COURT FILE NO.: CR-21-00000959-0000

DATE: 2026 02 24

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEE N:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Jelena Vlacic and Sydney Hopkins, for the Applicant

Applicant

• and -

L.L

Anthony Bugo, for the Respondent

Respondent

HEARD: January 16 th , 2026.

RESTRICTION ON PUBLICATION

Pursuant to an order of this court, issued under s.486.4(1) of the Criminal Code , no information that could serve to identify the complainant in this prosecution shall be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

This decision has been anonymized so that it complies with this direction.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LEMAY J

[ 1 ] After a judge alone trial, I convicted the offender, L.L., of 5 charges in relation to two separate incidents. Both incidents involved the offender’s then romantic partner, K.D. I am now required to impose sentence.

[ 2 ] Flowing from the first incident, on the evening of May 18 th and 19 th , 2019, I convicted L.L. of uttering a death threat to K.D., uttering a threat to burn K.D.’s house down and a sexual assault on K.D. The sexual assault involved L.L. forcing K.D. to perform oral sex on him. These were counts 3,4 and 5 on the indictment

[ 3 ] Flowing from the second incident, on the evening of June 15 th and 16 th , 2019, I found L.L. guilty of two offences, causing damage by fire to K.D.’s residence and breaking and entering K.D.’s residence for the purposes of committing an indictable offence. These were counts 8 and 9 on the indictment.

Facts

a) The Offences

[ 4 ] As this was a judge-alone trial, my factual findings are set out in my detailed reasons ( 2025 ONSC 4097 ), and these findings continue to apply on sentencing. I will not repeat those reasons here but will summarize the points that are most relevant to my reasons for sentence.

The May 18-19, 2019, Incident

[ 5 ] As I have indicated, at the time of this incident, L.L. and K.D. were in a romantic relationship. That relationship had started approximately six months previously, but they had known each other for some longer period of time.

[ 6 ] L.L. was found guilty of uttering threats to K.D.’s person, uttering threats to burn down K.D.’s house and coercing K.D. to perform oral sex on L.L. against her will. The events started on the evening of May 18 th , 2019, when a barbecue was held at K.D.’s house. K.D. lived in a home with her father, but he was not home that day. L.L. had been drinking before the barbecue began. Some friends, C.S. and C.D., came over and joined K.D. and L.L.

[ 7 ] K.D. has two children, a daughter and a son, from a previous relationship. She went and picked the children up from their father’s house around 9:00 p.m., brought them home and put them to bed. They were in the house for all of the events that subsequently happened that evening. Once K.D.’s children were put to bed, C.S. and C.D. left about 9:30 p.m. By this point, L.L. had also consumed some of K.D.’s clonazepam as well as some cocaine.

[ 8 ] Some videos were taken by K.D. of some of the interactions between her and L.L. after C.D. and C.S. had left. During these interactions, L.L. was looking for a bottle of whisky that K.D. had hidden, spraying her with whipping cream and throwing flowers at her. After these videos were taken, L.L. locked K.D. out of her house. K.D. got back into the house, and she and L.L. continued to argue.

[ 9 ] L.L. then left in K.D.’s vehicle. While he was gone, he broke one of the windows in K.D.’s car. He returned about twenty minutes later and was angry with K.D. K.D then called C.S. and asked him to come and take L.L. away. Shortly after K.D. called C.S., L.L. smashed K.D.’s cellphone while they were continuing to fight. C.S. then arrived and took L.L. to his house.

[ 10 ] Shortly after arriving at C.S.’s house, L.L. made his way back to K.D.’s house. She had locked the doors and gone upstairs to bed. However, L.L. was able to enter the house through a basement window that he knew was unlocked. When L.L. arrived back in the house, he went upstairs where K.D. was in bed with one of her children, grabbed her by the throat and made a comment along the lines of “so you want to call people”. There were some words exchanged, and K.D.’s son, who was an infant at the time, woke up. K.D. had her daughter’s tablet in bed with her and L.L. noticed the tablet and took it.

[ 11 ] The two of them then went downstairs with the baby. At this point, L.L.’s mood was oscillating back and forth between a state of anger and a state of apology. K.D. was holding her infant son, and L.L. was demanding that she give him the baby. At one point in this interaction, L.L. uttered some threats such as “I’ll fucking kill you all” and threatening to burn K.D.’s house with her children in it.

[ 12 ] Ultimately, K.D. calmed L.L. down, went back upstairs and put the baby to bed. She then came back downstairs and talked to L.L. for approximately an hour. She then told L.L. she was going to check on the children and go to bed. L.L. allowed her to do that.

[ 13 ] Then, when K.D. was lying in bed with one of the children, she heard L.L. come upstairs. L.L. started to call out to K.D. in a low voice, asking her to come to her father’s bedroom. She said no. L.L. called her a couple more times and then got angry, and said words to the effect of “come to your fucking dad’s room now.”

[ 14 ] K.D. got up out of bed and met L.L. in the hallway. L.L. again told her to go to her dad’s bedroom. Then, he said words to the effect of “you are going to suck my fucking dick, or I’m going to kill you and your kids.” K.D. then proceeded to perform oral sex on L.L. for approximately ten minutes. She then left and went to sleep.

[ 15 ] L.L. and K.D. discussed this incident the next day, and L.L. had no memory of it. Over the next month, L.L. and K.D. ultimately decided to break up.

The June 15-16, 2019, Incident

[ 16 ] On the evening of June 15 th , 2019, a birthday party was being held for both C.S. and K.D. at the house where C.S. lived with his parents, his partner C.D. and their child. As I have noted, L.L. and K.D. had broken up a couple of days previously. However, L.L. was invited to the party because K.D. wanted him there.

[ 17 ] L.L. arrived at the party around 7:00 p.m. and consumed some cocaine. He also drank some beer. He left around 8:30 p.m. At that time, C.S. and another friend attempted to prevent L.L. from leaving because he had been drinking and consuming cocaine and it was not safe for him to drive. L.L. ultimately evaded C.S. and their other friend and drove away. He was gone for approximately an hour and a half.

[ 18 ] When he returned around 10:00 p.m., he tried to persuade K.D. to leave with him. She refused. L.L. then left the party again. Once again, he evaded some friends who were attempting to prevent him from driving away in his vehicle.

[ 19 ] At approximately 11:30 p.m., L.L. returned to C.S.’s house and was banging on the back door demanding to be admitted. C.S.’s mother, K.S., had known L.L. for a very long time. She let him into the house to try and talk to him. L.L. then stormed around the house looking for K.D., who had been concealing herself on the couch immediately to the left of the patio doors where L.L. had entered the house. When L.L. went upstairs, K.D. went downstairs.

[ 20 ] After running through the house looking for K.D., L.L. was escorted out of the house by C.S. He came back almost immediately, as he had forgotten his cellphone. L.L. left again, while K.D. remained at the party.

[ 21 ] Sometime much later in the evening, around 2:30 a.m. on June 16 th , 2019, L.L. texted K.D. and said “should of just talked to me”. Very shortly thereafter, emergency responders were called to the residence K.D. lived at in order to respond to fires. Fortunately, no one was home. Both K.D.’s children and her father were elsewhere.

[ 22 ] When emergency services arrived at K.D.’s residence, they discovered that three separate fires had been set in K.D.’s house. One was in the laundry room in the basement. A second was in the storage closet under the basement stairs. The third, which did not really catch, was in the living room where L.L. had attempted to set the curtains on fire. For the reasons I explained, I found that all three of those fires were intentionally set by L.L.

b) The Offender

[ 23 ] Before imposing sentence on L.L., it is important to understand his personal history. To assist in understanding that history, I had the following material:

a) A pre-sentence report (“PSR”);

b) A series of “recovery materials” showing how L.L. has managed the addictions issues that he has since the offences;

c) More than thirty letters of support from family members, friends, community leaders and other people in his support network;

d) A package of materials on the advocacy work that L.L. has done in terms of mental health and addictions.

[ 24 ] L.L. is currently 33. At the time of the offences, he was 27 years old. When L.L. was 8 years old, he was diagnosed both with ADHD and with a learning disability. During his primary school, he was bullied by other kids. He was also enrolled in some special education programming to address his learning needs. He finished high school but did not pursue any post-secondary education.

[ 25 ] L.L. has had serious addiction issues, and he has recently become sober. The addiction issues arose when he was a teenager. He began experimenting with alcohol and marijuana. By the middle of high school, the use of addictive substances was a daily event. L.L. was using marijuana every day and was drinking alcohol every weekend, except when he was playing hockey.

[ 26 ] A significant part of the reason that L.L. developed addictions was because of events that had taken place when he was in high school, although the use of these substances began before these events. L.L. testified that he had a girlfriend, S., when he was in high school. This relationship lasted throughout high school.

[ 27 ] However, when he was 16, L.L. went with his family, and with S. and her mother M. to the Dominican Republic. M. performed a sex act on L.L. during this trip, and they began a clandestine relationship that lasted for five years. L.L. continued with his relationship with S. and, during this time period, worked for S.’s father B. S’s father and mother were married at the time.

[ 28 ] Understandably, L.L. testified that he found this experience both emotionally confusing and psychologically damaging to him (my words). It had a significant negative effect on his schooling and appears to have been part of the reason why his addiction disorder became as serious as it was. This would clearly have been a scarring experience. It was made worse when L.L. and his family reported it to the police. The police investigated and determined that it was consensual, and L.L. was over the age of 16. After M. was investigated by the police, she told people that it was L.L. that had blackmailed her into engaging in the sexual encounters. This did not assist L.L. in coming to terms with what had happened and ruined some of his friendships.

[ 29 ] After high school, L.L. began working in the drywallers union, as well as working doing painting and security. He also began to use cocaine on a regular basis, and his substance abuse (of both cocaine and alcohol) escalated substantially. This negatively affected his ability to maintain employment, and he did not maintain stable employment during this time period. He also began dealing drugs.

[ 30 ] In this time period, L.L. was diagnosed with PTSD as a result of the sexual abuse he reported suffering at the hands of M., as well as with a severe depressive disorder. L.L. has reported a history of three suicide attempts.

[ 31 ] L.L.’s drinking and cocaine use continued up to the time that he met K.D. It is clear that he was an addict and that his addiction disorder was active during this time period. Their relationship lasted about six months and ended as I have described above.

[ 32 ] After he was arrested on June 16 th , 2019, L.L. entered a residential treatment program and completed a 35-day rehabilitation program. He then had a period of sobriety. During this period of sobriety, he met P.M., who was also a recovering addict. They met through Alcoholics Anonymous in February of 2021, became friends and were then in a relationship. By the summer of 2021, they were engaged. The relationship had some tumultuous moments, and the two of them broke up and got back together again a couple of times.

[ 33 ] The relationship between L.L. and P.M. ended for good in November of 2022. At that point, L.L. was charged with various offences. He had been out on bail for the charges stemming from the two 2019 incidents, and I will address the bail conditions below. However, in November of 2022, L.L. was taken into custody and faced various charges as a result of the end of his relationship with P.M. He appears to have spent approximately three months in custody.

[ 34 ] In October of 2023, L.L. pled guilty to one count of criminal harassment pursuant to section 264 of the Criminal Code and two breaches of probation. The remaining charges were withdrawn. L.L. was given a conditional sentence for these charges, as well as credit for 90 days pre-sentence custody, so his record shows that he was in custody for four and a half months. He was also on probation for a period of two years.

[ 35 ] L.L. reports having found sobriety while in custody in January of 2023 and having remained sober since. He completed a second 35-day residential program in the spring of 2023. The materials filed by L.L. also show that he attended the PAR program, has taken an anger management course and has taken other courses designed to assist him in self-improvement. He has also taken courses and programs that will assist him in sharing his story with others so that they can also learn from it.

[ 36 ] L.L. has also become an advocate and regular speaker on the subject of addictions and mental health. The reference letters that were provided by his friends and family speak to his genuine efforts to put his past errors behind him, while learning from them and helping others in the same position. The rehabilitation that L.L. has engaged in since January of 2023 is both significant and commendable.

[ 37 ] At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, L.L. was given the right of allocution. He declined to say anything in addition to what his counsel had already said. However, the PSR states that, although L.L. does not recall these incidents, he expressed remorse for his actions and acknowledged the harm that had been caused to K.D., her father and K.D.’s children.

c) The Victim Impact Statements

[ 38 ] K.D. and her father A.C. provided victim impact statements. These statements were in writing and read out to the Court during the sentencing hearing.

[ 39 ] K.D.’s statement speaks to the fact that, with the sexual assault, L.L. violated her body, her trust and her sense of safety. K.D.’s statement also speaks to the fact that this violation took place in K.D.’s home, which should have been a safe haven for her and her children.

[ 40 ] In terms of the arson, K.D. and her family lost many keepsakes and mementos that could never be replaced. More importantly, the arson took away the sense of stability and security that her family had built around their home. K.D. also spoke of the financial losses that the arson have caused for her family, particularly in these tough economic times.

[ 41 ] Finally, K.D. spoke about the damaging effect of having all of these events happen in a situation where her children could have been put at risk. For her, these events took away her feeling of safety and security and have caused significant anxiety and distress. The anxiety and distress have affected her children, both because they see their mother suffering and because it has caused K.D. to have struggles parenting her children.

[ 42 ] A.C. spoke about the destruction of many family keepsakes and mementos. He also spoke about the stress, pain and suffering caused by both the arson and the other things that L.L. did to K.D. that led to these convictions. He spoke in particular about the helplessness (my word) of having to see K.D. suffer with the memories of what L.L. did to her.

The Positions of the Parties

[ 43 ] The Crown seeks a sentence of seven (7) years incarceration, apportioned as follows:

a) Four years for Count 5, the sexual assault;

b) Six months concurrent to Count 5 for Count 3, uttering threats to kill;

c) Six months concurrent to Count 5 for Count 4, uttering threats to property;

d) Three years for Count 8, the arson, to be served consecutive to the time for Counts 3-5; and

e) Three years for Count 9, the break and enter, to be served concurrently to Count 8 but consecutive to Counts 3 to 5.

[ 44 ] The Crown seeks a global sentence of 7 years for the offences. The Crown argues that, but for the principle of totality, the appropriate sentence on Count 5 should be five (5) years incarceration.

[ 45 ] The Crown also seeks the following ancillary orders:

a) DNA order pursuant to s. 487.051 to attach to all counts;

b) Non-communication order pursuant to s. 743.21 in respect of K.D. and her immediate family members;

c) Weapons prohibition pursuant to s. 109 for life to attach to Counts 3,4,5 and 8.

d) SOIRA order pursuant to section 490.012 for 20 years.

[ 46 ] The defence seeks a global sentence of a conditional sentence of two years less a day, with the following conditions:

a) Between two thirds and the entire sentence to be subject to house arrest and GPS monitoring with expections for employment, medical emergencies, one five-hour period weekly to obtain the necessities of life and any other reason pre-approved by his supervisor.

b) Not to possess any weapons as defined in the Criminal Code ;

c) No contact with K.D. or A.D.

d) Seek and continue counselling for alcohol and drug addiction any mental health counselling as directed by the supervisor.

e) Complete a pre-determined number of community service hours.

f) Not to possess or consume any alcohol or any intoxicating substances unless directed by a medical professional.

[ 47 ] The two-year conditional sentence would be followed by three years of probation with conditions similar to the ones listed above, but with a curfew instead of house arrest.

[ 48 ] Defence agrees to the s. 109 weapons order and the DNA order, but opposes L.L. being included in SOIRA.

[ 49 ] Finally, I should note that, when L.L. was arrested, he spent 23 days in jail before he was given bail. The parties agree that thirty-five days credit should be given for this pre-trial custody.

Sentencing Principles

[ 50 ] The fundamental principles of sentencing are set out in sections 718 , 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code . The purpose of sentencing, as set out in section 718 , is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to a respect of the law and the maintenance of a just and peaceful society. A just sentence shall serve one or more of the objectives identified in sections 718 (a) to (f), as follows:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

[ 51 ] Sentencing must take these factors into account. However, sentencing is an individualized exercise. R. v. Lacasse , 2015 SCC 64 , [2015] 2 S.C.R. 1089 . In engaging in that exercise and weighing these factors, I must also take the offender’s unique circumstances into account.

[ 52 ] The goal in every case is a fit, fair and principled sanction. In pursuing that goal, proportionality is the organizing principle: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 , [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366 at para. 10 . Accordingly, “all sentencing starts with the principle that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”: R. v. Friesen , 2020 SCC 9 , [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424 at para. 33 .

[ 53 ] In other words, as noted in Lacasse , at para 53 :

[53] This inquiry must be focused on the fundamental principle of proportionality stated in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code , which provides that a sentence must be “proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”. A sentence will therefore be demonstrably unfit if it constitutes an unreasonable departure from this principle. Proportionality is determined both on an individual basis, that is, in relation to the accused him or herself and to the offence committed by the accused, and by comparison with sentences imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. Individualization and parity of sentences must be reconciled for a sentence to be proportionate: s. 718.2 ( a ) and ( b ) of the Criminal Code .

[ 54 ] In assessing proportionality, I must consider both the individual circumstances of the offender (and the offence) and the sentences imposed for similar crimes.

[ 55 ] I also note that, in determining the appropriate sentence, a sentencing judge must consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender: Criminal Code, s. 718.2(a). A proper inventory of these is essential to evaluating the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility for committing the offence. The aggravating and mitigating factors serve to “push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences”: Nasogaluak, at para. 43.

Aggravating Factors

[ 56 ] There are a number of aggravating factors in this case. First, it is a significant aggravating factor that, with each of his offences, L.L. victimized K.D., his intimate partner. This is a statutorily aggravating factor ( s. 718.2 (a)(ii) of the Criminal Code . It magnifies the gravity of each of L.L.’s offences.

[ 57 ] Second, there is the effect that this crime had on K.D. Again, this is a statutory aggravating factor under section 718.2 (a)(iii.1). The victim impact statement from K.D. clearly sets out the significant impact that this has had on both her and her family. However, the impact of the crime on the victim and her family cannot unduly distort the otherwise appropriate penalty: R. v. Haggart , 2024 ONSC 5957 at para. 47 .

[ 58 ] Third, there is the fact that both of these crimes took place in K.D.’s home, a place that should have been safe for her. The first crimes, the sexual assault and the threats, were in essence part of a home invasion. This was not the classic home invasion of armed individuals arriving at the front door and gaining entrance. Instead, this was a break and enter. However, in my view, this is an aggravating factor because it was a violation of the sanctity and security that K.D. should have felt in her home: R. v Wright , 2006 40975 , (2006) 83 O.R. (3d) 427 at para. 14 .

[ 59 ] Before turning to the mitigating factors, it is necessary to address a further factor that the Crown argues is aggravating. The Crown argues that, although this was not arson endangering life as the house was known to be unoccupied, the damage caused by the fires and the fact that it might have endangered other properties is also aggravating. I do not view this as an aggravating factor, as the damage to the home is part of the effect of these crimes on K.D. More generally, the fact is that when a person commits arson, there is always the risk of damage to property and injury to people. In my view, this is inherent in the offence and not an aggravating factor.

Mitigating Factors

[ 60 ] In his argument, L.L.’s counsel set out seven different mitigating factors. I will review each of these in turn.

[ 61 ] First, L.L. is functionally a first-time offender. At the time that these offences occurred, he had no criminal record, and the Crown accepts this characterization. I also accept this as a mitigating factor in this case.

[ 62 ] Second, there is the significant amount of time that has passed since these offences took place. It has been more than six and a half years since L.L. committed these offences. In my view, the mere passage of time is not a mitigating factor. The fact that time has passed since the offence, without more, does not automatically imply a reduction in the sentence.

[ 63 ] However, what L.L. has done with that time, particularly since January of 2023, is a significant mitigating factor. He has addressed his significant substance abuse issues and has managed to keep himself sober for three years. He has also done considerable work in the community both telling his story and helping others on their own journeys to sobriety. This is a very significant mitigating factor.

[ 64 ] This brings me to the third mitigating factor in this case. In addition to his substance abuse disorder, L.L. also has depression and ADHD. Both of those conditions appear to have played a role in the substance abuse disorder and have made it more difficult for L.L. to overcome the substance abuse disorder.

[ 65 ] Fourth, there is the fact that L.L. appears (both from the PSR and his testimony at trial) to understand that what he did was wrong. He testified that he has no memory of the incident, but he also testified that he knows that he can never drink alcohol or consume other substances again. Through both his testimony before me and his advocacy work, L.L. has demonstrated insight into his past conduct, which is a mitigating factor.

[ 66 ] Fifth, there is the support that L.L. has from his friends, his family and his community. As I noted at paragraph 23 (c), more than thirty letters were filed by L.L.’s friends, family members and people he works with in the community. Those letters demonstrate that his family has supported L.L., that he has a support network in the community and that he has made an impact with all of the work that he has done in the community, particularly in the area of mental health.

[ 67 ] Sixth, and related to the fourth factor, is the fact that L.L. acknowledges that he has to make changes to himself and his behaviour given what happened with K.D. This speaks positively to L.L.’s rehabilitative potential and is a significant mitigating factor.

[ 68 ] The seventh factor that counsel advanced is the argument that, when all of these other factors are considered together, that the Court should view L.L. as a rehabilitative success. I will return to that issue in my discussion of the appropriate sentence in this case.

The Restrictive Bail Terms

[ 69 ] I start with a review of the bail conditions that L.L. was on. He was arrested on June 15 th , 2019. As noted at paragraph 49, he was in custody for 23 days, and was released on bail on July 8 th , 2019. At that point, his restrictions were to remain in his residence at all times, except for medical emergencies, in the direct presence of one of his sureties or while attending residential treatment. L.L. was also not permitted to drive a vehicle. There is no dispute between the parties that these were very strict bail conditions. They are akin to house arrest.

[ 70 ] L.L.’s bail conditions changed as follows:

a) June 30 th , 2020- a new surety was added to more easily facilitate L.L.’s attendance at A.A. meetings, and to permit L.L. to be employed by that surety.

b) July 9 th , 2021- to permit L.L. to drive a vehicle and to travel to and from work, and be at work, without a surety present.

c) On November 22 nd , 2022, L.L. was charged with the offences, as well as numerous other charges, in respect of P.M. He was originally held in jail for seven days and then released. His bail conditions in respect of those charges were strict.

d) On December 28 th , 2022, L.L. beached his bail conditions by attending at P.M.’s residence. He was then re-arrested and held pending a bail hearing. The total amount of custody was approximately 90 days.

e) Towards the end of March of 2023, L.L. was released on strict bail conditions that amounted to house arrest, similar to the conditions he had in June of 2019. As noted above, L.L. completed a further five-week residential rehabilitation program.

f) On October 17 th , 2023, L.L. pled guilty to three of the counts he faced in respect of P.M. He was sentenced to a conditional discharge, and his record reflected four and a half months of time served, or 90 days pre-sentence custody. He was also sentenced to twenty-four months probation and required to take a number of counselling courses. One of the charges that L.L. pled guilty to was a breach of his bail terms in respect of this matter.

g) On December 12 th , 2023, the bail conditions were varied to permit (once again) travel to work, A.A. and church meetings without the presence of a surety as well as accessing the computer and the internet in the presence of a surety. L.L. remained on GPS monitoring at that point.

h) On July 4 th , 2024, the bail conditions were varied to remove the GPS monitoring.

i) On October 11 th , 2024, house arrest was replaced with a curfew.

j) On February 14 th , 2025, the curfew was removed entirely.

[ 71 ] The trial in this matter was originally scheduled to commence on February 6 th , 2023. L.L. sought, and was given, an adjournment of the trial on December 9 th , 2022. The trial was re-scheduled for October 10 th , 2023. That date was adjourned on April 21 st , 2023, again at the request of the defence. The trial was re-scheduled for April 8 th , 2024.

[ 72 ] L.L. was on restrictive bail conditions when he was first charged with these offences. However, there were changes in his bail conditions over time. There was also the intervening event of the charges in respect of P.M. that affected L.L.’s liberty. As a result, I must consider the law in respect of restrictive bail conditions in some detail. The starting point is R. v. Downes , 2006 3957 , (2006) 79 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.) , where the Court noted (at para. 29):

[29] On the other hand, some of the same considerations that justify credit for pre-sentence custody apply to an offender who has spent a long time under house arrest. Stringent bail conditions, especially house arrest, represent an infringement on liberty and are, to that extent, inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence. House arrest is a form of punishment, albeit of a different character than actual incarceration. Pre-sentence house arrest varies little in character from the house arrest that is often imposed as a term of a conditional sentence under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code .

[ 73 ] These principles have been addressed in more recent cases. In R. v. Joseph , 2020 ONCA 733 , 153 O.R. (3d) 145 , the Court noted (at para. 108):

[108] The propriety of treating "stringent bail conditions, especially house arrest", as a sentencing consideration was affirmed in R. v. Downes (2006), 2006 3957 (ON CA) , 79 O.R. (3d) 321, [2006] O.J. No. 555, 205 C.C.C. (3d) 488 (C.A.), at para. 33 . Although it is not uncommon to speak of providing "credit" for stringent bail conditions, "pre-trial bail is conceptually a mitigating factor" in assessing a fit sentence: R. v. Panday (2007), 2007 ONCA 598 , 87 O.R. (3d) 1, [2007] O.J. No. 3377 (C.A.) [at para. 28]. Mitigation is given because stringent bail conditions can be punitive and therefore "akin" to custody: Downes , at para. 29 . The criteria to be considered in assessing the weight of the mitigation to be given therefore include the amount of time spent on bail conditions; the stringency of those conditions; their impact on the offender's liberty; and the ability of the offender to carry on normal relationships, employment and activity: R. v. Place , [2020] O.J. No. 3685, 2020 ONCA 546 (C.A.) , at para. 20 . The mitigating effect that such considerations have on the sentence to be imposed falls within the discretion of the trial judge: Downes , at para. 37 .

[ 74 ] In Joseph , the Court goes on to note (at para. 114) that the relevant inquiry is whether the bail conditions were punitive enough to be akin to punishment, thereby warranting mitigation. That requires a review of the effect of the bail conditions on the offender.

[ 75 ] In this case, I must also consider the reason for the restrictive bail conditions. The appropriateness of the conditions is not a relevant factor. However, the onus remains on the offender to establish the facts supporting the impact of the conditions: R. v. Place , 2020 ONSC 546 , at paras. 19 and 21 .

[ 76 ] More importantly, where an offender faces subsequent charges which result in more restrictive conditions on his liberty and is then convicted of at least some of those charges, the offender cannot establish that the bail conditions in the first case impacted his liberty. Those subsequent more restrictive conditions have been subsumed into the sentence flowing from the subsequent charges and conviction.

[ 77 ] In this case, therefore, L.L. is not entitled to any credit for restrictive bail conditions from the moment that he was charged with the offences in respect of P.M. on November 22 nd , 2022, to when he pled guilty to those offences on October 17 th , 2023.

[ 78 ] Similarly, the delays in the trial in this case were at the behest of L.L. Counsel for L.L. argued that the first adjournment, at least, was not L.L.’s responsibility. That may be, as then counsel got off the record. However, in permitting counsel to be removed from the record, the Court cannot inquire as to the reasons why counsel is no longer able to act, as those are privileged. The second adjournment was also at the behest of L.L. As a result, I am not persuaded that L.L. should be entitled to credit for restrictive bail conditions flowing from delays that were caused by his request for adjournments.

[ 79 ] However, pursuant to Downes , the offender is entitled to a reduction in his sentence for the time that he has spent under strict bail terms in relation to these charges. There is no hard and fast rule in the case-law as to what the credit should be. The period of strict bail conditions is from July 8 th , 2019 through to July 9 th , 2021, when L.L. was permitted to travel in the community on his own in certain circumstances. Some more limited credit should also be given for the time period between July 9 th , 2021, and the end of November 2022. While the restrictions in that time period were substantially lower, they were still restrictions that might exist in a conditional sentence and some mitigation should be given for them.

[ 80 ] On the other hand, between November of 2022 and trial, for the reasons set out at paragraphs 76 and 77, I am not persuaded that there should be any reduction in L.L.’s sentence on account of the bail conditions. To those reasons, I would add that, by October of 2024, the conditions on L.L. were very limited, and were not the sort of conditions that would be imposed in a conditional sentence.

The SOIRA Term

[ 81 ] Before turning to the fit sentence, I must also address the dispute between the parties over whether L.L. should be required to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (“ SOIRA” ). Under section 490.012 (1), L.L. has been convicted of a designated offence (sexual assault) and under section 490.013(2)(b), this order would be for twenty (20) years.

[ 82 ] The order is presumptive and not mandatory. Under section 490.012(3), there are two circumstances in which the court can decline to make the order. The offender must satisfy the Court that:

(a) there would be no connection between making the order and the purpose of helping police services prevent or investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act; or

(b) the impact of the order on the person, including on their privacy or liberty, would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society through the effective prevention or investigation of crimes of a sexual nature, to be achieved by the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act.

[ 83 ] In this case, L.L.’s counsel argues that the SOIRA term should not be imposed given both the mitigating factors in this case and the fact that L.L. will be caught by Christopher’s Law (Sex Offender Registry), 2000 , S.O. 2000, c. 1. I start with the argument in respect of Christopher’s Law . That registry is a provincial registry, and the SOIRA registry is national. As a result, they are designed to accomplish different, if overlapping, goals. I have no idea what L.L.’s future holds, and he may move somewhere else in Canada. As a result, I do not find the argument that he should be kept off the national registry because he is on the provincial registry to be persuasive.

[ 84 ] This brings me to the argument that the imposition of a SOIRA order would be grossly disproportionate and/or that there would be no connection between the order and the purpose of helping the police investigate or prevent crimes. In support of this argument, L.L.’s counsel directs my attention to the decision in R. v. A.R. , 2024 ONSC 3786 .

[ 85 ] In A.R. , the court was considering a case where the accused had engaged in two separate sexual assaults involving touching. These two sexual assaults were also accompanied by physical assaults. Having reviewed the facts extensively, Barnes J. concluded that a SOIRA order was not necessary. He stated (at para. 103):

[103] The mitigating factors suggest the prospects for rehabilitation are promising. He is currently involved in therapy. He has completed the PARS program; he has been on a lengthy bail with no incident. He is currently in a relationship with no reported incidents. He has no criminal record. All indications are that his risk of reoffending is low. These factors significantly assuage any concerns of reoffending raised by the absence of an expression of remorse and questions about whether he has insight into his offences and the harm his actions have caused the complainants. For all these reasons, I conclude that there is a low risk that A.R. will re-offend and decline to order that he be subject to the terms of SOIRA .

[ 86 ] In R. v. Wicker , 2025 ONSC 930 , the Court was faced with a case of domestic violence involving a sexual assault. The Court determined that the SOIRA order was not necessary, as there had never been any issue in terms of the identity of the offender. The offender had not tried to evade police and he lived in a small community. As a result, there would be no issue with them locating him.

[ 87 ] In this case, I am persuaded that the SOIRA term is not necessary. I note that the fact that L.L. has become sober is not the principal reason that the SOIRA term is not necessary. There is always the possibility of a relapse, as happened between these charges and the charges involving P.M. However, L.L.’s offences have all been directed at an intimate partner and not a stranger. As a result, it is unlikely that a SOIRA order will help in investigating any future offences, and I view it as unnecessary in this case given how intrusive it is.

The Fit Sentence

[ 88 ] In determining what the fit sentence for these incidents are, I must consider both the appropriate sentence for the sexual assault and the appropriate sentence for the arson. I must then consider the principle of proportionality in looking at the global sentence.

[ 89 ] I acknowledge that L.L. was found guilty of other offences as a result of both the May and June incidents. However, the sentences for those offences will be shorter than the sentence for either sexual assault or arson and will be served concurrently with those sentences.

Sexual Assault Sentences

[ 90 ] Sexual assaults are serious and substantial violations of the personal integrity of the victim, and they can have a long-lasting impact on the victim. As the Court of Appeal explained in R. v. Brown , 2020 ONCA 657 , (2020) 152 O.R. (3d) 650 (at para. 59 ):

[59] Sexual offences raise particular considerations in the proportionality analysis. In R. v. Friesen , [2019] S.C.J. No. 100, 2020 SCC 9 , 444 D.L.R. (4th) 1, the Supreme Court said, at para. 75: "In particular, courts need to take into account the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual offences against children when applying the proportionality principle. Accurately understanding both factors is key to imposing a proportionate sentence." There is no reason to think that it does not also apply to sexual offences at large. As the Supreme Court observed, "taking the harmfulness of these offences into account ensures that the sentence fully reflects the 'life-altering consequences' that can and often do flow from the sexual violence": Friesen , at para. 74 .

[ 91 ] I also note the observations of Rahman J. (as he then was) in R. v. Allen , 2017 ONCJ 405 . In that case, the victim had been forced to perform oral sex on the accused. The Crown asked for a sentence of between 20 and 26 months. Rahman J. invited submissions from the parties, as he was concerned that the Crown’s position was too low. A sentence of three years, less time served, was imposed. In imposing this sentence, Rahman J. stated (at para. 35):

[35] I recognize that sexual assaults involving vaginal penetration pose different risks than those involving oral penetration, including an increased chance of disease transmission, and internal injuries. However, I do not think which part of a victim’s body is the subject of a sexual assault should have such a large bearing on the range of sentence, where an offender commits what is otherwise a violent and invasive sexual assault. The presence or absence of vaginal penetration as a major factor that moves a sentence in or out of the penitentiary range may be seen as trivializing serious sexual assaults like the one committed by the offender. Parliament repealed the crime of rape over 30 years ago. It does not seem appropriate to re-create it judicially by putting “rapes” in a different category than other sexual assaults.

[ 92 ] In Allen , the Court noted that it was more appropriate to look at the full picture of the assault and its’ aggravating features.

[ 93 ] In support of the Crown’s position that a sentence of four years for the sexual assault is appropriate, I was directed to several decisions. While sentencing is an individualized exercise, parity is also a factor that the Court must consider. I have reviewed all of these decisions and will extract some principles from the cases.

[ 94 ] First, in R. v. U.A. , 2019 ONCA 946 , the Court of Appeal considered a case where one cellmate forced the other cellmate to engage in oral sex on three separate occasions on the same day. The Court upheld a sentence of four years’ imprisonment, noting (at para. 11) that three-to-five-year sentences were generally the appropriate range for this type of conduct. In R. v. S.A. , 2014 ONCA 266 , the Court of Appeal noted that taking two consecutive dates to a secluded area, threatening violence and coercing oral sex required a penitentiary term.

[ 95 ] In R. v. Alkhalil , the Defendant was convicted of a sexual assault and unlawful confinement. He was 40 at the time of the offences. He found a 17 year old runaway in the parking lot of a closed coffee shop and invited her to enter his car. She accepted, thinking that he would take her to an open coffee shop. Instead, he took her to a parking lot and forced her to perform oral sex on him. He then drove her back to the parking lot. He was given a sentence of six years for the sex assault and three years concurrent for the unlawful confinement.

[ 96 ] I draw two key principles out of these decisions. First, in most if not all cases, a penitentiary term is going to be necessary for these types of offences. That is because of the serious nature of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence. Second, the fact that penetrative sex did not take place in this case does not lessen the offence.

[ 97 ] As a result, I am of the view that the Crown’s sentence of four years for the sexual assault is entirely reasonable and, absent mitigating factors, would be the sentence that I would impose.

The Arson Sentences

[ 98 ] In this case, the conviction for arson was under section 434 of the Criminal Code . It is the section that deals with the intentional or reckless damaging of property by fire. For this offence, the Crown has also provided me with a series of cases that I have reviewed. For arson, the sentences range from a low of six months to a high of three to four years. The sentences at the higher end of the range in arson tend to involve an element of endangering life, which is a different provision of the Criminal Code . I will now review some of the offences.

[ 99 ] In R. v. Garcia , 2019 ONSC 5095 , the offender deliberately set a fire in her apartment, which was a public housing entity. She then bolted the door, and the firefighters had to break the door down. There was approximately $16,000 in damage to the unit. The Court found that a sentence of twelve months was appropriate in that case, taking into account the limited mitigating factors.

[ 100 ] In R. v. O’Hanley , 2020 ONSC 1310 , the offender was in a relationship with the victim. He got into an argument at the victim’s residence. He then left, but returned when the property was vacant. He set fire to the property, resulting in its complete destruction. The Court noted (at paras. 52 and 53):

[52] I acknowledge and applaud all that Mr. O’Hanley has done since these charges were laid. He has been of good behaviour, maintained excellent employment with a reputable bridge contractor that values his services. As mentioned, it is significant that he recently obtained his Provincial Red Seal certification.

[53] However, these efforts, while laudable, cannot fully overtake the requirement that in these circumstances a conviction for arson, even by a first-time offender, requires a period of incarceration necessary to give appropriate gravitas to the principles of denunciation and deterrence. Persons in our society need to be aware that arson is a serious offence that carries with it (except in the most extreme circumstances) a period of incarceration.

[ 101 ] A conditional sentence for an arson alone would be an unusually low sentence, even when there are significant extenuating circumstances. If the accused was only charged with arson, the circumstances in this case might meet the “most extreme circumstances” that King J. refers to and justify a conditional sentence rather than a period of incarceration. However, the arson charge is coupled with a sexual assault charge from a different series of events. A conditional sentence is not supportable on these facts.

Final Analysis

[ 102 ] In his submissions, L.L.’s counsel made the point that, if L.L. had gone to jail and served his sentence, society would view him as a rehabilitative success. He has achieved the end goal of the sentencing process, so we should not sentence him to a period of incarceration. As a result, L.L. should be permitted to serve a conditional sentence.

[ 103 ] One of the goals of sentencing is rehabilitation, and I accept that, on the facts of this case, that goal might be achievable through a conditional sentence. The offender has, in the last three years worked hard to try and turn his life around and, in many ways, has succeeded. However, that is not the only goal in the sentencing process. There is also denunciation and deterrence, both specific and general. I have less concern about specific deterrence in this case.

[ 104 ] However, general deterrence remains important. Further, the cases all note that a conditional discharge for either the sexual assault or the arson would be a very exceptional outcome. When I step back and consider that the accused is charged with both offences, flowing from different incidents, I am of the view that a conditional sentence is not proportional in this case. Further, there is the fact that, in both cases, L.L. targeted his intimate partner in these offences. Under the influence of substances or not, that is still a very significant aggravating factor.

[ 105 ] For these reasons, I impose the following sentence on L.L.:

a) For Count 5, the sexual assault, three and a half years;

b) For Count 3, uttering threats to kill, six months concurrent to Count 5;

c) For Count 4, uttering threats to property, six months concurrent to Count 5;

d) For count 8, arson, two years consecutive to Counts 3 to 5;

e) For count 9, breaking and entering with intent, two years concurrent to Count 8 but consecutive to Counts 3 to 5.

[ 106 ] This produces a total sentence of five and a half years. Under the totality principle and considering the circumstances of L.L., I would find that a global sentence of four years would be appropriate and would reduce the total sentence accordingly.

[ 107 ] In addition, L.L. is entitled to further mitigation for the time that was spent on restrictive bail conditions. In my view, that should result in a reduction of his sentence of twelve months, for a global total sentence of three years, less the 35 days credit for the time spent in pre-trial custody. As a result, L.L. will serve two years, ten months and twenty-five days.

[ 108 ] In addition, the following orders will be made:

a) A DNA Order pursuant to s. 487.051 to attach to all counts;

b) A non communication order pursuant to s. 743.21 in respect of K.D. and her immediate family members, including her father;

c) A weapons prohibition pursuant to s. 109 for life to attach to Counts 3, 4, 5 and 8.

[ 109 ] I thank counsel for their clear and helpful submissions in this matter.

LEMAY J

Released: February 24, 2026