Amelia M. Leckey

A plumber used an open flame torch to repair a leaking pipe in the basement of a heritage mansion.

Shortly after the repair was completed, a massive fire broke out, destroying the house.

The property owner and the condominium corporation's insurers brought a subrogated negligence claim against the plumbing company.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, as there was no evidence the downward-directed flame ignited combustibles in the adjacent joist space.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to establish a breach of the standard of care because they did not call expert evidence on the standard expected of a reasonably prudent plumber performing soldering work.

A commercial premises was largely destroyed by fire, causing the tenant to cease operations and stop paying rent.

The landlord sought coverage for lost rental income from its insurer, who denied the claim on the basis that the tenant remained legally obligated to pay rent.

The motion judge found the lease was frustrated and ordered the insurer to pay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the result but for different reasons, finding that the loss of anticipated rental income triggered the business interruption coverage regardless of the tenant's continuing legal obligations.

The insurer was required to pay the claim and could subsequently pursue the tenant via subrogation.

The appellant insurer appealed a jury-based judgment awarding life insurance proceeds to the respondent beneficiary.

The sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of a change in insurability under s. 180(1)(c) of the Insurance Act.

The court held that, given the insurer's own delivery form and underwriting evidence, insurability was properly linked to the insured's state of health in the circumstances of this case.

The appeal was dismissed and appeal costs were fixed at $10,500 inclusive.

Following dismissal of an appeal from a master's order, the court considered written submissions regarding costs.

The court applied s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing proportionality and the factors governing costs awards.

The court also relied on appellate guidance that costs should be fair and reasonable rather than reflective of full indemnity for actual expenses.

Finding that the successful defendant was entitled to costs, the court awarded partial indemnity costs in a modest all‑inclusive amount.

At a status hearing under Rule 48.14(13) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants sought dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action for delay arising from a 2007 lawsuit relating to the purchase of a retirement home and alleged wrongdoing by vendors, real estate agents, and the plaintiffs’ former solicitor.

The court reviewed the procedural history, including delays in scheduling examinations for discovery and counsel availability, and applied the two‑part test requiring the plaintiffs to explain the delay and demonstrate an absence of prejudice to the defendants.

Although the litigation had progressed slowly and one plaintiff was medically incapable of discovery, the court found this was the first status hearing, the plaintiffs were not in breach of court orders, and a litigation timetable had been proposed.

The court concluded the plaintiffs should be given a “lifeline” to proceed.

A timetable was ordered requiring the trial record to be passed within twelve months.

The plaintiffs appealed a master's order dismissing their motion for answers to refusals arising from an examination for discovery.

The master held that because the action had been set down for trial, the plaintiffs required leave under rule 48.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to bring a refusals motion, and no such leave had been sought.

The appeal court reviewed conflicting jurisprudence on whether leave is required for refusals motions after an action is set down for trial.

The court endorsed the line of authority requiring leave and found that the master properly exercised discretion in declining to hear the motion in the absence of a request for leave.

The appeal was dismissed, though the plaintiffs remained at liberty to seek leave to bring a refusals motion.

Following the dismissal of an appeal, the successful parties sought costs of $17,790.17 on a partial indemnity basis.

The unsuccessful appellant argued that the claimed fees were excessive, particularly the time spent preparing the factum and the attendance time for the hearing.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principle that costs should be fair and reasonable rather than strictly reflective of actual legal expenses.

The court found that certain hours claimed for factum preparation were excessive and that the hearing occupied only a half day.

Costs were fixed at $14,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The defendant appealed a master’s order refusing to compel answers to discovery refusals and production of additional financial documents in a fatal motor vehicle accident action involving dependency claims under the Family Law Act.

The appeal challenged the master’s refusal to require the surviving spouse to answer questions about post‑accident income and dividends and to produce corporate and financial documents sought by the defendant’s expert.

The court held that the master applied the correct relevance test and did not commit a palpable and overriding error in determining that questions relating to post‑accident investment income were irrelevant to the dependency claim in the circumstances of a single‑income household.

The court also upheld the master’s discretionary decision to deny several production requests as premature or unnecessary, particularly where the materials had not been pursued during discovery or involved non‑parties.

The appeal was dismissed and the discovery rulings were upheld.

During a jury trial concerning entitlement to life insurance proceeds, the court issued a mid‑trial ruling on when a life insurance contract takes effect under s. 180(1) of the Insurance Act.

The dispute concerned whether the policy came into force on its stated effective date or only upon delivery, payment of the first premium, and the absence of any change in insurability.

The court held that ambiguous language in the application’s signature form did not displace the statutory requirements.

The contractual references to an “effective date” related only to the calculation of policy benefits and time periods, not the date the policy came into force.

Accordingly, s. 180(1) governed and the policy would only take effect if there had been no change in insurability between application and delivery.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking an order that the trial of a motor vehicle negligence action against the provincial transportation authority proceed in Hamilton rather than Peterborough, where the accident occurred.

The claim alleged highway disrepair under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act.

The court considered the statutory presumption under s. 33(9) that such actions be tried in the county where the default occurred, alongside the discretionary factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

After weighing the location of witnesses, the plaintiffs’ disabilities, the location of treating professionals, and the comparative convenience and costs of each venue, the court concluded that the interests of justice favoured Hamilton.

The presumption in favour of the accident location was rebutted due to the significant hardship and logistical inefficiencies associated with holding the trial in Peterborough.

The purchaser bought a house and subsequently discovered serious latent structural and plumbing defects.

The vendors had completed a Seller Property Information Sheet (SPIS) indicating no ongoing problems, which the real estate agent, acting for both parties, passed on without verification.

The purchaser recovered under her title insurance policy but also sued the vendors and the agent.

The trial judge found the vendors liable for negligent misrepresentation but dismissed the claims against the agent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the vendors' liability and the application of the private insurance exception to prevent deduction of the insurance proceeds.

The Court allowed the purchaser's cross-appeal, finding the real estate agent negligent for failing to verify the vendors' representations or recommend an independent inspection, and apportioned fault equally between the vendors and the agent.

The child, a Crown Ward with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder and other mental health issues, applied for release from a secure treatment program.

The child argued that the criteria for emergency admission under the Child and Family Services Act were not met.

The Board reviewed the child's history of aggressive behaviour, threats, and previous unsuccessful placements.

The Board found that the child had a mental disorder, posed a risk of serious bodily harm, and that the secure treatment program was the least restrictive and most appropriate method of treatment.

The application for release was denied.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action for damages and breach of confidence against the respondent.

The appellant had provided the respondent with confidential discount information belonging to a third-party medical network during a business pitch.

The respondent subsequently contracted directly with the third party, excluding the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant was not the entity entitled to the confidence and that the respondent had not misused the information, as it was used exactly for its intended purpose of evaluating the third party's services.

Following a preliminary issue hearing where the applicant was precluded from proceeding to arbitration on attendant care benefits, the insurer sought its expenses.

On consent of the parties, the arbitrator ordered the applicant to pay the insurer's expenses in the amount of $5,000, payable in equal monthly instalments over six months.

If the applicant defaults, the insurer may request an order for the balance of the expenses originally sought.