Paul R. Cassan

The plaintiff Beechhill Capital Corp. brought a motion for summary judgment on a promissory note in the amount of $1,372,230.00 issued by the defendants.

The defendants acknowledged the debt but raised defences including lack of consideration, statute of limitations, oppression claims, and misrepresentation regarding the value of pledged HEXO shares.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the defences lacked merit.

The court determined that valuable consideration existed through antecedent debt and forbearance, the limitation period had not expired as the note was renewed, oppression was not a valid defence to a promissory note, and the alleged misrepresentations could not have induced the defendants to sign the note since the debt predated the note and the defendants had knowledge of the share dispositions.

Cette décision porte sur une motion de Facinet-Bigus Bangoura visant à obtenir l'autorisation de modifier sa déclaration introductive d’instance contre l’Université Algoma.

La Cour examine la suffisance des causes d’action proposées, notamment en diffamation, discrimination, violation d’équité procédurale et rupture de contrat.

La juge Perron conclut que la déclaration amendée ne révèle aucune cause d’action fondée contre l’université et que l’action constitue un recours abusif visant à contester une décision académique déjà tranchée.

La motion est rejetée et des dépens sont accordés à la défenderesse.

The appellant appealed the municipality's refusal to approve a consent application for an easement over a private access driveway serving four waterfront lots.

Prior to the hearing, the parties and a local road committee reached a settlement.

Based on uncontested expert planning evidence, the Tribunal found the proposed consent consistent with the Provincial Policy Statement and in conformity with the Official Plan, as the existing private road location was more appropriate for the topography than the originally planned route.

The appeal was allowed and provisional consent granted subject to the conditions in the settlement.

The appellant land developer brought a $6 million breach of contract action against a not-for-profit environmental association and its members, alleging that the association's president had breached a settlement agreement by testifying before the Ontario Municipal Board regarding the ecological impact of the appellant's proposed subdivision development.

The respondents brought a pre-trial motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation.

The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondents met the threshold burden under s. 137.1(3) and that the appellant failed to satisfy either the merits-based hurdle under s. 137.1(4)(a) or the public interest weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b).

The Court provided comprehensive guidance on the proper interpretation and application of Ontario's anti-SLAPP framework, clarifying the standards of 'satisfies,' 'arises from,' 'substantial merit,' and the public interest weighing exercise.

The decision affirms that freedom of expression and public participation in democratic processes are fundamental values that the anti-SLAPP legislation was enacted to protect.

The defendant corporation brought a disclosure application seeking either a stay of proceedings or a disclosure order, alleging the prosecution failed to disclose relevant information regarding a guarding project conducted at the defendant's facility between 2007 and 2009.

The defendant was charged with failing to ensure prescribed measures and procedures were carried out in the workplace, contrary to the Occupational Health and Safety Act, specifically regarding failure to guard a machine.

The application was heard on the first day of trial.

The court denied the application, finding that the requested information was not in the possession of the prosecution, was not part of the fruits of the investigation, and was not obviously relevant to the defendant's case given the significant time lapse and modifications made to the equipment between 2007-2009 and the alleged 2016 offence date.

The Township of Prince appealed the property assessment for 326 Ironside Drive.

In a previous interim decision, the Board found a portion of the property was in the commercial property class.

The Township submitted that the entire detached garage should be classified as commercial and provided apportionment values for the 2012, 2013, and 2014 taxation years.

As the other parties did not challenge these values, the Board accepted the Township's submissions and apportioned the property assessment accordingly.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability and age following her termination.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed because the applicant had signed a full and final release.

The applicant argued the release should be set aside due to economic duress and misrepresentation.

The Tribunal found that financial pressure alone does not constitute economic duress and that the respondent did not make any false representations regarding the business reasons for her termination.

The Tribunal concluded that proceeding with the application would be an abuse of process and dismissed the application.

The self-represented applicants filed a notice of application containing allegations of impropriety against the respondent municipality's lawyers and CAO.

The applicants subsequently abandoned the application.

The respondent sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court held that the unproven and unfounded allegations of impropriety warranted an elevated costs award.

The court fixed costs payable by the applicants to the respondent at $17,696.47.

The respondent son brought a motion to disqualify the applicant's solicitor due to a conflict of interest.

The solicitor had previously acted for the respondent mother in the transfer of her property, but was now representing the applicant in an application to declare the mother incapable of managing property.

The court found that the solicitor was in a conflict of interest because he was attacking the legal work done during the first retainer and could potentially be called as a witness regarding the mother's capacity.

The motion was granted and the solicitor was removed as counsel.

The defendant university moved to set aside a default judgment, writ of execution, and garnishment arising from a dispute over a student recruitment and satellite campus arrangement.

Applying the five-factor test for setting aside default judgment, the court held that the defendant had shown an arguable defence, particularly because the judgment had been based on a liquidated contractual claim rather than the pleaded fiduciary duty theory emphasized by the plaintiff.

The court also found a genuine issue for trial as to whether the parties' relationship was contractual or fiduciary in nature.

The motion was granted, the garnished funds were to be returned except for $52,000, and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The defendant corporation moved to set aside a default judgment obtained after a damages hearing arising from the sale of allegedly faulty woodworking equipment.

The court applied the test under Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring the moving party to explain the default, bring the motion without undue delay, and demonstrate a triable defence.

Although the defendant advanced an arguable defence, the court found the corporate principal knew of service of the statement of claim, delayed bringing the motion for strategic reasons, and provided unreliable affidavit evidence.

The court also found prejudice to the plaintiff due to the death of a key witness involved in the transaction.

Balancing the interests of justice, the motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.

The Municipality of Wawa applied to the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal to set aside a Review Officer's order that invalidated its 2006 amended pay equity plan.

The Tribunal heard partial evidence regarding whether changed circumstances justified the 2006 plan and whether the new plan detrimentally impacted employees.

Finding it lacked sufficient evidence to determine the potential detrimental impacts and the proper valuation of a specific job class, the Tribunal directed the Municipality to produce complete job descriptions and evaluation documents and referred the matter to the Registrar to schedule further hearing dates.

The respondent requested the dismissal of the human rights application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that the substance of the application—whether the respondent could have accommodated the applicant's permanent medical restrictions in 2003—had been appropriately dealt with in WSIB proceedings.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the WSIAT decision relied upon by the respondent only determined the re-employment obligation and did not address the accommodation issue.