Peter K. Boeckle

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence actions arising from a fire that destroyed an historic mansion shortly after a plumber repaired a leaking pipe using a blowtorch.

At trial, the appellants did not call expert evidence on the standard of care, arguing the plumber's conduct was egregious.

The trial judge found the plumber's conduct was not egregious and that expert evidence was required to establish the standard of care for soldering.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proving a breach of the standard of care without expert evidence.

A plumber used an open flame torch to repair a leaking pipe in the basement of a heritage mansion.

Shortly after the repair was completed, a massive fire broke out, destroying the house.

The property owner and the condominium corporation's insurers brought a subrogated negligence claim against the plumbing company.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, as there was no evidence the downward-directed flame ignited combustibles in the adjacent joist space.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to establish a breach of the standard of care because they did not call expert evidence on the standard expected of a reasonably prudent plumber performing soldering work.

On five identical summary judgment motions, the moving parties sought dismissal of claims and third party and fourth party claims arising from a flood in a commercial office tower allegedly caused by a failed radiator pipe repair.

The responding party argued that a 1:06 a.m.

BAS alarm could have related to low water pressure and that the moving parties negligently failed to monitor or report it.

Applying the post-2010 summary judgment framework under Rule 20 and Hryniak, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The surveillance video and proposed further expert inspection did not amount to cogent admissible evidence capable of establishing a triable issue.

Summary judgment was granted and all claims against the moving parties were dismissed.

The minor plaintiff was allegedly attacked by the insureds' son on school property.

The plaintiff sued the son for intentional torts and the parents for negligent supervision.

The parents' homeowner's insurer denied coverage and refused to defend the action, relying on an exclusion clause for intentional or criminal acts by 'any person or any named insured'.

The parents successfully brought a motion for summary judgment declaring the insurer had a duty to defend them.

The insurer appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the exclusion clause ambiguous as to whether the intentional act of one insured excluded coverage for all insureds, including those sued in negligence.

The ambiguity was resolved in favour of the insureds.

Following the release of reasons for judgment allowing the appeals by the Canadian Red Cross Society and Canada, the Court of Appeal received written submissions on the costs of the trial.

The Court ordered that the Canadian Red Cross Society shall have its costs on a party-and-party scale from the plaintiffs, with no costs to or against Canada or Ontario.

The disposition of Bayer's costs ordered by the trial judge was not disturbed.

The plaintiffs, who suffered from Hemophilia B, contracted HIV from unheated Factor IX blood products distributed by the Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS).

They sued the CRCS, Bayer, and Ontario in negligence, alleging a delay in the introduction of heat-treated Factor IX.

The CRCS claimed over against Canada, alleging regulatory delay.

The trial judge found the CRCS and Canada liable for delaying the transition to heat-treated products.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the trial decision, finding that the CRCS and Canada did not breach their respective standards of care, as the delay was due to necessary regulatory approvals.

The Court also found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the dates of their infections, which was fatal to causation, and that the trial judge erred in drawing adverse inferences against the CRCS for not calling certain witnesses.

The plaintiffs contracted HIV from blood and blood products supplied by the Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS) between 1983 and 1985.

They alleged the CRCS was negligent in its blood donor screening procedures.

The trial judge found the CRCS breached its standard of care by using a 'good health' questionnaire rather than symptom-specific questions, but dismissed one plaintiff's action for failing to prove causation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the negligence findings and reversed the causation dismissal by applying a presumptive causal link.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the CRCS's appeals, holding that while the Court of Appeal erred in applying a presumptive causal link, causation was established under the material contribution test because the CRCS's failure to implement adequate screening measures materially contributed to the plaintiffs contracting HIV.