McCoy v. McCoy, 2023 ONSC 878

Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-21-402-0000

DATE: 2023-02-03

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Dean McCoy, Applicant

AND:

Caylah Colleen McCoy, Respondent

BEFORE: Kurz J.

COUNSEL: Self-represented Parties

HEARD: April 26, September 19, 2022, and January 18, 2023

ENDORSEMENT

Introduction

1Dean McCoy (“Dean”) brings an application to have his sister, Caylah Colleen McCoy (“Caylah”), declared a vexatious litigant. This application was first brought in early 2021. For a variety of reasons regarding service and the belated involvement of Caylah in these proceedings, it was not completed until January 18, 2023, when I reserved my decision. This is my decision.

2This matter originally came to my attention as an uncontested written application. Caylah had been served with all of Dean’s application materials by an alternative to personal service, but in light of the relief sought, I was concerned with ensuring that those materials actually came to Caylah’s attention. After Dean had followed my directions and proven to my satisfaction that Caylah had been served with his application materials, I heard his oral submissions. While my decision was on reserve, Caylah came forward, seeking to participate in this proceeding and to bring her own proceeding to have Dean declared a vexatious litigant.

3Although she had failed to offer a compelling explanation for her initial lack of response to this application, on May 20, 2022, I granted Caylah leave to file responding materials and move to reopen the evidence in this proceeding. I did so because: 1) I had not yet issued my decision; 2) I wished to ensure that every party, wherever possible, have their “day in court”; and 3) the relief sought is significant.

4However, I stayed Caylah’s motion to have Dean declared a vexatious litigant because: 1) I had not yet determined his application against her, and 2) from my reading of the materials filed, her allegations against him do not meet the high bar required to make the order she seeks. Accordingly, I directed the court office to set a new hearing date in which to hear the arguments of the parties regarding Dean’s application.

5As the price of the indulgence of reopening this case. I also ordered that Caylah pay some minimal costs. I wrote:

In that this hearing and acceptance of Ms. McCoy’s affidavit is an indulgence that I have granted to her, particularly in light of the fact that her affidavit was light in evidence explaining her previous failure to properly respond to this application and because I have stayed her motion to have the Applicant declared a vexatious litigant, she shall pay the costs of this attendance, fixed at $500, payable within 90 days. If it is not paid. I will strike her affidavit.

6Caylah never paid those costs and accordingly, I struck her affidavit just before the return of this application for argument. However, I allowed her to make submissions on the voluminous materials that had already been filed by Dean. Those materials are detailed and contain copies of transcripts and legal decisions that Dean relies upon. They are persuasive.

7For the reasons to follow, I grant this application.

Background

8While this case involves two siblings, it reflects a larger level of conflict within the McCoy family, one which has also ensnared the parties’ sister, Andrea, the estate of their late father, Eric McCoy (“Eric”), as well as others who have been involved in legal proceedings involving this family. It also involves numerous court proceedings in two provinces, spanning estates, bankruptcy, defamation, and even criminal charges. I refer to a number of the most substantial proceedings involving the parties and Andrea below.

9In March 2009 Caylah sent a defamatory email to Dean’s employer, impersonating a police officer and a member of the Crime Stopper’s Board. In the email, she falsely accused Dean of being a criminal who had committed various offences involving drugs and theft, who remained under investigation for other crimes. After Dean sued, the parties settled. But Caylah then terminated her counsel and reneged on the negotiated settlement agreement drafted by her counsel. On June 9, 2011, Murray J. of this this Court granted Dean judgment for $10,500, based on that settlement. That amount included $2,500 for costs.

10In 2012 Caylah began cyber-harassing her sister Andrea. Caylah sent emails and posted ads on the "Canadian Escort Recommendation Board" for various items on sale or for services offered. Those ads and emails used Andrea’s coordinates or email address as contact information. Caylah also made an unfounded report to a social service agency, the Centre Jeunesse de la Montérégie. That false report suggested that Andrea’s daughter should be removed from her care pending the results of a psychiatric evaluation.

11Caylah was charged and ultimately pled guilty to two charges of criminal harassment of Andrea. She was granted a conditional discharge on October 19, 2012.

12Andrea sued Caylah for damages due to her cyberstalking and infringing upon her rights and those of her daughter. In a decision reported at 2014 QCCS 286, Justice Perrault of the Quebec Superior Court ordered Caylah to pay Andrea $10,000 in moral damages and a further $10,000 in punitive damages. Perrault J. found that Caylah had unlawfully and intentionally interfered with Andrea’s Charter rights. At paragraph 34, Perrault J. wrote:

The Court believes they were intentional because Caylah knew without a doubt that the ads and emails would result in an interference with Andrea’s right to respect for her private life and the safeguard of her dignity, honour and reputation. For example, Caylah knew that involving the CJ Montérégie in Andrea’s life, with the added threat that she may lose custody of her daughter, would cause Andrea stress and anxiety, as would the ad on CERB with Andrea’s phone number. This is what Caylah wanted and intended.

13In the same proceeding, Caylah unsuccessfully countersued Andrea, seeking damages of $875,000 for cyberstalking and harassment. She later admitted to having chosen that figure arbitrarily. She later reduced her claim to $100,000 at trial. Among the forms of harassment she claimed were Andrea’s complaint to the police that Caylah had harassed her. Since Caylah had pleaded guilty to the charges that arose from Andrea’s police complaint, Perrault J. rhetorically asked, “how can [Caylah] possibly contend that this constitutes harassment on the part of Andrea?” Caylah’s countersuit was found to be “clearly unfounded in law” and dismissed.

14Perrault J. further found that the claims that Caylah had made in the action before her were a repetition of the claims she had made in the 2012 Small Claims Court action. That action had already been stayed pending the resolution of the Quebec Superior Court action. Perrault J. wrote that Caylah’s “use of procedure was unreasonable and caused Andrea to incur unnecessary legal fees and extrajudicial costs.” She ordered Caylah to pay costs of $100,000 to Andrea.

15In a separate but related action, Perrault J. ordered that Caylah pay a further $35,000 to Andrea.

16The parties’ father, Eric, had died in 2009, leaving a notarized 2007 will. However, Caylah attempted to probate an invalid 2009 will of Eric, without her siblings’ knowledge. After years of litigation, the Quebec Superior Court annulled the invalid 2009 will, finding that Eric lacked testamentary capacity and ordering Caylah to pay costs of $9,127.

17Dean and Andrea sued Caylah for damages regarding the invalid 2009 will. Caylah moved to dismiss the action, erroneously claiming that the release in Dean’s 2009 defamation action against her covered any subsequent action between them. On April 22, 2016, the Quebec Superior Court rejected Caylah’s motion to dismiss Dean and Andrea’s action and declared Caylah’s motion an abusive pleading.

18In a decision reported at 2017 QCCS 45, Armstrong J. of the Quebec Superior Court awarded damages to Dean and Andrea arising from Caylah’s attempt to probate Eric’s invalid 2009 will. Armstrong J. found that Caylah had been motivated by a desire “… to “cut [Dean and Andrea] out financially.” She concluded that Caylah “intentionally planned to obtain the probate judgment without Dean and Andrea’s knowledge,” and had fired her lawyer “in order to be free to manoeuvre on her own.” Caylah did so, knowing that “Dean and Andrea would contest the probate application, and she wanted to put them in a position where they would be forced to incur significant legal fees to set the probate aside.”

19Armstrong J. also recounted that in the estates litigation:

1. Caylah had sued Andrea’s lawyer, Irving Handelman, falsely accusing him of “continued theft of an elderly woman [the parties’ mother] … perjury before the court, use of extortion in the court, fraud in the court, slander, libel, bullying, stalking and using the court to benefit monetarily.”
2. In April 2015 Caylah stole the identity of yet another lawyer, who had never met her, in order to obtain an expert report.
3. Caylah’s “contestation of Dean and Andrea’s action in nullity of the 2009 Will was abusive in all respects.”

20Armstrong J. ordered Caylah to reimburse Dean and Andrea $81,233.94, with legal interest, representing the full amount that they spent in the estates litigation. She also ordered that Caylah pay moral damages of $15,000. Caylah had sought $20,000 in damages of her own from her siblings. Armstrong J. rejected that claim, finding that Caylah is the “artisan of her own injury, if any.”

21With the exception of the Murray J. judgment, none of the money that Caylah was ordered to pay to either Dean or Andrea was ever paid. In 2017 Caylah filed for bankruptcy and has yet to be discharged.

22In each of 2011, 2014, and 2018 Caylah filed a private Information against Dean, alleging harassment. The Crown took over all three of these cases and withdrew the charges.

23On or about August 6, 2018, a car on Dean’s property was set on fire. On October 11, 2018, Caylah was charged with arson by the Halton Regional Police Service. At trial, Atwood J. of the Ontario Court of Justice acquitted Caylah. In his reasons he said that he was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Caylah was guilty. However, he added that:

if the test had been on a balance of probabilities, I would have no hesitation in saying that the evidence would establish that [Caylah set the fire]. That is, to “more likely than not”, which is not the test in criminal cases but is in civil, that would be established.

24As a result, Atwood J. took the unusual step of ordering Caylah to enter into a Peace Bond whose terms included not contacting Dean for one year.

25On November 16, 2020, ten days after the expiry of her peace bond, Caylah sued Dean and his spouse, Nancy Van Dorp, in Cornwall Small Claims Court, claiming defamation and harassment. She raised a farrago of allegations against Dean and Ms. Van Dorp; some going as far back as 2001. Many of the claims she made were already dealt with in the previous legal proceedings cited above. Because Caylah is an undischarged bankrupt, the action was stayed on December 20, 2021. At the same time, the claims against Ms. Van Dorp were dismissed as there was no possibility that the action could succeed against her. So too were a series of claims that Caylah made against Dean.

26On January 22, 2022, in a disciplinary proceeding that did not involve Dean or Andrea, the Disciplinary Council of the Order of Nurses of Quebec (the “Council”) found Caylah guilty of two counts of professional misconduct. Those counts arose from Caylah’s a failure to cooperate with an investigation of her practices and false or misleading representations on her website regarding her professional qualifications. The Council temporarily “disbarred” her for a total of seventeen months. Among its findings were the following:

The respondent simply refuses to cooperate fully, whether at the investigation stage or following the filing of the disciplinary complaint. She requested that her name be removed from the College roll on December 19, 2018 instead of providing the missing information that she agreed to provide to the complainant the day before. Before taking this step, as already explained, she multiplied the maneuvers to derail the complainant's investigation into her independent practice in medico-aesthetics. In fact, everything indicates that the respondent does not want the Order to be able to ensure that its clientele is protected in the context of this practice.

Issues:

27This case raises three issues:

1. Is Caylah a vexatious litigant?
2. If so, should the court exercise its discretion to order that no further proceeding be instituted by Caylah in any court?
3. Should this court dismiss the Cornwall Small Claims Court proceeding commenced by Caylah?

28For the reasons set out below, I find that Caylah is a vexatious litigant and that she be prohibited from instituting any further proceedings without leave of the court. I further dismiss the Cornwall Small Claims Court proceeding and stay any other proceeding previously instituted Caylah in any court in Ontario.

Issue No. 1: Is Caylah a vexatious litigant?

Legal Principles

29Section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 governs this proceeding. It provides as follows:

Vexatious proceedings

140 (1) Where a judge of the Superior Court of Justice is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently and without reasonable grounds,

(a) instituted vexatious proceedings in any court; or

(b) conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner,

the judge may order that,

(c) no further proceeding be instituted by the person in any court; or

(d) a proceeding previously instituted by the person in any court not be continued,

30In GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc. v. Hicks, 2019 ONSC 4942, at paras. 55-56, Corthorn J. reviews the relevant caselaw regarding s. 140(1) as follows:

55 Principles have been established in case law for determining an application pursuant to this section. Those frequently cited are set out by Henry J. in Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian (1987), 1987 CanLII 172 (ON SC), 59 O.R. (2d) 353:

(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;

(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the Court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;

(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;

(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

56 The court may consider both judicial and non-judicial proceedings when applying the principles quoted above (Bishop v. Bishop, 2011 ONCA 211, [2011] O.J. No. 1290, at para. 9, leave to appeal refused, [2011] C.S.C.R. No. 239). At para. 5 of Bishop, the Court of Appeal addresses the inference that may be drawn from a litigant's conduct in non-judicial proceedings:

... the institution of non-judicial proceedings can, depending on the circumstances, constitute evidence from which a court may infer that court proceedings commenced by the litigant are not bona fide but the product of someone who is unreasonably obsessed with a cause and likely to pursue vexatious court proceedings on an indefinite basis unless stopped.

31The seven Lang Michener Lash Johnston factors set out in GoodLife Fitness Centres are not exhaustive. Nor does the court have to find the presence of each factor in a given case: Dobson v. Green, 2012 ONSC 4432, at para. 10. The court may consider “a wide range of proceedings in which an allegedly vexatious litigant has participated, including actions, applications, motions and appeals, and the manner in which the litigant has conducted him or herself within those proceedings, including any acts of dishonesty or deceit with the court. In the end, whether or not any proceedings have been pursued vexatiously is to be judged on an objective standard”: Dobson, at para. 11.

32Further, as Campbell J. found in Dobson, at para. 12:

Moreover, the court is not strictly limited to the conduct of the allegedly vexatious litigant in the courtroom. The behaviour of a litigant both inside and outside of the courtroom may be relevant. It is not uncommon for a vexatious litigant to utilize the court process as simply part of an overall strategy of abuse and harassment. Their conduct out of court may provide evidence from which it may be inferred that court proceedings are not bona fide but merely the product of someone who is "unreasonably obsessed with a cause and likely to pursue vexatious court proceedings on an indefinite basis unless stopped." In this way, the conduct of the vexatious litigant outside of the courtroom may be helpful in understanding his or her motivation and conduct within the litigation process. See: Canada Post Corporation v. Varma, 2000 CanLII 15754 (FC), [2000] F.C.J. No. 851, at para. 22-24; Bishop v. Bishop, at para. 8-9.

Application of the Law to the Facts of this Case

33Below I consider the application of factors set out in Lang Michener Lash Johnston to the facts of this case. They demonstrate that Caylah is clearly a vexatious litigant; one who has instituted vexatious proceedings in any court and conducted legal proceedings in a vexatious manner. Some of the legal proceedings cited below have already been cited in the background section of this endorsement. Others are repeated because they fit into a number of categories of factors relevant to the determination of vexatiousness.

Caylah persistently and unreasonably brought numerous actions, many to determine an issue already determined, or which obviously could not succeed

34A number of legal proceedings commenced by Caylah have attempted to determine an already determined issue or seek to raise causes of action that obviously cannot succeed. Examples include:

a. After Andrea sued her for cyberstalking and harassment, Caylah did not defend the claim. Rather, she launched a counterclaim for $875,000. The Quebec Superior Court described her counterclaim as “clearly unfounded in law”. It noted that she had admitted that the high quantum damages she claimed was arbitrarily chosen.

b. In April 2014 Caylah brought a suit against media company, Quebecor, accusing one of its journalists of defamation and cyber bullying. She also accused Andrea and Dean of being the company’s clients. She later abandoned this claim.

c. Caylah filed a Quebec Small Claims Application against Andrea alleging harassment. It raised many of the same claims and issues set out in her Quebec Superior Court proceeding against Andrea. That counterclaim was dismissed in its entirety. Armstrong J, found that Caylah had “adopted unfounded positions and filed frivolous proceedings.”

d. After already being noted in default regarding probate of Eric’s invalid 2009 will, Caylah brought a motion to dismiss that judgement. She alleged that the case was a waste of the court’s time over a ridiculous family feud. That motion was dismissed.

e. One of the bases of Caylah’s claim of harassment by Dean in a Quebec Superior Court action was the allegation that he was responsible for her being falsely charged with criminal harassment. Yet she pled guilty to those charges.

f. Caylah attempted to sue Andrea’s lawyer, Irving Handelman, based on a clearly false premise, for improper reasons.

g. The three private Informations that Caylah lodged against Dean were withdrawn by the Crown without requiring a trial.

h. Caylah brought a Cornwall Small Claims Court claim alleging that Dean and his wife had defamed and harassed her. In doing so, she relied in part on issues already determined or which allegedly occurred so long ago that they were beyond any relevant limitation period.

Caylah brought various actions against Dean and Andrea for an improper purpose including harassment and oppression

35Caylah attempted to probate Eric’s invalid 2009 will. In defending her conduct, she made numerous allegations of impropriety against Dean, Andrea and others. Those allegations were strongly rejected by Armstrong J. of the Quebec Superior Court. In her decision, Armstrong J. made the following findings:

1. At para. 42: “the Court concludes that Caylah intentionally planned to obtain the probate judgement without Dean and Andrea’s knowledge, and that Caylah revoked [her lawyer’s] mandate in order to be free to manoeuvre on her own. She knew Dean and Andrea would contest the probate application, and she wanted to put them in a position where they would be forced to incur significant legal fees to set the probate aside.”
2. At paras. 55-56 the Court noted “the extent to which Caylah was prepared to go in her attempt to harm Dean and Andrea” and that the latter “have had to incur legal fees to contest Caylah’s pleadings.”
3. At para. 64: “the Court concludes that Caylah’s contestation of Dean and Andrea’s action in nullity of the 2009 Will was abusive in all respects.”
4. At para. 68 the Court found that “Caylah asked for probate of the 2009 Will in order to harm” Dean and Andrea.
5. At para. 70: She took advantage of the fact that she was representing herself and incurred no legal costs.
6. Similarly, Caylah’s countersuit against Andrea for harassment was wholly unfounded.

A number of the grounds and issues in Cayla’s lawsuits were rolled forward into subsequent actions

36One of the patterns of Caylah’s litigation against Dean and Andrea is the extent to which she repeats the same allegations against them, rolling them forward from one action to another. Examples include:

1. Caylah commenced a Quebec Small Claims Court claim against Andrea. But she later commenced a counterclaim in the Quebec Superior Court, based on the same cause of action. That led Perrault J. to describe the counterclaim as “nothing more than a repetition of her Small Claims Court action.”
2. On April 16, 2016, the Quebec Superior Court rejected a motion by Caylah to dismiss Dean and Andrea’s lawsuit against her as a ridiculous family feud. Caylah had erroneously relied on the 2010 release she signed in regard to Dean’s 2009 defamation action. The Court concluded that this motion constituted an abusive proceeding.
3. Many of the same allegations included in the Cornwall Small Claims action, whose allegations go back to 2001, were also included in her Quebec cyberstalking countersuit.

Caylah brought proceedings against lawyers who had worked for or against her

37Caylah has brought a number of proceedings or complaints against lawyers who have worked both for and against her, all of which were ultimately dismissed. Examples include:

a. Caylah filed two complaints to the Barreau de Quebec against Andrea’s lawyer Irving Handelman.

b. In June 2012 Caylah filed a complaint against her own former lawyer, Mtre. Rothman. After a Barreau hearing, charges were dismissed.

c. In April 2014 Caylah sued Mtre. Handelman for $210,000, alleging theft, perjury, extortion, fraud, slander, libel, bullying, and stalking. She eventually abandoned these claims.

d. Caylah later admitted that “she instituted proceedings against Mtre. Handelman in 2014 because he had refused to settle the present case” (2017 QCCS 45, at para. 51.)

e. In April 2014 Caylah brought an action against William Lemay, a prosecutor in Montreal assigned to deal with criminal charges against her. She claimed damages of $25,000 for perjury, fraud, and bribery. She alleged that he was in collusion with Dean and Mtre. Handelman. She later abandoned the claim.

Caylah’s failure to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings

38As set out above, the only evidence before this court demonstrates that Caylah has failed to pay any of the damages or costs she was ordered to pay to Dean and Andrea in the Quebec proceedings cited above. Caylah later declared bankruptcy, with Dean as an acknowledged creditor for $167,000.

39As noted above, she failed to pay the $500 in costs ordered as a term of allowing her to file materials in this proceeding. I note that she was present when the costs order was made and did not object.

Caylah’s behaviour outside the courtroom provides evidence of vexatious motivation or conduct

40The evidence produced in this action, as well as the previous judicial findings against Caylah, provide ample evidence of her vexatious motivation, particularly against Dean and Andrea. In particular:

1. In March 2009, Caylah impersonated a police officer while sending emails to Dean’s employer, alleging he had a criminal past. He sued her for defamation, leading to her agreeing to pay him $8,000. Dean then had to move before Murray J. to enforce that settlement.
2. Caylah pled guilty to two counts of criminal harassment against Andrea in 2012.
3. Caylah made three unsuccessful attempts to have Dean charged with criminal harassment. The Crown withdrew each case.
4. Caylah was ordered to pay $35,000 in moral and punitive damages to Andrea following a lawsuit for cyberstalking and harassment.
5. She was also found guilty of the offence of telecommunications harassment against Andrea and given a conditional discharge.
6. Caylah was arrested and charged with arson after allegedly pouring gasoline over Dean’s car. The trial judge who acquitted her, Atwood J., stated that he would have found her liable under the civil standard and ordered her to enter into a peace bond whose terms included non-contact with Dean.
7. Armstrong J. found that Caylah’s conduct in the estates litigation against Dean and Andrea was motivated by a desire to financially harm Dean and Andrea.

41As all of the conduct cited above involves Dean and Andrea, one can only conclude that Caylah was vexatiously motivated to engage in a more than a decade-long legal vendetta against her siblings.

Caylah’s pattern of deceit in pursuing her legal claims or defending the claims of others

42One factor that I may consider in regard to both whether Caylah is a vexatious litigant, and whether I should exercise my discretion on her behalf, is her pattern of deceit in pursuing her legal claims or defending the claims of others. Caylah has proven herself willing to lie and misrepresent in order to assist her in pursuing her legal goals. Among the examples set out above are the following:

1. Her impersonation of a police officer in order to harm Dean’s reputation with his employer.
2. Her surreptitious attempt to probate an invalid will of her father, behind the backs of Dean and Andrea.
3. Her impersonation of a lawyer to retain an expert opinion during litigation of Eric’s will. The Barreau de Quebec in its own opinion considered these actions as constituting criminal offences.
4. Her false report of Andrea to a social service agency, the Centre Jeunesse de la Montérégie.
5. Her lawsuits against lawyers Irving Handelman and William Lemay, based on false premises.
6. The finding of the OIIQ [Order of Nurses of Quebec] Disciplinary Board in January 2022 that Caylah deceived and obstructed an investigation against her, repeatedly provided false names and address to the court, fabricated law firms and impersonated a paralegal.

Caylah meets the criteria of s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act

43The determination of whether Caylah meets the criteria of s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act is not even a close one. She has engaged in a more than decade-long pattern of vexatious litigation, both in and out of the courtroom. She has made meritless claims and engaged in deceit in order to meet her ends. While the brunt of Caylah’s litigation is aimed at her siblings, Dean and Andrea, it is not limited to them. Rather, the blunt instrument of Caylah’s litigation tactics is apparently aimed at anyone whom she believes to be opposed to her interests or her vendetta against her two siblings. Thus, I find that Caylah meets the criteria of s. 140(1).

Issue No 2: Should the Court exercise its discretion to order that no further proceeding be instituted by Caylah in any court?

44The wording of s. 140(1) regarding the applicable remedy is not mandatory. Even where there is a finding of vexatiousness, the court “may” rather than “shall” order that no further proceedings be instituted by the vexatious litigant. In Dobson v. Green, at para. 54, Campbell J. wrote:

The declaration that the respondent is a "vexatious litigant" does not mean that an order must necessarily follow that the respondent should engage in no further proceedings except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice. The legislation uses discretionary language in suggesting that, in such circumstances, such an order "may" be made. Accordingly, the legislation contemplates that there will be at least some circumstances in which there is a declaration made that someone is a "vexatious litigant" and yet there is no order made impacting on their ability to launch and/or continue court proceedings.

45That being said, I have been presented with no reason to exercise my discretion in Caylah’s favour. The manner in which she has engaged in litigation with her siblings and the animus that has motivated her conduct makes it risky for the legal system to allow her vexatious pattern of proceedings to continue.

46In argument before me, Caylah asserted that I should not grant the relief sought by Dean because it will only encourage him to sue and lodge complaints against her. Such an order would only add to what she described as his “repertoire of demonizing” her. I disagree for two reasons.

47First, I have been presented with no evidence that Dean has initiated any groundless legal proceedings against Caylah. In fact, most of his filings are in response to either her improprieties or legal proceedings she has initiated against him. Second, an order under s. 140(1) is intended to inject an element of discipline into the conduct of vexatious litigants. Both Dean and Caylah appear to have had enough of each other. I anticipate that an order under s. 140(1) will discourage Caylah from engaging in conduct that would warrant a further lawsuit from Dean. For his part, I have seen no evidence that if Caylah obeys my order and forbears from continuing her conduct towards him, that Dean would want to engage with her any further.

Issue No 3: Should I dismiss the Cornwall Small Claims Court Action?

48The Cornwall Small Claims Court proceeding initiated by Caylah is already stayed because she remains an undischarged bankrupt. It is unlikely to proceed any further in any event. Further, Caylah has stated in court that she would not object to its dismissal. I see no reason to allow it to continue in light of my findings above. Thus, I order that it be dismissed.

Conclusion

49I find that Caylah is what can be described as a vexatious litigant. In the wording of s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, she has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings and conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner. I order that no further proceeding be instituted by Caylah in any court. The Cornwall Small Claims Court proceeding commenced by Caylah against Dean and Nancy Van Dorp, action no. SC-2020-165, shall be dismissed. So too is her motion in this proceeding, which is devoid of any merit. Further, any proceeding previously instituted by Caylah (of which I am unaware) shall be stayed, subject to an application under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

Costs

50Caylah is an undischarged bankrupt. Her bankruptcy already includes large damages and costs awards against her. It is unlikely that any costs award that I make against Caylah will ever be enforced. However, if Dean seeks an order of costs, he shall provide the court with a written submission of not more than three pages, double-spaced, one-inch margins, along with costs outline, setting out his costs claim. He need not include copies of any reported authorities. However, any submission should refer to the applicable statutory provision or paragraph of a case he relies upon. If I have not received such a submission within 14 days of the release of these reasons, I will assume that Dean is not seeking costs of this proceeding. Caylah may respond upon the same terms within 14 days of service of any costs submission by Dean. There will be no reply submission unless I request it.