Mohammed v. TTC Insurance Company Limited, 2025 CanLII 111740

Citation: Mohammed v. TTC Insurance Company Limited, 2025 ONLAT 25-000781/AABS-R

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before:

Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number:

25-000781/AABS

Case Name:

Sandra Mohammed v. TTC Insurance Company Limited

Written Submissions by:

For the Applicant:

Sherilyn Pickering, Counsel

For the Respondent:

Nabil Mahmood, Counsel

OVERVIEW

1On August 19, 2025, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s preliminary issue decision released July 29, 2025 (“decision”).

2Stemming from an incident that occurred on a TTC bus on November 3, 2022, and a request for benefits made pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (“Schedule”), the parties participated in a written hearing. In the decision, the adjudicator found the applicant was not entitled to accident benefits, pursuant to s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8.

3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or

c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

4The applicant relies on Rule 18.2(b) to support her request. She is seeking an order to vary the decision to find she is eligible for accident benefits.

5The respondent asks the Tribunal to dismiss the request.

RESULT

6The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.

8I find the applicant has not established a ground for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(b).

9As a limit to the general requirement under s. 268(1) of the Insurance Act that every “contract evinced by a motor vehicle liability policy” must provide for accident benefits, s. 268(1.1) provides the following exclusion for occupants of public transit vehicles:

Despite subsection (1) and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, no statutory accident benefits are payable in respect of an occupant of a public transit vehicle, in respect of an incident that occurs on or after the date this subsection comes into force, if the public transit vehicle did not collide with another automobile or any other object in the incident.

10The incident took place as described at paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision:

On November 3, 2022, the applicant was an occupant of a TTC bus. As the bus was about to enter the intersection, a fire truck with its emergency lights activated, travelled through the intersection. The vehicle ahead of the TTC bus came to a stop, and in response, the TTC bus made a sudden stop.

The TTC bus did not collide with the vehicle ahead of it or any other object.

11A central finding in the decision was that the adjudicator did not accept the applicant’s argument that she herself was “any other object” for the purposes of s. 268(1.1). This analysis is laid out, in part, from paragraphs 13 – 16 of the decision (emphasis added):

I find that the words that we are focused on when interpreting s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act are “collide with another automobile” or “collide with any other object in the incident”. However, it is also necessary to consider the surrounding words in order to provide colour to the meaning of the terms.

It is undisputed that the applicant was an “occupant” of a public transit vehicle, as she was a passenger on the TTC bus at the time of the incident. It is also undisputed the TTC bus did not collide with another automobile or any object external to the TTC bus. Therefore, the focus of this analysis is whether the TTC bus collided with any other object in the incident, namely the applicant herself. I do not accept the applicant’s submissions that she herself was “any other object in the incident”.

I agree that the terms “collide with”, “collision”, and “object” are not defined in the Insurance Act. While the applicant has provided the definitions of both “collide” and “object” in her submissions, I find that the ordinary meaning of these words must be read in the context of the provision. I further find that the entire language in s. 268(1.1) must be examined and not just the word “any other object”. When reading the full section, the words connote a separate and tangible thing that is outside of the bus.

I agree with the respondent that the meaning of these words in the context of the provision, clearly establishes that when a vehicle collides with any other object, it is the exterior of the vehicle that collides with the object. I further agree that the occupant cannot be the object, as she was an occupant inside the TTC bus and the TTC bus did not collide with her.

12The applicant highlights several alleged errors in the decision. First, the applicant claims the adjudicator did not provide sufficient reasons to explain her conclusion that “any other object” in s. 268(1.1) must mean something that is outside of the public transit vehicle. Second, the applicant submits that the adjudicator did not correctly consider the “broad nature of the wording” in s. 268(1.1), an error that runs counter to the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33 (“Barton”). Third, the applicant argues that the adjudicator erred by relying on the discussion of what constitutes a “Collision or Upset” in s. 7.1.2 of the Ontario Automobile Policy (Owner’s Policy) (“OAP-1”). Finally, the applicant asserts that the adjudicator incorrectly stated at paragraph 16 that “the TTC bus did not collide with her”. According to the applicant, video surveillance clearly shows she collided with the interior of the bus.

13First, I do not accept the applicant’s position that the adjudicator provided insufficient reasons to explain her determination that “any other object” must mean something outside of the public transit vehicle.

14As the Supreme Court noted in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (“Vavilov”) at paragraph 79, reasons ensure the fairness and legitimacy of administrative decision-making (citations removed):

Reasons explain how and why a decision was made. They help to show affected parties that their arguments have been considered and demonstrate that the decision was made in a fair and lawful manner. Reasons shield against arbitrariness as well as the perception of arbitrariness in the exercise of public power…

15Additionally, as stated in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) (“Baker”) at paragraph 39, reasons allow decisions to be questioned: “Reasons… are invaluable if a decision is to be appealed, questioned, or considered on judicial review”.

16Considering the principles set out in Vavilov and Baker, I conclude that the adjudicator’s reasons—while brief—provide a basis to understand the chain of reasoning she used to conduct her statutory analysis. After describing the basic principles of the modern approach to statutory interpretation from Vavilov, the adjudicator made the following findings. First, she determined that the applicant was an “occupant” under s. 268(1.1); she then assessed the meaning of words like “collide with” and “object” within the context of this provision; and she concluded that, as an “occupant”, the applicant could not be an “object”. The adjudicator further endorsed the arguments presented by the respondent in its submissions—arguments that focused on the purpose and intent of the legislation. Finally, she looked to the definition of “Collision or Upset” from OAP-1, as well as the arbitrator’s conclusions about the term “object” in Cusido v. TTC Insurance Company Limited, 2015 ONFSCDRS 176, to help bolster her interpretation of s. 268(1.1).

17Once again, these reasons are concise, but I do not find they are insufficient. As the reviewing decision-maker, I can follow the adjudicator’s chain of logic, such that I can conduct this reconsideration review. Overall, the decision does not appear to be arbitrary, and it adheres to the principles for sufficient reasons from Vavilov and Baker.

18Second, though the adjudicator does not cite Barton, I find the applicant has not demonstrated that she ignored this binding case law. According to the applicant, the Supreme Court ruled that “where Parliament uses broad words… it cannot be said to have intended to limit its application”. A similar argument was made in her preliminary issue hearing submissions.

19As is clear from paragraphs 13 – 16 quoted above, the adjudicator started her analysis of the words “object”, “collide with”, etc. from a broad and general position. Then, by applying the modern approach to statutory interpretation, she worked her way towards a more specific understanding of these words within the context of s. 268(1.1). The applicant has not shown how this analytical framework is erroneous.

20Third, I find the applicant has not demonstrated how removing the adjudicator’s consideration of the OAP-1 “would likely” have led her to reach a different result. The applicant claims that the definition of “Collision or Upset” from the OAP-1 is irrelevant to this dispute, since this definition relates to “one of the four types of optional coverages”. Accident benefits are mandatory, so—according to the applicant—this definition is an “irrelevant factor” for interpreting s. 268(1.1).

21Even if I accepted the applicant’s position, I find removing this consideration from the decision would not have likely resulted in a different outcome. As noted above, the OAP-1 definition forms part of a larger assessment of s. 268(1.1)—an assessment that included case law, a consideration of the parties’ positions, etc. I am not satisfied that taking out this one piece of the overall chain of reasoning would have likely led the adjudicator to a different conclusion about s. 268(1.1). A party requesting reconsideration must satisfy both parts of the test under Rule 18.2(b), and I find the applicant has not met this onus.

22Finally, I find the applicant’s argument about the adjudicator’s statement at paragraph 16 is an attempt to have the Tribunal conduct a fresh interpretation of s. 268(1.1), a type of re-litigation that is not appropriate for the reconsideration process. Briefly, while the applicant takes issue with the adjudicator’s comment at paragraph 16 that “the TTC bus did not collide with her”, this statement is not a finding that there was no contact between the applicant and the inside of the bus. Rather, the adjudicator was summarizing the outcome of her interpretation of the words “object” and “collide with” within the context of s. 268(1.1) (emphasis added):

I agree with the respondent that the meaning of these words in the context of the provision, clearly establishes that when a vehicle collides with any other object, it is the exterior of the vehicle that collides with the object. I further agree that the occupant cannot be the object, as she was an occupant inside the TTC bus and the TTC bus did not collide with her.

23Put another way, this statement was the conclusion of the adjudicator’s statutory interpretation, not a finding that there was no contact between the applicant and the inside of the bus.

24Taken together, the applicant has not met the standard under Rule 18.2(b). The request for reconsideration is dismissed.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

25The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

Craig Mazerolle

Vice-Chair

Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal