David Freedman

Following earlier reasons determining that insurance proceeds formed part of an estate and that a claimant qualified as a spouse under s. 57 of the Succession Law Reform Act, the court addressed costs of the proceeding.

The applicants sought full indemnity costs payable from the estate after partial success at trial and on an earlier motion.

The respondents argued the requested costs were excessive and should be denied or reserved.

The court held that a proper costs determination required resolution of outstanding issues, including whether the claimant qualified as a dependant and the amount and form of support to be ordered.

Costs of the prior motion, preliminary motion, and trial phase were therefore reserved to the judge who will ultimately determine the remaining issues.

The applicants, the deceased's common-law partner and their child, sought dependants' relief from the deceased's estate.

The central issue was whether a $1 million life insurance policy, which the deceased had been ordered to maintain with his estranged wife as the irrevocable beneficiary in prior family law proceedings, was available to all dependants under s. 72(1)(f) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court held that the deceased still 'owned' the policy despite the court orders, and the estranged wife was not a 'creditor' under s. 72(7).

The policy proceeds were therefore deemed part of the estate for dependants' relief purposes.

The court also found the common-law partner met the definition of 'spouse' under the Act.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs’ claim concerning a transfer of real property allegedly gifted by the parties’ parents to the defendant.

The plaintiffs alleged the transfer should be voided based on mental incapacity of the donors, undue influence, and alleged oral promises that the property would pass to them as part of an estate plan.

The court reviewed the test for striking pleadings under Rule 21 and the “plain and obvious” standard.

While certain arguments based on the Statute of Frauds and evidentiary issues were premature at the pleading stage, the court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the pleadings could not sustain the relief sought.

The motion to strike was allowed and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The applicant, who was pregnant with the deceased's child at the time of his death, brought a motion for interim support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The deceased's ex-wife opposed the motion, arguing the applicant was not a dependant and that the deceased's life insurance policy was not available for support due to an irrevocable beneficiary designation in her favour.

The court held that the applicant was a dependant and that the life insurance proceeds were available to satisfy the support claim under s. 72 of the Act.

The court ordered $20,000 in interim support to be paid from the insurance proceeds.

Following a successful motion by certain beneficiaries to strike a will challenge on the basis of estoppel, the court determined costs arising from the motion.

The unsuccessful parties argued that costs should be paid from the estate due to the alleged novelty of applying estoppel to bar a will challenge within the limitation period and contended the claimed costs were excessive.

The court rejected that position, emphasizing the modern principle that estate litigation costs are not automatically payable from the estate.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for the successful moving parties and reduced certain billed amounts for duplication and excess.

Costs were ordered payable personally by the unsuccessful challengers rather than from estate assets.

The moving parties sought to strike a will challenge brought by an estate trustee and her son concerning the validity of the deceased’s 2010 primary and secondary wills.

The estate trustee had administered aspects of the estate for over a year, including paying significant estate taxes, relying on the wills in dealings with third parties, and exercising authority as estate trustee.

The court held that her conduct created an assumption among the parties that the wills were valid and that others relied on that assumption to their detriment, particularly in relation to complex estate planning transactions and tax consequences arising from an estate freeze.

Applying the doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, the court concluded that the estate trustee was barred from challenging the wills.

The son’s parallel challenge was also struck because he lacked independent knowledge of the estate and acted as a proxy for the trustee.