Michally Iny

The offender was sentenced after a jury conviction for repeated sexual offences against his stepdaughter over several years and physical and sexual offences against his biological daughter.

Applying the governing sentencing principles for sexual offences against children, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, the extreme breach of parental trust, the duration of abuse, the youth of the complainants, the offender's prior sexual assault record, and his absence of remorse or rehabilitative insight.

The court fixed consecutive component sentences totalling 12 years, but reduced the aggregate sentence to 10 years under the totality principle.

The court also imposed DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA, non-communication, and s. 161 prohibition orders.

The accused brought an application challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code, which eliminated peremptory challenges and replaced lay triers with the trial judge for challenges for cause.

The accused argued these changes violated his rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the amendments did not infringe the accused's right to an independent and impartial jury, nor did they violate principles of fundamental justice.

The court also held that the amendments were procedural in nature and applied retrospectively to the accused's trial.

The accused, charged with sexual assault involving allegations of drugging the victim, brought a pre-trial motion to prevent the mention of his stage name, 'Bill Cosby', in front of the jury.

The defence argued the name would create an odious association with the notorious allegations against the American entertainer of the same name.

The court directed the Crown to make its best efforts to present the case without reference to the stage name, noting that the ruling could be reconsidered if the Crown is unable to fully and fairly present its case.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused following his arrest for sexual assault, while the accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found that the accused's initial statements to police were voluntary and admissible.

However, during a subsequent video interview, the police failed to ensure the accused understood his right to counsel after he expressed confusion.

The court held this was a serious breach of s. 10(b) and excluded the video interview statements and a buccal swab obtained for DNA analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant brought an application to stay his criminal charges, arguing that the 32-month delay to trial violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court analyzed the chronology of the proceedings, attributing portions of the delay to intake, institutional delay, and the applicant's tactical decisions regarding the preliminary hearing.

The court concluded that the total institutional delay of 17.75 months across two levels of court was within administrative guidelines and that the prejudice suffered by the applicant was largely inherent to being charged with serious offences.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of robbery using an imitation firearm.

Prior to sentencing, the accused brought an application for a mistrial or to re-open the trial, arguing that the late disclosure of a 911 tape breached his section 7 Charter right to make full answer and defence.

The court applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence and dismissed the application, finding that the evidence was not fresh, the defence lacked due diligence, and the evidence would not reasonably be expected to have affected the outcome of the trial.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal stabbing of his wife of 32 years.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 18 years, while the defence argued for 10 to 12 years.

The court considered the brutality of the killing, the gratuitous violence, the victim's suffering, and the offender's lack of remorse, balancing these against his lack of a criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with a minimum period of parole ineligibility of 15 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the deceased victim to police officers, firefighters, and paramedics shortly after a stabbing.

The defence objected on the basis that the statements were hearsay.

The court considered whether the statements qualified as dying declarations, res gestae statements, or were admissible under the principled approach to hearsay.

The judge concluded that although the strict requirements for dying declarations were not met, the statements were admissible as res gestae and also satisfied the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled hearsay exception.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her medical malpractice claims against the respondent doctor, who inadvertently punctured her radial artery while attempting to aspirate a ganglion cyst.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict and nil damages assessment were unreasonable, and that the trial judge misdirected the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence and conclude the doctor met the standard of care for informed consent.

The court also found no reviewable errors in the trial judge's jury charge and held that the standard practice for removing a ganglion cyst is not fraught with obvious risks.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action against the respondent family physician.

The appellants alleged the respondent over-prescribed narcotics, causing the appellant husband's addiction.

The motions judge dismissed the action as statute-barred under the one-year limitation period in the Regulated Health Professions Act, finding the appellants knew the material facts when they complained to the College of Physicians and Surgeons over two years before commencing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the discoverability rule did not postpone the limitation period as the appellants were aware of the material facts and did not require an independent medical opinion to commence the action.

Following an appeal where the appellant was partially successful, the parties sought a determination on costs.

The respondent had made a pre-trial offer to settle for $275,000, and the appeal reduced her damages to $394,884.52, which still exceeded the offer.

The trial costs order of party and party costs to the offer date and solicitor and client costs thereafter was maintained.

For the appeal, the appellant succeeded on two of six issues.

The court awarded the appellant one-third of its party and party costs of the appeal, noting the respondent's pre-appeal offer did not address all issues on which the appellant succeeded.

The plaintiff, a senior communications consultant, was wrongfully dismissed after one year of employment.

A jury awarded her 12 months' notice (including a three-month Wallace extension for bad faith) and $75,000 in punitive damages.

The employer appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 12-month notice period, finding the employer's conduct in maintaining cause allegations and withholding commissions justified the Wallace extension.

However, the court set aside the punitive damages award, finding no independent actionable wrong and that the generous compensatory award was sufficient to deter the employer's conduct.

The court also ordered a new trial on the limited issue of whether the plaintiff's compensation included revenues from the Montreal office, as the trial judge had unfairly precluded the employer from leading evidence on this point.