COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-77995

DATE: 2019/09/11

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

GOODLIFE FITNESS CENTRES INC.

Applicant

– and –

ANTHONY HICKS

Respondent

Elizabeth M. Traynor, for the Applicant

Self-represented Respondent

HEARD: January 4, 2019

AMENDED REASONS FOR DECISION

The text of the original Reasons for Decision was amended on September 11, 2019 and the description of the amendment is appended

corthorn J.

Introduction

[1] Anthony Hicks worked for GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc. (“GoodLife”) as a personal trainer for 5.25 years. During those years, GoodLife repeatedly attempted to address Mr. Hicks’ attitudinal and behavioural issues. In the fall of 2013, GoodLife proposed to Mr. Hicks that he be transferred from one GoodLife location to another.

[2] In response, Mr. Hicks stopped going to work, retained counsel, and asserted that he had been constructively dismissed. In 2014, Mr. Hicks commenced an action against GoodLife. In October 2014, approximately seven months after that action was commenced, Mr. Hicks consented to an order dismissing the action without costs.

[3] Mr. Hicks’ pursuit of claims against GoodLife did not end with the dismissal of his 2014 action. From 2015 to 2018, Mr. Hicks pursued judicial and non-judicial proceedings against GoodLife. All of the proceedings relied on allegations arising from Mr. Hicks’ employment with GoodLife. Not one of the proceedings was successful.

[4] In the fall of 2018, Mr. Hicks threatened to bring additional proceedings. As of early 2019, when this application was heard, there were no ongoing proceedings in this court in which Mr. Hicks and GoodLife are parties. Regardless, GoodLife no longer wishes to expend resources to respond to either Mr. Hicks’ threats of additional proceedings or any other proceedings that he might commence.

[5] GoodLife, therefore, seeks (a) an order declaring Mr. Hicks to be a vexatious litigant, and (b) protection for itself and others from any new proceeding by Mr. Hicks that is vexatious and/or without merit.

[6] Mr. Hicks’ conduct from 2014 through 2018 falls squarely within that of a vexatious litigant. He refuses to accept the outcome of proceedings he initiates. Dissatisfied with the outcome in one forum, Mr. Hicks attempts to pursue the same matter in one or more additional forums.

[7] Mr. Hicks is, in a word, unrelenting.

[8] GoodLife, as well as other entities and individuals, are entitled to protection from the kinds of proceedings Mr. Hicks has pursued over the last four-plus years. Granting that protection is a mechanism by which to ensure that the court process is not abused by Mr. Hicks.

[9] Mr. Hicks will not be precluded from pursuing a judicial proceeding. He will be able to pursue such a proceeding if he is successful in satisfying this court that the claim he seeks to advance is bona fide and meritorious.

Background

[10] After his employment with GoodLife came to an end, the first proceeding Mr. Hicks initiated was a complaint to the Ontario Labour Relations Board (“OLRB”). In December 2013, Mr. Hicks filed a claim with the OLRB for termination pay, reprisal, and “other”. Mr. Hicks withdrew that claim in early January 2014 so that he could pursue a civil action.

[11] Although Mr. Hicks was initially represented by counsel in his dealings with GoodLife, the statement of claim issued in March 2014 (“the 2014 Action”) identifies Mr. Hicks as being self-represented. At no time since then (from March 2014 to early 2019 when this application was heard) has Mr. Hicks been represented by counsel.

a) The 2014 Action

[12] The statement of claim issued in March 2014 was clearly prepared by a lawyer or by an individual with some degree of legal training. The form and substance of the pleading are in keeping with statements of claim typically seen in wrongful dismissal actions.

[13] The 2014 Action was dismissed without costs less than seven months after it was started. The order dismissing the action without costs was made on a motion by GoodLife to set aside “the discontinuance of the action”.

[14] Included in the documents provided by Mr. Hicks in response to the application is a copy of a September 2014 exchange of emails between him and counsel for GoodLife. I use the word “provided”, because Mr. Hicks did not deliver a notice of appearance in response to the notice of application. Counsel for GoodLife did not object to the two volumes of documents “provided” by Mr. Hicks being before the court for the purpose of the application.

[15] The September 2014 email exchange relates to GoodLife’s motion to set aside the discontinuance and obtain an order dismissing the action. In an email sent by Mr. Hicks on September 30, 2014 to counsel for GoodLife, Mr. Hicks says:

In making my decision without legal council (sic) it appears that my best option would be to exit the matter without cost. I filed a notice of discontinuance with the court and sent you a copy and an affidavit of service via email. So I would like to choose option (B) I give my consent to file a motion for dismissal without cost, and I thank you for that.

[16] Mr. Hicks made a deliberate decision when he consented to dismissal of the 2014 Action; he wanted to be in a position to pursue his complaint before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“HRTO”).

b) The HRTO Application

[17] On April 2, 2014, Mr. Hicks made an application to the HRTO. That application was made nine days after Mr. Hicks commenced the 2014 Action. The application proceeded to a three-day hearing before the HRTO.

[18] The HRTO decision was released in May 2016. In the decision, Mr. Hicks’ allegations are described as being “reprisal and discrimination with respect to employment because of colour, ethnic origin, contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19” (Hicks v. GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc., 2016 HRTO 687, at para. 1).

[19] The decision includes findings with respect to the circumstances that led to the end of Mr. Hicks’ employment with GoodLife. The adjudicator found that “the evidence clearly establishes that the end of [Mr. Hicks’] employment with GoodLife was not related to any Code-protected right, and was instead entirely related to [Mr. Hicks’] conduct” (para. 84). The adjudicator also found no conduct on GoodLife’s part that amounted to reprisal contrary to s. 8 of the Code (para. 102).

[20] Mr. Hicks requested a reconsideration of the adjudicator’s decision. The adjudicator issued his reconsideration decision in June 2016 (Hicks v. GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc., 2016 HRTO 839). The Reconsideration Decision is less than two pages long. At para. 5, the adjudicator summarizes the reasons provided by Mr. Hicks in support of his request for reconsideration: “the applicant does not agree with the result.” The adjudicator concludes that Mr. Hicks’ disagreement with the adjudicator’s finding was not a basis for reconsidering the May 2016 decision (para. 8). Mr. Hicks’ request for reconsideration was denied.

c) The Ministry of Labour Claim

[21] In early 2014, Mr. Hicks withdrew his initial complaint to the Ministry of Labour (“MLO”) so that he could pursue the 2014 Action. He then consented to the 2014 Action being dismissed so that he could pursue his complaint to the HRTO. In the fall of 2014, with his complaint still before the HRTO, Mr. Hicks filed a second complaint with the provincial Ministry of Labour (“the MLO Claim”).

[22] The MLO Claim was commenced in September 2014, before the 2014 Action was dismissed. The MLO Claim was Mr. Hicks’ third proceeding in less than six months related to his employment with GoodLife.

[23] In the MLO Claim, Mr. Hicks alleges that he was constructively dismissed by GoodLife. He also alleges reprisal and that GoodLife breached certain provisions of the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41.

[24] The MLO Claim was dismissed in January 2015. The claims related to constructive dismissal and overtime pay were dismissed because they had been the subject of the 2014 Action. The reprisal claim was denied based on the Employment Standards Officer’s review of the evidence available to her.

[25] In early 2015, unhappy with the outcome of the MLO Claim, Mr. Hicks turned to the Ontario Labour Relations Board (“OLRB”) for yet another potential avenue of recourse.

d) The Ontario Labour Relations Board

[26] As of early 2015, Mr. Hicks’ civil action was dismissed, his complaint to the HRTO had yet to proceed to a hearing, and the MLO Claim was dismissed. In February 2015, Mr. Hicks applied to the OLRB for a review of the decision of the Employment Standards Officer dismissing the MLO Claim.

[27] That application resulted in five OLRB decisions (two in July, and one in each of September, October, and December 2015). Copies of the latter three decisions are included in the record before the court on this application. The October decision provides information as to the outcome of the application. It was dismissed in its entirety by a Board decision dated July 2, 2015. Mr. Hicks requested a reconsideration of that decision.

[28] In the Reconsideration Decision dated July 22, 2015, the Board confirms that “much of the complaint did not make out a prima facie violation of the [ESA] or was [statute-barred]”. As part of the reconsideration, the Board requested additional submissions from Mr. Hicks and GoodLife with respect to the allegation of reprisal.

[29] The Board’s September decision was released following receipt of submissions from Mr. Hicks and GoodLife. The Board concludes their September decision by stating:

Having reviewed the entirety of the record before the Board and having provided the applicant with an opportunity to identify those material facts upon which he relies in support of his application, the Board concludes that this application does not make out a prima facie case for any of the remedies sought by the applicant. While the application contains bald allegations that the responding party engaged in “continued reprisals”, the applicant has not pleaded any material facts upon which the Board could conclude that such any such reprisals occurred. For these reasons and for the reasons set out in the Board’s decision of July 22, 2015, this application is dismissed.

[30] After the release of the September decision, Mr. Hicks wrote to the Board and alleged that he never received a copy of GoodLife’s additional submissions. He requested the opportunity to deliver reply submissions. The Board permitted Mr. Hicks to file reply submissions and thereafter released its October decision.

[31] The Board characterizes the October decision as being made in response to a request from Mr. Hicks for reconsideration of the September decision. The Board describes the contents of Mr. Hicks’ reply submissions as including “a number of bald allegations of fraud and bad faith”. The Board highlights that Mr. Hicks continues to attempt to deal with issues, other than reprisal, that were disposed of by the Board’s earlier decisions (para. 5). The reconsideration request was dismissed, and the dismissal of the application was affirmed.

[32] Not prepared to give up, Mr. Hicks filed a further request for review—this time of the October decision. That request was made in November 2015.

[33] The complaint process was ended by the Board in its December 2015 decision. That decision concludes with the following paragraph:

The applicant has already been provided with a full opportunity to make submissions on his prior request for reconsideration, and the Board has issued its final decision in this matter. In the circumstances, the Board will not exercise its discretion to consider this matter further, and will not respond to further requests for reconsideration.

[34] As of 2016, Mr. Hicks had commenced a civil action, had made a complaint to two separate provincial bodies, and had made five requests for reconsideration of non-judicial decisions (one decision of an Employment Standards Officer and four OLRB decisions).

[35] With his non-judicial proceedings (HRTO, MLO, and OLRB) at an end, Mr. Hicks remained undeterred. He resorted once again to civil litigation.

e) The 2018 Action

[36] In April 2018, Mr. Hicks commenced an action in this court (“the 2018 Action”). GoodLife was once again named as a defendant. The “Ontario Ministry of Labour” and the “Ontario Human Rights Tribunal” are also named as defendants.

[37] The prayer for relief identifies claims “as against the defendant” in the singular. The damages claimed are under the same headings as those claimed in the 2014 Action. For instance, damages are claimed for constructive dismissal and unpaid overtime. The only difference between the prayer for relief in the 2018 Action and that in the 2014 Action is that some of the monetary amounts have changed. Some of the damages claimed in the 2018 Action are higher, and some lower, than those claimed in the 2014 action.

[38] Mr. Hicks’ pleading in the 2018 Action is more than 40 pages long and includes 259 numbered paragraphs. By contrast, his pleading in the 2014 Action is 17 pages long and includes 70 numbered paragraphs.

[39] The 2018 statement of claim includes many, if not all, of the paragraphs from Mr. Hicks’ pleading in the 2014 Action. The claim against GoodLife is clearly duplicative of the claim advanced in the 2014 Action—a claim that was dismissed by court order, with Mr. Hicks’ consent, in October 2014.

[40] The claims against each of the MLO and HRTO in the 2018 Action are summarized at paras. 29-31 of the statement of claim:

29. Mr. Hicks states by issuing decisions not finding any Human Rights Violations, nor finding Mr. Hicks had been constructively dismissed by Goodlife Fitness Centers Inc. The Human Rights Tribunal unlawfully participated in a conspiracy to terminate Mr. Hicks employment.

30. Mr. Hicks also states given the overwhelming evidence provided to the Ministry of Labour for the hearing and to Catherine Gilbert regarding both the Goodlife Fitness Center Inc matter and the PetSmart matter prove Mrs. Gilberts decision to not review both cases shows she has acted improperly in her Registrars position at the OLRB.

31. All defendants acted in a way to cover up this matter and failed to investigate these serious allegations.

[41] Mr. Hicks added approximately 160 numbered paragraphs to the text of the 2014 pleading. Not only do those paragraphs address Mr. Hicks’ claims against the MLO and HRTO, they name and refer to the conduct of:

• both of the lawyers and law firms by whom Mr. Hicks was represented in late 2013;

• a physician who prescribed Mr. Hicks with an anti-depressant in late 2013;

• the HRTO adjudicator who dismissed Mr. Hicks’ complaint;

• the Registrar of the OLRB;

• the lawyer and law firm who have represented GoodLife in all proceedings (including this application);

• a police officer by whom Mr. Hicks was arrested in Gatineau, Quebec in January 2015;

• a member of the Ottawa Police Service; and

• the YMCA and a number of its employees.

[42] This list is not exhaustive. Mr. Hicks names and makes reference to the conduct of many more individuals and entities—none of whom are named as defendants in the 2018 Action. At the heart of the allegations made in Mr. Hicks’ 2018 statement of claim is his belief that, at every turn in his life, people and institutions are conspiring against him and/or are corrupt.

[43] In response to the statement of claim, each of GoodLife and the HRTO filed a requisition pursuant to r. 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. Pursuant to the summary process available under r. 2.1, Justice Beaudoin concluded that the statement of claim was abusive in nature and dismissed the action (Hicks v. GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc., 2018 ONSC 3858, 294 A.C.W.S. (3d) 61).

[44] Mr. Hicks was once again unhappy with the outcome of a proceeding he initiated. Undeterred, he applied to the Federal Court for judicial review of Justice Beaudoin’s decision.

f) The Federal Court

[45] In August 2018, Mr. Hicks’ application for judicial review was dismissed by the Federal Court because of a lack of jurisdiction.

[46] In September 2018, Mr. Hicks filed a notice of appeal. In his notice of appeal, Mr. Hicks asserts that the Federal Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the judicial review application because the 2018 Action involves many Federal government agencies, including “Bell Canada, the PMO, UPS, Canada Post, DND, CRA, RCMP, [and] LSUC”. As of the return date for the application before this court, the status of Mr. Hicks’ appeal in the Federal Court was unknown.

g) Other Proceedings

[47] In support of its application, GoodLife identifies judicial and non-judicial proceedings commenced by Mr. Hicks against numerous other entities. Those proceedings are described, in chart form at para. 29 of the affidavit of Ms. Ross, filed in support of the application (“Ross Affidavit”). Ms. Ross is general counsel for GoodLife.

[48] The chart identifies two applications for review of either the conduct or a decision of an Employment Standards Officer and seven proceedings before the HRTO. The ESA matters relate to Pet Smart and the YMCA. The seven entities against whom complaints to the HRTO were made are:

• Service de Police de la Ville de Gatineau;

• Mr. Rooter Plumbing (Ottawa);

• The Ottawa Hospital—Riverside Campus;

• United Parcel Service of Canada Ltd.;

• Borden Ladner Gervais LLP (one of the law firms by which Mr. Hicks was previously represented);

• Ministère de la Justice du Québec; and

• Ottawa Police Services.

[49] Each of the nine proceedings was dismissed.

h) Other Conduct

[50] GoodLife asks the court to consider Mr. Hicks’ behaviour towards its counsel, administrative tribunals, and others. At para. 34 of her affidavit, Ms. Ross lists 17 examples of the types of emails sent by Mr. Hicks in the years since his employment with GoodLife came to an end. Samples of the emails are attached as an exhibit to the Ross Affidavit.

[51] Counsel for GoodLife is an addressee, alone or with others, in each of the 17 examples listed. The contents of the emails include allegations of conspiracy against Mr. Hicks, institutional corruption, and threats directed specifically at counsel representing GoodLife. The content of the emails is concerning and the number of emails sent is extreme. On January 21, 2015, the Registrar of the HRTO received 63 emails from Mr. Hicks. On the same date, Mr. Hicks sent more than 100 emails to GoodLife’s counsel.

i) Summary

[52] GoodLife asks the court to consider Mr. Hicks’ conduct in judicial and non-judicial proceedings against GoodLife, judicial and non-judicial proceedings against other entities and individuals, and personal conduct in the form of email communication. GoodLife submits that Mr. Hicks’ conduct demonstrates that he is a vexatious litigant.

The Issues

[53] There are two issues to be determined on this application:

1. Is Mr. Hicks a vexatious litigant?

2. If so, what reasonable measures are required to protect the administration of justice from Mr. Hicks’ vexatious conduct?

Issue No. 1 - Is Mr. Hicks a vexatious litigant?

a) The Law

[54] Section 140 (1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”) provides:

Where a judge of the Superior Court of Justice is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently and without reasonable grounds,

(a) instituted vexatious proceedings in any court; or

(b) conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner, the judge may order that,

(c) no further proceeding be instituted by the person in any court; or

(d) a proceeding previously instituted by the person in any court not be continued,

except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

[55] Principles have been established in case law for determining an application pursuant to this section. Those frequently cited are set out by Henry J. in Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian (1987), 1987 CanLII 172 (ON SC), 59 O.R. (2d) 353:

(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;

(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the Court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;

(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;

(g) the respondent’s conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

[56] The court may consider both judicial and non-judicial proceedings when applying the principles quoted above (Bishop v. Bishop, 2011 ONCA 211, [2011] O.J. No. 1290, at para. 9, leave to appeal refused, [2011] C.S.C.R. No. 23). At para. 5 of Bishop, the Court of Appeal addresses the inference that may be drawn from a litigant’s conduct in non-judicial proceedings:

… the institution of non-judicial proceedings can, depending on the circumstances, constitute evidence from which a court may infer that court proceedings commenced by the litigant are not bona fide but the product of someone who is unreasonably obsessed with a cause and likely to pursue vexatious court proceedings on an indefinite basis unless stopped.

[57] In addition, the court is entitled to take into consideration Mr. Hicks’ conduct “outside the courtroom” (Dobson v. Green, 2012 ONSC 4432, [2012] O.J. No. 3593, at para. 12).

b) Analysis

[58] For a litigant to be vexatious, their conduct is not required to fall within the scope of each of the Lang Michener categories. I find that Mr. Hicks’ conduct fits squarely within the principles enumerated in (a) to (d), and (g) at para. 54, above.

▪ Issue already determined (principle (a))

[59] Mr. Hicks turned to both judicial and non-judicial proceedings, at times simultaneously, and otherwise sequentially, in an effort to address the circumstances in which his employment with GoodLife came to an end. The non-judicial decisions are replete with conclusions that Mr. Hicks’ complaints were previously considered and therefore not properly the subject of a non-judicial proceeding. The 2018 Action was in part a repeat of an earlier action that was dismissed with Mr. Hicks’ consent.

▪ Obvious action cannot succeed (principle (b))

[60] Justice Beaudoin’s decision dismissing the 2018 Action pursuant to r. 2.1 sets out a number of reasons why it was obvious that the action could not succeed.

▪ Actions brought for improper purpose (principle (c))

[61] After pursuing a civil action and non-judicial proceedings in three settings (the MLO, HRTO, and OLRB), Mr. Hicks attempted to sue the MLO and HRTO. He did so after exhausting, to the point of abuse, various avenues for reconsideration of their respective decisions. He did not assert any legitimate rights against either the MLO or the HRTO. The 2018 Action, and possibly some of the requests for reconsideration, were brought for an improper purpose.

▪ Grounds/issues repeated and supplemented (principle (d))

[62] The pleading in the 2018 Action is a striking example of an instance where grounds and issues from a previous proceeding (the 2014 Action) are “rolled forward” and “supplemented”—the latter with the 190 paragraphs drafted by Mr. Hicks. The additional paragraphs include allegations against lawyers who previously acted for Mr. Hicks and many other individuals working in the justice system.

▪ Persistent and unsuccessful appeals (principle (g))

[63] Mr. Hicks’ request that the Federal Court perform a judicial review of Justice Beaudoin’s r. 2.1 decision stood no chance of success, and yet Mr. Hicks refuses to accept the Federal Court’s lack of jurisdiction in the matter. He is pursuing the judicial review application at the Federal Court of Appeal.

[64] The repeated and persistent requests for reconsideration of decisions in non-judicial proceedings are analogous to unsuccessful appeals in judicial proceedings. Those requests demonstrate that Mr. Hicks will simply not be deterred. He is undaunted when he does not receive the relief sought in judicial and non-judicial proceedings.

▪ Conduct outside the courtroom

[65] The number and nature of the emails sent by Mr. Hicks are of significant concern. The emails span a four-year period from the fall of 2014 to the fall of 2018.

[66] In a November 2014 email sent to counsel for GoodLife, the RCMP, and the FBI, Mr. Hicks states: “your racist friends like to get into government and play with people’s identities and make them go missing”. In the same email, Mr. Hicks assures GoodLife’s counsel that he will “see this through to the end”.

[67] Two years later, in December 2016, Mr. Hicks sent an email to counsel for GoodLife, the RCMP, and a partner at one of the law firms that previously represented him. In that email, Mr. Hicks says: “[s]o which one of you are getting municipal workers to commit fraud with parking tickets. I am personally taking pleasure in knocking down your cheap joke of a corruption ring … I guarantee you you step to the wrong person.”

[68] The most recent examples provided of emails sent by Mr. Hicks are from October 2018. The Ross Affidavit was sworn on November 5, 2018. Two of the emails are addressed to counsel for GoodLife. In the first, Mr. Hicks states: “I think the country and the legal system is better off without y’all.” In the second, he informs counsel for GoodLife that he will be filing a criminal harassment complaint against her.

[69] These are but four of the 17 examples of Mr. Hicks’ emails included in the record. The 17 examples are only a few of the more than 175 emails sent by Mr. Hicks to counsel for GoodLife and others; 163 of those emails were sent on a single day. I draw an inference and find that the number of emails sent by Mr. Hicks since 2014 is in excess of 175.

[70] I find that the emails from Mr. Hicks were sent for purposes other than addressing any ongoing proceedings that would require him to communicate with any of the addressees. These emails are vexatious. In addition, the emails are abusive and at times threatening. Together with the various proceedings, the emails are part of an overall strategy of abuse and harassment (Dobson, at para. 12).

c) Summary

[71] The purpose of s. 140 of the CJA is to “protect honest citizens and litigants and the overall integrity of the justice system against those who continually abuse the court process by engaging in frivolous and vexatious litigation” (Dobson, at para. 8). I find that Mr. Hicks falls within the category of litigants “who continually abuse the court process by engaging in frivolous and vexatious litigation.” Therefore, the answer to Issue No. 1 is “yes”—Mr. Hicks is a vexatious litigant.

[72] I now turn to Issue No. 2 and the relief to be granted further to the declaration that Mr. Hicks is a vexatious litigant.

Issue No. 2 - If so, what reasonable measures may be taken to protect the administration of justice?

[73] Section 140 of the CJA is the mechanism by which the court prevents a litigant from abusing the civil justice system to cause harm to others. This preventive mechanism does not take away Mr. Hicks’ fundamental right to access to justice; it permits the court to put in place a process by which the bona fides and merits of a proposed proceeding are vetted before Mr. Hicks is permitted to proceed (Diler v. Heath, 2012 ONSC 3017, [2012] O.J. No. 2447, at para. 34).

[74] For the reasons discussed in Issue No. 1, I find that a preventive mechanism is required for Mr. Hicks with respect to existing and future proceedings in any court.

[75] Section 140 of the CJA does not give this court the discretion to issue an order precluding a person from commencing or continuing administrative (i.e. non-judicial) proceedings or complaints. However, some protection can be provided to individuals and entities who are the target of Mr. Hicks’ conduct. This protection is in the form of an order requiring Mr. Hicks to provide a copy of the vexatious litigant order and these reasons to any person or body with whom he initiates or continues a complaint of any kind (Peoples Trust Company v. Atas, 2018 ONSC 58, 295 A.C.W.S. (3d) 42, at paras. 307-08). A term to that effect is included in the order made below.

[76] In the circumstances, it is reasonable to dispense with the requirement that Mr. Hicks’ approve, as to form and content, the order to be taken out pursuant to these reasons. A term to that effect is also included in the order made below.

Summary

[77] The relief requested by GoodLife is granted. I order as follows:

1. THIS COURT DECLARES THAT Anthony Hicks:

a) has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious court proceedings and has conducted court proceedings in a vexatious manner within the meaning of ss. 140(1)(a) & (b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”); and

b) is a vexatious litigation pursuant to s. 140 of the CJA.

2. THIS COURT PROHIBITS Anthony Hicks, either directly or indirectly, from instituting any proceeding or continuing any proceedings previously instituted in any court, except and until such time as he has obtained leave by a judge of the Superior Court of Justice pursuant to s. 140(3) of the CJA and as provided for in this order.

3. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT all existent actions, appeals, and applications brought by Anthony Hicks be and are immediately stayed except and until such time as he has obtained leave pursuant to s. 140(3) of the CJA and as provided for in this order.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT should the Respondent file material seeking to commence or continue a proceeding or any appeal in any court in Ontario without first filing an entered Order permitting him to do so, the proceeding shall be immediately stayed upon any person filing a copy of this Order in such a court.

5. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT Anthony Hicks shall deliver a copy of this Order, and of the Reasons for Decision herein dated August 23, 2019, to any person or body with whom he initiates or continues any complaint, including, without limitation, any court, administrative body and/or tribunal, regulatory body, the police, and the Crown.

6. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT the requirement for Anthony Hicks to approve, as to form and content, this or any other draft order herein is dispensed with.

Costs

[78] GoodLife is entirely successful in their application. GoodLife brought this application to bring to an end the financial expense it incurs responding to the proceedings initiated and relentlessly pursued by Mr. Hicks. GoodLife has achieved its goal.

[79] There is no obvious reason why costs should not follow GoodLife’s success on this application. I note, however, that Mr. Hicks has been self-represented in every proceeding he pursued. The lack of financial resources to hire a lawyer may be a contributing factor to Mr. Hicks being self-represented.

[80] It is unlikely that Mr. Hicks is in a position to pay costs if an award of costs is made against him. From a practical perspective, there may be little value in such an award. On the other hand, Mr. Hicks’ failure to pay costs, if awarded against him, would be yet another aspect of his conduct as a litigant upon which GoodLife might rely at a later date.

[81] To be clear, Mr. Hicks is not entitled to his costs of the application. If GoodLife seeks its costs of the application and is unable or chooses not to attempt to resolve the issue of costs directly with Mr. Hicks, then costs submissions may be made as follows:

a) The submissions shall be limited to a maximum of four pages, exclusive of a bill of costs;

b) Written submissions shall comply with Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure;

c) Hard copies of any case law or other authorities relied upon shall be provided with the submissions and shall comply with Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to font size;

d) The submissions, documents referred to therein, case law, and other authorities shall be on single-sided pages;

e) Written submissions shall be delivered by GoodLife by 4:00 p.m. on the twentieth day following the date on which these reasons are released; and

f) Written submissions shall be delivered by Mr. Hicks by 4:00 p.m. on the thirty-fifth day following the date on which these reasons are released; and

g) The reply submissions, if any, of GoodLife shall be delivered by GoodLife by the fiftieth day following the date on which these reasons are released.

Madam Justice Sylvia Corthorn

Released: September 11, 2019

APPENDIX

On page 16, at para. 81(g) “fiftieth business day” has been changed to read “fiftieth day”.

COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-77995

DATE: 2019/09/11

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

GOODLIFE FITNESS CENTRES INC.

Applicant

– and –

ANTHONY HICKS

Respondent

Reasons for decision

Madam Justice Sylvia Corthorn

Released: September 11, 2019