Stephen Sargent

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking the production of additional documents from the defendants in an action alleging fraudulent accident benefit claims.

The requested documents included law firm financial records and other business records.

The court ordered the production of certain client files and records on consent but denied the request for broader banking and business records, finding them overly broad, disproportionate, and premature prior to establishing liability.

The defendants brought a motion to examine the plaintiffs' in-house counsel, Mr. Townsend, for discovery in a complex fraud action.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing that Mr. Townsend lacked firsthand knowledge, and that his examination would be oppressive and risk breaching solicitor-client privilege.

The court, applying Rule 31.03(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, affirmed the defendants' prima facie right to select the witness.

It found that in-house counsel is not immune from discovery and that Mr. Townsend's knowledge of the audit results made him a relevant witness, provided questions avoided privileged legal advice.

The motion was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an order to conduct non-destructive testing of a Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) subway train's door function and safety features following a claimed accident.

The court granted leave for the motion despite a trial record being served, as there was no prejudice to the defendant.

The court also addressed a breach of the deemed undertaking rule (Rule 30.01.01) by the plaintiff's counsel, which was acknowledged and resolved without further remedy.

However, the primary request for inspection and testing under Rule 32.01 was dismissed.

The court found the proposed testing was not "necessary" because the plaintiff's expert already demonstrated a good understanding of the subway door system, had not fully reviewed all available documentation, and the request itself was vague, evolving, and lacked specificity regarding methodology and expected probative value.

The court also noted the problematic nature of testing an "exemplar" car given the passage of time and lack of evidence that it would operate identically to the incident car.

The defendants sought costs after successfully obtaining summary judgment, which dismissed the plaintiff's action for failing to establish a serious, permanent impairment under the Insurance Act.

The self-represented plaintiff opposed the costs and sought reimbursement for her own expenses.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs, reducing the amount sought due to estimated, undocketed fees of a retired counsel and considering the plaintiff's stated impecuniosity, while affirming the principle that costs compensate the successful party.

The plaintiff, Angela Fleming Halley, brought a personal injury action against the Toronto Transit Commission and Natalie Chamber after a slip and fall on a bus.

The defendants brought preliminary motions, including a summary judgment motion, to dismiss the action or strike it from the trial list.

The plaintiff, self-represented, intended to rely solely on her own testimony and had no medical evidence or documentation to establish her injuries met the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act for non-pecuniary damages, healthcare expenses, or loss of income.

The court found that the plaintiff could not adduce the necessary expert medical evidence to prove a permanent serious impairment of an important function, which is required to maintain a tort action for such damages.

Consequently, the court granted the defendants' summary judgment motion and dismissed the action.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to add an insurer as a defendant for unidentified motorist coverage, over four years after learning an unidentified vehicle was involved in the accident.

The proposed defendant argued the claim was statute-barred.

The court applied recent appellate jurisprudence holding that the limitation period for an unidentified motorist claim does not begin to run until a demand for indemnity is made and refused.

As no demand had yet been refused, the limitation period had not expired, and the motion to amend was granted.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to restore their motor vehicle accident action to the trial list after it was administratively struck.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss for delay.

The court found a history of inattention and missed deadlines by the plaintiffs' former counsel, with no reasonable explanation for the delay.

The court also found the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice if the action proceeded, as discoveries were incomplete and evidence had not been preserved.

The plaintiffs' motion was dismissed, and the action was left to be administratively dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's personal injury action, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs based on the plaintiff's fabricated claims and an unaccepted offer to settle.

The court held that Rule 49.10 does not permit substantial indemnity costs for a successful defendant, and the plaintiff's conduct did not rise to the level of reprehensible conduct required to justify elevated costs.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs in the amount of $193,043.98.

The plaintiff brought two negligence actions: one against the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) and its driver for a bus door incident, and another against the City of Toronto for a slip and fall on an icy sidewalk.

The court dismissed both actions, finding no negligence on the part of the defendants and significant credibility issues with the plaintiff regarding his injuries, pain, and efforts to return to work.

The court also found that the plaintiff's alleged psychological injuries were not causally linked to the TTC accident or were too remote.

Following a trial where the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) was found not liable for a streetcar accident involving a four-year-old child, the TTC sought its costs of the proceeding.

The court declined to award costs to the TTC, noting that the child could not be at fault and that the TTC, as a public service, should bear the costs of defending such claims where the injured party is not at fault.

The court also declined to award costs for the TTC's counterclaim against the child's parents, resulting in no order as to costs for any party.

Following the dismissal of a slip and fall negligence action on summary judgment, the defendant sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $21,331.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be ordered due to the seriousness of the injuries and the plaintiff’s limited financial means, asserting that bringing a reasonable claim should not attract a costs penalty.

The court held that partial indemnity costs are not punitive and serve broader objectives in civil justice, including indemnifying successful litigants and encouraging settlement.

While acknowledging potential hardship, the court found the defendant was entitled to costs as the successful party.

After modest reductions and consideration of fairness, the court fixed costs at $17,500 inclusive.

The defendant transit authority brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a slip‑and‑fall action arising from a fall on stairs at a subway station.

The plaintiff alleged she slipped on debris on the steps and that the occupier failed to keep the premises reasonably safe under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The court held that the plaintiff produced no direct evidence that debris or another hazard existed at the time of the fall, relying instead on speculation and past observations of debris elsewhere in the station.

Evidence showed the stairs were non‑slip tiles in good repair and that the defendant maintained a reasonable inspection and cleaning system.

Applying the summary judgment principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded the plaintiff could not establish a breach of the statutory duty of care.

A four-year-old boy ran across a street mid-block and was struck by a TTC streetcar.

The plaintiffs sued the TTC and the streetcar operator for negligence.

Under s. 193(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, the defendants bore the onus of proving they were not negligent.

After hearing extensive expert evidence on accident reconstruction, perception-reaction times, and streetcar braking mechanics, the court concluded that the child ran into the streetcar's path too late for the operator to avoid the collision.

The defendants successfully rebutted the presumption of negligence, and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff's personal injury action was subject to a status hearing after a notice was issued by the court for delay.

The defendants sought to have the action dismissed.

The court applied the test from Khan v. Sun Life Assurance, finding that while the plaintiff's delay was not ideal, it was partially explained by her residence in Israel and a change in counsel.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, as the delay was not unduly excessive and relevant evidence had been preserved.

The action was allowed to continue subject to a strict timetable, with no order as to costs.