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The Court of Appeal upheld the contextual interpretation of a zoning by-law limiting commercial floor area.
The appellant sought a declaration that a zoning by-law provision limiting gross leasable commercial floor area for a "community shopping centre" to 4,645 m² (50,000 ft²) did not apply to developments with five or fewer separate spaces for lease or occupancy.
The appellant argued that "community shopping centre" must be a type of "shopping centre" as defined in the by-law, which requires six or more separated spaces.
The application judge dismissed the application, finding that "community shopping centre" was a distinct term from "shopping centre" and that the provision applied regardless of the number of units.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the application judge's contextual interpretation of the by-law in light of the Official Plan.
The court held that a zoning size restriction applies regardless of the number of units.
The applicant sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of a zoning by-law provision concerning the maximum gross leasable commercial floor area for a "community shopping centre" on its property.
The applicant argued that the 50,000 square foot limitation only applied if the development contained six or more separated spaces, based on the general definition of "Shopping Centre" in the by-law.
The respondent municipality argued that the limitation applied to any project irrespective of the number of units.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the definition of "Shopping Centre" did not apply to "community shopping centre" in the specific context of the by-law and Official Plan, and that the size limitation was intended to apply to the square footage of a structure accommodating a community shopping area, not based on the number of units.
Appeal of traffic ticket abated following appellant's death; judgment below stayed.
The appellant died after leave to appeal a $95 traffic ticket was granted.
The appellant's counsel moved to substitute a personal representative to continue the appeal, while the municipal prosecutor sought to abate the appeal due to mootness.
The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its jurisdiction to continue the appeal, noting that the matter had no practical consequences for the estate, was not evasive of review, and lacked a sufficient factual record to decide an issue with province-wide implications.
The appeal was abated and the judgment below was stayed.
Leave to appeal granted to determine calculation of time for filing notice of intention to appear.
The applicant was convicted of speeding after mailing a notice of intention to appear that was received after the 15-day period stipulated on the Offence Notice.
The applicant sought leave to appeal, arguing that under Rule 4 of Regulation 200, the calculation of time meant his notice was filed on time, and that the Offence Notice failed to comply with the Provincial Offences Act by not specifying the manner of delivery.
The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal on these two grounds, finding they raised questions of law of general application concerning the calculation of time limits and the sufficiency of prescribed forms.
