Mohammed v. TTC Insurance Company Limited, 2025 ONLAT 25-000781/AABS-PI
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 25-000781/AABS
In the matter of an Application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.
Between:
Sandra Mohammed
Applicant
and
TTC Insurance Company Limited
Respondent
PRELIMINARY ISSUE HEARING DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR:
Melanie Malach
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
Sherilyn J. Pickering, Counsel
Mercedes Lavoy, Counsel
For the Respondent:
Nabil Mahmood, Counsel
HEARD:
By Way of Written Submissions
OVERVIEW
1Sandra Mohammed, the applicant, was involved in an accident on November 3, 2022, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”). The applicant was denied benefits by TTC Insurance Company Limited, the respondent, and applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal – Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE IN DISPUTE
2The preliminary issue to be decided is:
i. Is the applicant entitled to accident benefits as a result of the incident or whether such benefits are barred by operation of section 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act.
RESULT
3The applicant is not entitled to accident benefits as a result of the incident and such benefits are barred by operation of section 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act.
ANALYSIS
4On November 3, 2022, the applicant was an occupant of a TTC bus. As the bus was about to enter the intersection, a fire truck with its emergency lights activated, travelled through the intersection. The vehicle ahead of the TTC bus came to a stop, and in response, the TTC bus made a sudden stop.
5The TTC bus did not collide with the vehicle ahead of it or any other object.
6The applicant submits that the force of the sudden stop resulted in physical contact between her and the interior of the TTC bus, which resulted in injuries. She therefore claims that the TTC bus collided with an object, namely her.
Law
7Section 268(1) of the Insurance Act provides:
268(1) Every contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability policy, including every such contract in force when the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule is made or amended, shall be deemed to provide for the statutory accident benefits set out in the Schedule and any amendments to the Schedule, subject to the terms, conditions, provisions, exclusions and limits set out in that Schedule.
Exception, public transit vehicles
(1.1) Despite subsection (1) and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, no statutory accident benefits are payable in respect of an occupant of a public transit vehicle, in respect of an incident that occurs on or after the date this subsection comes into force, if the public transit vehicle did not collide with another automobile or any other object in the incident.
Parties Submissions
8The respondent submits that the clear language of s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act and subsequent case law establishes that an occupant of a public transit vehicle cannot be an “object” for the purposes of s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act. The purpose and intent of the legislation would be defeated if this were the case. The respondent submits that as the applicant was an occupant located inside the TTC bus, and the bus did not collide with any other vehicle or any other object outside of the TTC Bus, the applicant is not entitled to claim accident benefits. The respondent submits that the Ontario Automobile Policy (Owner’s Policy) (OAP-1) speaks directly to the meaning of an automobile involved in a collision with an object and requires that the exterior of the automobile collide with the object.
9The applicant submits that “any other object” includes herself, and that the TTC bus collied with her in the incident. She submits that in analyzing the language of the provision, the words are to be read in their grammatical and ordinary sense. She submits that the definition of “collide” is “to come together with solid or direct impact” and there is no requirement that the external parts of the items are what come together. She submits that the definition of “object” is “something material that may be perceived by the senses” and there is no requirement in the definition that it not be a person.
10The applicant submits that the legislature’s use of the words “another automobile or any other object”, is broad and has no qualifications as to the nature, location or animation of the other automobile or object. She submits that had the legislature intended it to be limited to external automobiles or other objects, it could easily have said so. She therefore submits that if a public transit vehicle directly impacts any other material that can be perceived by the senses, such as a person, it qualifies.
The applicant herself does not constitute “any other object” for the purposes of s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act
11I find the applicant herself does not constitute “any other object” for the purposes of s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act.
12The modern approach to statutory interpretation is well-settled law and was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. At paragraph 117, the Court stated, “the words of a statute must be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.” The legislative intent can be understood only by reading the language chosen by the legislature in light of the purpose of the provision and the entire relevant context.
13I find that the words that we are focused on when interpreting s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act are “collide with another automobile” or “collide with any other object in the incident”. However, it is also necessary to consider the surrounding words in order to provide colour to the meaning of the terms.
14It is undisputed that the applicant was an “occupant” of a public transit vehicle, as she was a passenger on the TTC bus at the time of the incident. It is also undisputed the TTC bus did not collide with another automobile or any object external to the TTC bus. Therefore, the focus of this analysis is whether the TTC bus collided with any other object in the incident, namely the applicant herself. I do not accept the applicant’s submissions that she herself was “any other object in the incident”.
15I agree that the terms “collide with”, “collision”, and “object” are not defined in the Insurance Act. While the applicant has provided the definitions of both “collide” and “object” in her submissions, I find that the ordinary meaning of these words must be read in the context of the provision. I further find that the entire language in s. 268(1.1) must be examined and not just the word “any other object”. When reading the full section, the words connote a separate and tangible thing that is outside of the bus.
16I agree with the respondent that the meaning of these words in the context of the provision, clearly establishes that when a vehicle collides with any other object, it is the exterior of the vehicle that collides with the object. I further agree that the occupant cannot be the object, as she was an occupant inside the TTC bus and the TTC bus did not collide with her.
17I accept the respondent’s submission that the Ontario Automobile Policy (Owner’s Policy) (OAP-1) speaks directly to the meaning of an automobile involved in a collision with an object and requires that the exterior of the automobile collide with the object. Section 7.1.2 of the OAP reads:
i. Collision or Upset – we will pay for losses caused when a described automobile is involved in a collision with another object or tips over. Object includes:
a. Another automobile that is attached to the automobile,
b. The surface of the ground, and
c. Any object in or on the ground.
18I find that while I am not bound by FSCO decisions, the fact scenario in Christina Cusido v. TTC Insurance Company Limited, 2015 ONFSCDRS 176 (“Cusido”), is very similar to the facts before me, and I find it persuasive. I further find that this was the only case referred to by the parties that deals with s. 268(1.1) and a similar fact scenario. In Cusido, the applicant was a passenger on a public transit vehicle when, due to a brake application, her chest area came into contact with a stanchion pole. The Arbitrator concluded that the term “object” in the statute, when read in harmony with the scheme of the act and the purpose of the legislation, must mean an object outside of the public transit vehicle itself. The Arbitrator concluded that the plain meaning of s. 268(1.1) is that it is the outside of the bus (automobile) that must collide with another automobile or any other object.
19I find that the language in s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act clearly exempts a passenger on public transit bus from receiving entitlement to Statutory Accident Benefits, except where the public transit bus collides with an automobile or any other object that is external to it. I therefore find that the applicant has not proven on a balance of probabilities that the exemption in s. 268(1.1) applies, and she is not entitled to claim Statutory Accident Benefits.
ORDER
20The applicant is not entitled to accident benefits as a result of the incident and such benefits are barred by operation of section 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act.
Released: July 29, 2025
___________________________
Melanie Malach
Adjudicator