Nabil Mahmood

The appellant was injured when the public transit bus she was riding stopped abruptly, throwing her forward.

She sought statutory accident benefits, which were denied by the Licence Appeal Tribunal under s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act because the bus did not collide with another vehicle or object.

On appeal, the appellant argued she constituted 'any other object' under the statute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the plain wording and context of the provision require the object to be outside the vehicle, and a bus does not collide with a person inside it.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision that denied her accident benefits under s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act.

The applicant was injured when the public transit vehicle she was occupying made a sudden stop, but did not collide with another vehicle or object.

The Tribunal found that the adjudicator did not err in interpreting 'any other object' to mean something external to the vehicle, and that the applicant herself could not be the object.

The request for reconsideration was dismissed.

The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The insurer denied the claim because the application for benefits (OCF-1) was submitted beyond the 30-day prescribed time limit.

The applicant's counsel had inadvertently faxed the application to the wrong number.

The Tribunal found that the insurer failed in its positive obligation to assist the applicant with his claim after receiving treatment plans indicating an intention to claim benefits.

The Tribunal held that the applicant had a reasonable explanation for the delay and permitted the application to proceed.

The applicant was injured when the TTC bus she was riding made a sudden stop, causing her to strike the interior of the bus.

The bus did not collide with any external object.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits, arguing that she herself constituted 'any other object' with which the bus collided under s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act.

The Tribunal rejected this argument, finding that the ordinary meaning of the provision requires the public transit vehicle to collide with an object external to it.

As the bus did not collide with an external object, the applicant is barred from claiming accident benefits.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after allegedly being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street.

The respondent denied benefits, arguing no accident occurred as there was no physical contact.

The Tribunal found the applicant credible and, supported by surveillance video and hospital records, concluded he was struck by the vehicle.

Applying the purpose and causation tests, the Tribunal determined the incident met the definition of an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal awarded the claimed $2,200 for a psychological assessment, finding the $200 fee for reviewing the treatment plan is separate from the $2,000 assessment cap, and $2,200 for physiotherapy services.

The applicant, TTC Insurance Company Limited (TTCICL), sought an order extending the time to commence their appeal of a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision and an order joining this appeal with an existing application for judicial review.

Concurrently, the LAT and the Attorney General of Ontario sought leave to intervene in the appeal.

The court granted both motions, finding that the extension of time was justified given the recent Supreme Court decision in Yatar, the short delay, lack of prejudice to the respondent, and the overall interests of justice.

Intervenor status was granted to LAT and the Attorney General, with LAT's submissions restricted to procedural and jurisdictional issues, not the merits of its decision.

Following the settlement of a tort action arising from a pedestrian struck by a transit bus, the parties disputed the quantum of costs payable to the plaintiff.

The defendant argued the pretrial judge lacked jurisdiction to fix costs and that costs should only be proportional to the $100,000 tort component of the settlement, excluding the $550,000 statutory accident benefits component.

The court declined to recuse itself, finding jurisdiction to fix costs.

The court held that costs should be assessed on the global $650,000 settlement because the defendant directly benefited from the accident benefits settlement by reducing its tort exposure.

The court fixed partial indemnity fees at $300,000, post-settlement fees at $20,000, and disbursements at $125,000, plus HST.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $5,000.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a 2012 motor vehicle accident, claiming she sustained a catastrophic impairment due to mental and behavioural disorders.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant suffered a Marked impairment in both adaptation and concentration, persistence, and pace, satisfying Criterion 8 of the Schedule.

The Tribunal relied on the evidence of the applicant's treating professionals and experts, preferring them over the insurer's assessors who provided insufficient analysis.

The applicant was awarded attendant care benefits and a treatment plan for psychotherapy.

However, the Tribunal declined to order a special award under s. 10 of O. Reg. 664, finding the insurer's reliance on its medical assessments was not unreasonable.

During a civil jury trial for a slip and fall claim, the plaintiff moved to discharge the jury following the defendants' closing address.

The plaintiff argued that defence counsel's closing submissions contained numerous transgressions, including misstating evidence, expressing personal opinions, referring to unproven hearsay, and breaching the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The trial judge agreed, finding that the cumulative effect of the improper statements and trial conduct created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice that could not be cured by correcting instructions.

The motion was granted, the jury was discharged, and the trial was concluded by judge alone.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages after slipping and falling on a clear, greasy cleaning substance outside an elevator on the defendants' premises.

The court found the defendants 100% liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act, as their cleaner had improperly sprayed the substance onto the elevator doors, causing it to pool on the shiny granite floor without warning signs.

The court rejected arguments of contributory negligence.

The plaintiff suffered a mild traumatic brain injury (concussion) and chronic soft tissue injuries, leading to chronic migraines and neck pain that significantly impacted her career trajectory in the financial sector.

The court awarded $115,000 in general damages, $173,400 for past income loss, $501,500 for future loss of earning capacity (after a 15% contingency deduction), $10,000 for special damages, and $15,000 for past loss of housekeeping capacity.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action and third-party claim.

The court determined the quantum of costs payable by the plaintiffs to the defendant, Christine Raffan, and whether the plaintiffs or Ms. Raffan should pay the third-party costs.

The court awarded Ms. Raffan $300,000 in costs from the plaintiffs, finding the amount reasonable given the complexity, duration, and unproven fraud allegations.

The court further ruled that Ms. Raffan, not the plaintiffs, must pay the third-party costs, awarding David Corazza and Karen Caradonna $125,000 each, as their inclusion in the proceedings did not naturally flow from the plaintiffs' action.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a mistrial during their ongoing trial, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias after the court dismissed their action.

The action was dismissed because the plaintiffs' expert, a forensic accountant, failed to provide an opinion on the standard of care for a CGA, which was deemed essential for the case's success.

The court, acting as a gatekeeper for expert evidence, excluded the expert's testimony based on the two-step test from *White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co.* The motion for mistrial was denied, and the dismissal of the action was affirmed.

The applicant and respondents both provided professional liability insurance to a nurse facing a disciplinary complaint from the College of Nurses of Ontario.

Both insurers acknowledged a duty to defend.

The applicant sought an order that the respondents share the defence costs equally, arguing their 'other insurance' clauses were irreconcilable.

The court found that the 'other insurance' clause in the applicant's policy only applied to claims for compensatory damages ('professional incidents'), not disciplinary complaints.

Therefore, the clauses could be read together, making the applicant the primary insurer for the disciplinary complaint.

The application was dismissed.