Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: FS-24-110-AP
Date: 2025.03.11

BETWEEN:
Nasya Peters, Appellant
– and –
Mohammad Rahbar, Respondent

Appearances:

• Nasya Peters, Self-represented
• Zachary Liquornik, for the Respondent

Heard: January 23, 2025, via videoconference

Decision on Motions
P.J. Boucher, RSJ

Introduction

[1] The respondent, Mohammad Rahbar, moves for an order declaring Nasya Peters a vexatious litigant. He also asks for security for costs against Nasya Peters’ appeal from Justice Jenner’s decision dated April 12, 2024.

Background

[2] The appellant started proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice seeking a declaration that the respondent stood in the place of a parent to her children, orders for shared decision-making responsibility and parenting time as well as child support and spousal support. Nasya Peters also brought a motion for an order appointing the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to represent her children in the proceedings. The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the application in its entirety.

[3] On April 12, 2024, Jenner J. granted summary judgment and dismissed the appellant’s application. In his unpublished decision on costs dated April 30, 2024, Justice Jenner found the appellant acted in bad faith throughout the proceedings. He accordingly ordered her to immediately pay full recovery costs in the amount of $13,560 to the respondent.

[4] The appellant served a notice of appeal on May 2, 2024.

[5] On June 20, 2024, the appellant delivered in this court a motion record seeking temporary orders for the same relief she sought in the proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice. On July 25, 2024, Cornell J. dismissed the motion as an abuse of process and ordered costs of $2,000 against the appellant.

The Law

[6] Section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990 c. C.43 provides as follows:

If a judge of the Superior Court of Justice or of the Court of Appeal is satisfied that a person has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings in any court or conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner, the judge may make an order that includes any of the following terms:

1. No further proceeding may be instituted by the person in any court, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
2. No proceeding previously instituted by the person in any court shall be continued, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
3. Any other term that is just.

[7] Rules 24(20) and (21) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 provide as follows:

(20) A judge may, on motion, make an order for security for costs that is just, based on one or more of the following factors:

i. A party habitually resides outside Ontario. ii. A party has an order against the other party for costs that remains unpaid, in the same case or another case. iii. A party is a corporation and there is good reason to believe it does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs. iv. There is good reason to believe that the case is a waste of time or a nuisance and that the party does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs. v. A statute entitles the party to security for costs.

(21) The judge shall determine the amount of the security, its form and the method of giving it.

Positions of the Parties

[8] The respondent submits the appellant has harassed him for years, most recently through the justice system. He argues the relief the appellant sought in the Ontario Court of Justice is not available in law and her pursuit of a meritless appeal is vexatious. He further submits the appellant ought not be permitted to continue with the appeal until she has posted $10,000 as security for costs.

[9] The appellant asks that the motion be dismissed. She accuses the respondent of being abusive. She submits she does not understand why Jenner J. dismissed her application and why he ordered significant costs against her. She argues she tried to e-transfer $100 to counsel for the respondent to pay toward the costs but he would not accept it. In any event, she states that she is a single parent and is unable to pay anything further toward costs.

Analysis

Vexatious Litigant

[10] A party may be declared a vexatious litigant where their conduct is found to be persistent, without reasonable grounds, and vexatious: Peoples Trust Company v. Atas, 2018 ONSC 58 at para. 34. In Kaufman v. Kechichian, 2021 ONSC 1173 at paras. 26-29, Smith J. provides a helpful summary of factors to be considered when determining whether conduct is vexatious:

(26) There are two purposes for declaring a party as vexatious: (1) to prevent litigants from harassing others and; (2) to protect the vexatious litigant from squandering their own resources (Foy v. Foy (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 (Ont. C.A.)).

(27) The factors to consider in determining if a litigant is vexatious are set out in the leading case called Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian, [1987] O.J. No. 355 (Ont. H.C.):

i. the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;

ii. where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;

iii. vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

iv. it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

v. in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;

vi. the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;

vii. the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

(28) For a litigant to be declared vexatious, it is not necessary that the litigant's conduct fall within each of the factors enunciated above (GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc. v. Hicks, 2019 ONSC 4942).

(29) The Court may look at a litigant's conduct in the institution of both the judicial and non-judicial proceedings (Bishop v. Bishop, 2011 ONCA 211).

[11] In my view, the appellant’s conduct has been and continues to be persistent, without reasonable grounds, and vexatious.

Proceeding in the Ontario Court of Justice

[12] In his decision on costs, Jenner J. noted the claim to compel the respondent to have parenting time with the appellant’s children was “clearly meritless.” He found, however, that not all the appellant’s claims were problematic. For example, he held the claim for child support was not “inarguable.” However, he went on to find that the appellant “engaged in a duplicitous campaign of harassment to which her pursuit of legal relief was secondary.”

[13] In arriving at this conclusion, Jenner J. highlighted the following conduct at paragraphs 17 and 18 of his decision on costs:

(17) In her correspondences with the respondent’s family, friends, and legal counsel, the applicant regularly implied or explicitly accused the respondent of child endangerment, pedophilia, sexual assault, incest, child molestation, and human trafficking. She accuses him of attempting to kidnap the children and remove them to another country. She labels him a “monster”, with no heart and an evil soul. Her attacks resort to racism, xenophobia, and homophobia. Despite these vile and unsubstantiated accusations, her application sought to grant the respondent unsupervised parenting time with her children. (emphasis in original)

(18) The applicant’s baseless attacks were also not limited to the respondent. She ultimately began to target the respondent’s legal counsel. She accused him of stalking and harassing her. She refers to him as a pervert. Her communications are vulgar and explicitly homophobic. On one occasion, the applicant stated in an email to the respondent’s counsel that the settlement of the family litigation would be contingent on the respondent withdrawing criminal charges that the applicant was facing.

[14] Jenner J. noted that while the appellant’s personal attacks were more focused on the motion for summary judgment, they permeated the entire proceedings. He accordingly applied the bad faith finding “broadly to the litigation.”

[15] After Jenner J.’s dismissal of the appellant's proceedings and order to pay substantial costs, the appellant sent the following emails to counsel for the respondent:

• April 12, 2024: “You can’t force me to pay your client. Just like I can’t force him to see the kids.”
• April 23, 2024: “I rather pay for a bachelor party then to give him 23,000$.”
• May 01, 2024: “He will have to get it from my life insurance when I die.”
• May 05, 2024: “Withdrawn [sic] the costs and charges and I’ll withdraw the appeal and sign your form.”
• May 06, 2024: “Just dismiss the costs. He has plenty of money. He doesn’t need my money. Tell the judge you want to dismiss the costs. He seems to agree with whatever you want. This only aggravated everyone for no reason. Your approach was very abrasive. It was unwelcomed. I’m very happy for you that you are a successful Liar. I mean lawyer.”
• May 16, 2024: “I’m going to seek sexual assault charges against your client if you don’t withdraw the costs. I’ve already retained a lawyer. Withdraw the costs immediately or I will be seeking many counts of charges that my lawyer will press against your client.”
• May 28, 2024: “…If your client opposes the appeal I would agree to have the charges withdrawn immediately as well as for your client to withdraw the costs. I am prepared to take the next steps necessary to a resolution of this matter. As I am aware that your client would face significant prejudice in the event that I did continue with my appeal, he would also be facing very serious criminal charges….”

Proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice

[16] The appellant promptly brought her appeal of Jenner J.’s decision before this court. Her Notice of Appeal repeats arguments she advanced in the Ontario Court of Justice. It also contains allegations of bias and prejudice against court staff and lawyers in Sudbury.

[17] The appellant further notes: “I have never accused the respondent of anything other than being the other parent and providing for the children.” This is contrasted with her statement two pages later: “The responding party has unfortunately caused many hardships throughout the years and thus he is not entitled to the cost order sought.”

[18] The appellant also asked for an order for interim relief that mirrors many of her claims in the proceedings at first instance: compelled joint custody and parenting time as well as child support, though she suggests the access should be supervised. She pursued this request for interim relief on July 25, 2024. The motions judge summarily dismissed the motion as an abuse of process and fixed costs of $2,000 inclusive against the appellant.

[19] After this motion was served by the respondent, the appellant sent the following emails to his counsel:

• September 04, 2024: “A sick child molesting child biting smells peoples underwear You represent your clients interests only Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah Disgusting Facts.”
• September 05, 2024: “child molester”
• September 06, 2024: “Thanks for ruining my life I will fucken kill myself because of YOU And YOUR CLIENT IM HAPPY YOU CHOSE THIS CAREER”
• September 07, 2024, to counsel: “I spoke to a detective at the OPP detachment. Your client is in the shits. I am blocking your email. There will be no motion.”
• September 08, 2024, to counsel: “Your client will be facing Human Trafficking charges.”

[20] In addition, on November 03, 2024, the appellant emailed counsel for the respondent a completed stepparent adoption application, despite my endorsement dated October 17, 2024, in which I ordered that “no further motions shall be brought prior to the hearing of this motion.” While the adoption application does not appear to have been issued by the court, serving the draft on the respondent’s counsel was contrary to the spirit of my endorsement, and was clearly intended to harass.

[21] I have also considered the evidence in the appellant’s affidavit filed on this motion. It repeats many of the allegations made in the proceedings at first instance, as well as the following:

• She alleges the respondent is using the court process to abuse and humiliate her;
• She suggests several times that she is without funds and will not pay the costs ordered, other than the $100 she tried to pay;
• She accuses Jenner J. of slander and harassing and disgraceful behaviour (by referring to her comments as homophobic);
• She accuses Jenner J., counsel for the respondent and the Sudbury Police of a hate crime by allegedly orchestrating the loss of her horse;
• The Sudbury Police and courts in Sudbury manipulate and lie to the public about the existence of police body cameras.

Vexatious Litigant: Conclusion

[22] The appellant’s behaviour meets many of the factors set out in Lang Michener. It demonstrates an unrelenting attack on the respondent and his counsel as well as the justice system, including the courts, judiciary, counsel, and the police. The appellant’s conduct both within and outside this litigation is seriously troubling. It has driven up the costs of litigation for the respondent and has wasted precious court resources. The appellant’s unbounded accusations range from unfounded hateful name-calling to possible extortion. Her conduct demonstrates an unfettered disregard for the consequences of her actions and their impact on others.

[23] I accordingly conclude the appellant is a vexatious litigant.

Security for Costs

[24] In my view, this is an appropriate case for security for costs.

[25] Presently, the appellant owes a total of $15,560 in costs pursuant to two orders, though most of those costs are under appeal. In her affidavit delivered for this motion, the appellant states she does not earn significant income and is unable to and will not be paying the costs. She also indicates it would be unjust to expect her to pay the costs. I have already reviewed the emails sent by the appellant to counsel for the respondent in which she states she will not be paying the costs. Her conduct goes so far as to threaten criminal charges if the costs award is not withdrawn by the respondent.

[26] While the appellant suggests she attempted to pay $100 toward the costs orders, I find this effort was another example of her vexatious conduct. The appellant chose not to provide the password for the electronic money transfer of this $100 she emailed to counsel for the respondent. In submissions, she argues this is the respondent’s fault, because his lawyer does not have automatic deposit of electronically transferred funds. This position misunderstands the rules that apply to lawyer’s trust accounts and is not an excuse for her failure to make payment toward the costs orders. In short, the respondent has already incurred significant costs, and there is good reason to believe that any future costs awards associated with her appeal will not be paid by the appellant.

[27] Further, there is good reason to believe the appellant’s appeal is a waste of time and a nuisance. As noted by Jenner J., the appellant seeks in her appeal relief not available in law: the court cannot compel the respondent to have joint decision-making and shared parenting time with her children.

[28] The amount of security sought by the respondent is fair and reasonable having regard to the history of this proceeding. It is a realistic estimate of what he will incur in responding to the appeal. I also find the appropriate form of security is payment into court. I conclude, and the appellant confirms in her evidence, she has no intention of paying costs ordered by the court, regardless of ability to pay. It would be unfair to the respondent to allow the appellant to litigate her appeal without any fear of negative costs consequences: Baker v. Rego, 2013 ONSC 3309 at para. 30.

Conclusion

[29] For these reasons,

a. The court declares Nasya Peters is a vexatious litigant and orders pursuant to paragraphs 140(1) 1-3 of the Courts of Justice Act that:

i. No further proceeding may be instituted by Nasya Peters in any court, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice;

ii. No proceeding previously instituted by Nasya Peters in any court shall be continued, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice; and

iii. For the purposes of this appeal, Nasya Peters may seek leave to continue her appeal if she first pays into court the security for costs ordered in the next paragraph.

b. This court orders Nasya Peters shall pay into court the sum of $10,000 as security for costs for this appeal.

[30] If the parties cannot agree on costs of this motion, the respondent may within 15 days of the date of this order deliver submissions on costs of no more than 2 pages, not including any offers to settle or bill of costs. The appellant will have 30 days from the date of this order to deliver her submissions on costs of no more than 2 pages, not including any offers to settle or bill of costs. There will be no reply.

Regional Senior Justice P.J. Boucher
Released: March 11, 2025