respondent is diverting income with the rental property that would affect his level of support (s. 19(d) Guidelines). He claims the bonus on his taxes. He also claims the rent he receives from his tenants. If his employer discharges his mortgage (which could be as soon as 2028) and forgives the downpayment, then the issue of whether that value should be included in his income could be addressed at that time.

[60] The second financial benefit the respondent received from his employer was a loan for $350,000. Pursuant to their agreement on property, the respondent paid to the applicant $350,000 to equalize their net family properties. This was paid in two installments in January 2022 and June 2022. The respondent testified in cross that he received a loan from his employer to make the equalization payment. He did not include the loan amount in his tax return because he did not consider it wages. He further testified he is paying it back in full on his employer's terms, although he did not elaborate.

[61] The disclosure of this loan at trial is troubling. The respondent refused to answer questions about it earlier at questioning. This was despite the applicant's claim that income be imputed to the respondent. The loan is a significant amount of money that was advanced by his employer over three years ago. He has not provided the terms of repayment and, importantly, there is no mention of this debt or its repayment in his financial statement sworn November 13, 2024.

[62] The respondent has hidden from the applicant and the court the important details of this arrangement with his employer. It begs the question of whether the arrangement has diverted income that would otherwise impact child and spousal support. In these circumstances, where the respondent has not been accurate and truthful about his financial circumstances, I am prepared to draw an adverse inference against the respondent and impute income to him: Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548 at paras. 55 and 57.

[63] I am mindful that the onus rests with the applicant to provide a sufficient evidentiary basis for the court to impute income to the respondent. However, where a spouse has failed to make proper disclosure, the court can consider the record to determine the amount of income to impute: Graham v. Bruto, 2008 ONCA 260 at para. 4.

[64] I conclude the respondent's line 150 income is not the fairest determination of his income. I have considered the pattern of income the respondent has earned over the past three years, which he attributes to fluctuations in bonuses and overtime. I have also considered his evidence in cross that his annual income prior to separation was approximately $250,000 inclusive of bonuses, overtime and other perks. I am accordingly imputing an annual income to the respondent of $250,000.

Quantum and duration of spousal support

[65] The relevant portions of the Divorce Act in determining spousal support awards are set out below:

15.2(1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse.

(3) The court may make an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) for a definite or indefinite period or until a specified event occurs, and may impose terms, conditions or restrictions in connection with the order as it thinks fit and just.

15.4(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including

(a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;

(b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

(c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

15.2(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should

(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

[66] Entitlement to spousal support was conceded. I will review the basis for entitlement to spousal support further below. The ranges in the SSAGS are the starting point for awarding support: Politis v. Politis, 2021 ONCA 541 at para. 28. While the SSAGS are a helpful tool, they are not a substitute for judicial analysis: McGuire v. Bates, 2022 ONCA 431 at para. 33.

[67] The SSAGS suggest support should be paid for a minimum of 8.25 years and a maximum of 16.5 years. The applicant asks for support to be paid for ten years from the date of separation, or until she obtains a management position. Presently, the parties have been separated for 4 years. The respondent submits spousal support should be paid from 5 to 8.5 years from the date of separation.

[68] An award of time-limited spousal support after trial is the exception: Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813. However, since Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, courts in Ontario have awarded time-limited support for medium length relationships, such as here, where the economic disadvantages flowing from the breakdown of the marriage have not warranted indefinite support.

[69] In Fisher, the parties were married 19 years and did not have children. In ordering spousal support for 3 years, which was affirmed on appeal, the trial court considered the claimant was 45 years old, had no dependants and had relatively good employment prospects. In assessing the nature of the economic dependency, Justice Lang considered the following factors at paragraph 84:

The factors and objectives require a balancing of the parties' circumstances, including the duration of the parties' cohabitation, their ages, their incomes and prospective incomes, the effects of equalization, the stages of their careers, contributions to the marital standard of living, participation in household responsibilities, the absence of child-care obligations, the respondent's increased cost of living arising from his new employment, the parties' reasonable expectations, the respondent's rapid pre- and post-separation increases in income, the appellant's limited claim for compensatory support and her greater need for transitional support.

[70] The applicant's experience reflects classic non-specific compensatory support entitlement: she deferred pursuing her career for 10 years to care for the children and the family home. She returned to work just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. She took an online course to improve her chances at a management position, which she hopes to get within a year when her manager plans to retire. Since her return to work in 2019 she has remained in a position where she fills-in for others, which is essentially an entry level position for her chosen profession. By contrast, the respondent's career flourished to the point that he is a general manager making significant annual income in addition to other financial incentives provided by his employer.

[71] The applicant's budget reflects a modest lifestyle. It includes monthly savings of $833. She has approximately $444,000 in savings which earns her a passive income of about $1,000 per month. Her only debt is a mortgage with a balance of approximately $234,000 (resulting in about $250,000 of equity). Her assets are comprised of her home and her savings and a 10-year-old motor vehicle. She currently has a monthly shortfall of about $3,000. I have considered that she received from the respondent in 2022 an equalization payment of $350,000.

[72] Based on his financial statement, the respondent's expenses are about $11,000 monthly. The respondent does not have any motor vehicles, likely because one is supplied to him through his work, though he has some older recreational vehicles. He has about $100,000 in savings as well as his home and rental property. He states his real properties have the same value today as at the date of separation. He did not provide up to date details regarding the balances of the mortgages on these properties so it is impossible to determine the equity he may have in them. Other than the two mortgages, he shows no other debt. As I have discussed, he testified at trial that his employer loaned him the money to make the $350,000 equalization payment. The terms of repayment were not provided.

[73] The respondent's financial statement shows a monthly surplus of $6,000, based on stated annual income of $206,231. Although he discloses his current spouse's income ($62,000) he does not indicate what, if anything, she contributes to this budget.

[74] I find the fairest determination of the applicant's income is $112,584, the amount set out in her financial statement. This includes the revenue from her employment, which has remained stable, as well as passive income. I have imputed $250,000 of income to the respondent. The parenting arrangement reflects the fact Pascal is shared and Valerie resides with the respondent. Inputting this information into DivorceMate produces the following ranges of spousal support: $1,123; $2,014; $2,904. I have attached a copy of my calculations as schedule "A" to this judgment.

[75] In my view, the objectives for spousal support as set out in the Divorce Act, are best achieved with a mid-point order. The applicant has wisely used her equalization payment. She is earning $112,000 per year including passive income. She has undertaken extra learning to improve her chances at obtaining supervisory and management positions. This award will provide her with about 42% of the parties' net disposable income. The applicant's position that high-end support be paid for five months is not supported by the objectives I have discussed and the reality of the parties' financial positions.

[76] The time-limited support sought by the applicant is appropriate in this case. Although she was out of the workforce for 10 years raising the children, the applicant, even at an entry level position, has found meaningful, stable employment which allows her to earn over $100,000 annually. Caring for Pascal in alternate weeks has not prevented her from finding and maintaining this employment. Indeed, she has managed to work her schedule so that she only works two days when Pascal is in her care. She has continued with her education at the same time as working and caring for Pascal. This will increase her opportunities for management positions.

[77] While I agree with time-limited support for 10 years from the date of separation, in my view, the applicant's request that spousal support be terminated if she obtains a management position is best addressed by way of a review. There is simply too much material uncertainty about what that term means at this stage, including the salary and benefits attached to a management position. This is one of the rare cases where a review is appropriate: Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25 at paras. 36 and 37. The respondent's spousal support obligation will accordingly terminate on September 15, 2031, subject to the review I have described.

Conclusion

[78] For these reasons, the court orders as follows:

a. The parties shall share decision-making responsibility with respect to the children Valerie Lucie Dupuis (born August 15, 2009) and Pascal Gerald Dupuis (born October 25, 2015). In the event of disagreement, the applicant shall have final say with respect to decision-making for Pascal and the respondent shall have final say with respect to Valerie;

b. The applicant shall have parenting time with Valerie in accordance with Valerie's wishes;

c. The parties will share parenting time with Pascal on a week-about basis with exchanges to take place on Mondays after school;

d. Child support and spousal support are fixed at zero as of December 31, 2024;

e. Beginning January 01, 2025 and on the first day of each month thereafter, the respondent shall pay to the applicant as support for the children Valerie Lucie Dupuis (born August 15, 2009) and Pascal Gerald Dupuis (born October 25, 2015) the sum of $394 per month. This amount reflects a set-off payment considering Pascal's time is shared with his parents and Valerie resides with the respondent. It is based on the respondent's imputed annual income of $250,000 and the applicant's annual income of $112,584. It is in accordance with the Guidelines;

f. Beginning January 01, 2025 and on the first day of each month thereafter until September 15, 2031, the respondent shall pay to the applicant spousal support in the amount of $2,014.00 per month. This amount is based on the parenting arrangement and incomes set out in the preceding paragraph and is the mid-point amount in the SSAGS;

g. In the event the applicant obtains a management position at her workplace, either party may apply for a review of this spousal support order pursuant to section 15.2 of the Divorce Act;

h. For as long as support is to be paid, the parties shall provide updated income disclosure to the other each year on or before June 1 in accordance with section 25 of the Guidelines; and

i. The divorce may proceed on an uncontested basis.

[79] If the parties are unable to agree on costs, the applicant may file written submissions on costs of no more than two pages, double-spaced, not including any offers to settle and bill of costs within fifteen days of the date of this order. The respondent may file written submissions with the same restrictions within thirty days of the date of this order.

Regional Senior Justice P.J. Boucher

Released: August 26, 2025