Sarah Merredew

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to vary an order setting aside a dismissal of her action and to extend time, which also resulted in the dismissal of her action.

The court awarded costs to the City of Toronto and Toronto Transit Commission, with a 10% reduction due to the plaintiff's financial situation.

However, the court declined to award costs to the third party, Guild Electric Limited, on the basis that the plaintiff did not initiate the third-party claim.

The plaintiff's slip and fall action was dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14.

The court subsequently set aside the dismissal and imposed a mandatory timetable.

The plaintiff breached multiple steps of the timetable, including failing to deliver a sworn affidavit of documents, failing to answer undertakings, and failing to attend mandatory mediation.

The plaintiff moved to vary the set-aside order and extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The court applied the Reid and Jadid factors, finding the plaintiff failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay, did not miss the deadlines through inadvertence, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendants.

The motion was dismissed, and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured after slipping on ice on a municipal sidewalk after exiting a bus.

She sued the City of Toronto and the TTC, and later added the City's winter maintenance contractor, Pave-Tar.

Pave-Tar and the TTC brought motions for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them.

Pave-Tar argued the claim against it was statute-barred, while the TTC argued it owed no duty of care.

The court dismissed both motions, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the limitation period and concluding that partial summary judgment was inappropriate due to the intertwined facts and risk of inconsistent findings at trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her personal injury action for delay.

The action had stalled for five years because the plaintiff's former lawyer misled her into believing the case had settled, even having her sign release documents.

The court found the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the action because there was no reliable evidence of when it was struck from the trial list.

Alternatively, applying the Reid factors, the court set aside the dismissal, finding the plaintiff had a reasonable explanation for the delay, the failure to restore was inadvertent, the motion was brought promptly, and the defendant suffered no actual prejudice.

The motion to restore the action to the trial list was denied as the matter was not yet ready for trial.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' personal injury claims at a jury trial, the court assessed costs payable to the successful defendants.

The plaintiff argued impecuniosity, but the court found he failed to meet the evidentiary threshold to prove an inability to pay.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs up to the date of their reasonable settlement offer, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, fixing total fees at $180,000 plus HST and disbursements at $51,554.18.

During a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act to determine whether the plaintiff had sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The court assessed extensive medical evidence concerning shoulder injuries, surgeries, and alleged chronic pain.

While the court accepted that the accident aggravated a pre-existing shoulder condition requiring surgical treatment, it found the plaintiff’s evidence of ongoing limitations unreliable and inconsistent with medical opinions and surveillance evidence.

The court concluded that the plaintiff had not established, on a balance of probabilities, that any impairment was permanent, serious, or sufficiently impactful on important functions.

The statutory threshold was therefore not met and the claim for non‑pecuniary damages was barred.